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I:NTRODUCTIOlf: ;_ 
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF AFRICAN ARMED FORCE 1 
From time immemorial 9African societies have had th~ means ot 
protecting themsGlvesoit used to be the duty of all abl0 &died 
men in BF:tf given society 9 to takG up su~.h woapons as stone~ 9bows, 
and arrous 9 spoaro 9 clubs and dane gu.ns;in the defense of their 
., 
village or societyo 
Organized Armed Forees,as we know them today,was not in e%i-
etenee9in man;r African societieeoin other words 9there were no 
professional soldiers,and no standing army existed in time ot 
peace. 
The histo17 of organized Afriean Armed Forces dated baclc 
· to the colonial era,i~ most -casesoThe colonial administrators 
organiz~d thQse native@ into r@gular Armed Forces 9and used them 
in achieving their objectivesoNigeria presents a case in peint. 
For exampl@ 9from I90I ~I9049native soldiers from Southern Nige-
ria were used by the British,to conquer the Northern part of 
. '.. llj,, ·-~ ... · .-
Nigeriae _ 
--:;---=--
Also,dua'ing World War I and World War II,soldiers of diff-
erent African nations were used by their so called •colonial mas-
ters', to defeat their anemie@oHan.ee 9Nigerian soldiers fought in 
the jungles of Btlrma. 9 against the Japanese 9to secu.re the British 
colonies of India~Burma9IVLalaya 9Singapore and otharsoTh.ey also 
fought i~ East Mrica 9against thG Italians to liberatG Ethiopia, 
and also to makG Keeya!JUganda1and the rest of the British East 
African colonies saf0 for Britaine 
We ne@d ~Qt easumG that only Nigerian native aoldiera were 
used in this wayoGh~na 9 then l0;1oini as Gold Ooast,and other British 
colonies in Afric&~met the same fateo 
, , 
' . 
Nor must W® even b.elievG that Britain was the only offender 
o· 
in this respeotoOther EuropOan colonial power~ did exactly th0 
same thingoVietoroDoDuJ3ois,in one of his articles in Africa Report, 
has this to say: 
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":Before indepencence in 1958,Guinea soldiers;~ .. ,. 1 
served in regular French Army units,comp@sed 
entirely of Africanso·ii/Ianzy of them S8't1 action 
in Europe durin~ fjorld tJar II9and in Indo=China." I 
···-
' ' 't 
After Guinea opted for independence in \\le referendum of Sept~ 
ember I958 9 France almost at onoe began to repatriate Guinaana then 
serving in its arnw o Thus 91-1ha tever Arrey- Guinea 11011 ham1, is an inhe-
ri tanoe from the French colonial administration.The following quo-
tation testifies to this assertions 
"The withdrawal of the last detatch ot French 
troops from Mangin Casernes in Conakry,on No-
vember 30,I9589 opened th~ way for occupation 
of Guinean forces of all fo~mer French milit-
ary installationso 
From the territorial gendarmGrie establi-
shed by the French9and from the ranks of the 
new returning veterans 9President Toure proce-
eded to build his neir army- o 
·within the first threa months of independ-
enoe,Guinea0s Ar'iff3 had reached a strength of 
2,000 officers and men." 2 
· .... 
It could be said with some degree of truthfulness,that near]Jr·., 
· all African nations had armed forces whose reasons for existen-
ce,in the first place~were not based on the need f0r the defen-
ce of their territorial integrity and national seourityo 
This marked the difference betirreon the armed forces in indep-
endent African coun'triea ax1.d their ccunterparts 51 say i1f.t the Uni-
ted States or many other W9stol?'ll countriesoAfrioans in uniform,. 
saw themselves as mere mercenariessiserving the iihi te ..... man°s nee-
ds.Quite often9 they 11ero used against their 01m peopl00For exa-
mples, in I949 ~it lies lligerians in military uniforms, chiefly from 
the Nortb. 9 1:<rho 1·1ere used by the British commamding officers 9 to 
gun doim the defenceless striking ooa.l miners in Enugu.,Ea.stern 
N'igariao 
In another instanoe,the French pitted the Algerians against 
--
'' D l!l --'· 
... JL ... -.'".{i_;.,_~ ------·-· -==· ~~c-· ------------..-----------~~---~--------------------------~~ I l , •• , ",.'.--, :.· ··!.1., 
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their fellow seven bloolfy years,in the Algerian 
civil i--1ar 9i1hich finally ended i11. Algsria.n indc:r,endenc00 
The truth therGfcoro 9 is th&t 9 righ.t from th® begim1ing9 the Afr-
ican aoldiGrs were never trained to defend th0ir oin1 p~opls or 
natio110Their nations never existed9and their people i1ere mere 
agit~tors 9 trouble m~k0rs 9and most of them9di~gruntled el~ments. 
Even in K®nya 9Jomo KeID;yatta 9now th@ highly respected President 
of Keny0:9 i-1as once desori bed as 9 1'The leader of da1'")knesH3 and death." 
' 
Many .African pol·itiool thinkers,ther0fore 9 believ@d vecy stro-
ngly the" t these African soldiers 9 irere toole for suppression of 
·their Cftm peopl® 9in the hands of the European colonialistIBoThis 
was one of the reasons i:rby 9 they argued 9 Gr@at Bri tain 9 in her glo-
rious days 9with a populati©n far less than 50 million;iras able 
to keep well over 700 million people,all over the world,under her 
rule , for centuries. 
THE PRESENT COUPS IN AFRICA: 
1Ihe present coups in Afrioa. 9 can be traced back to the very- fo-
undations of the armed forces of these various African'nations. 
Their task was not to protect their own people,but to oppress,cr-
. ush and suppress th®mo 
To make sure that th0 arntr remained permanently their servant 
and tool 9majority of the African soldiers were treated as inferi-- . 
ors by their European counterpartsoThis is possibly also 9 to rid 
them of their· pride and anJr form of &mbi tien;for as 11e have to n-
Gte, they 9 thG African soldiers 9w@re always in the nwJjority in the-
se coloniesoAs President Sekou ~cure of Guinea Republic once obs-
erv®d9 th0 French 't"rrere very notorious also in this respect.He wa1 
on record as saying: 
"African soldiers were severely disoriminated 
again.at in virtually every aspect of French 
military lifeo They irore treated as inferiors 
in matters of pay 9 rank9housing and promotion; 
although Fr~nce made freo use of thom to f~ght 
her var.:kous tiara o 00 3 
I 
f' 
•. 
-6-
This policy recoiled upon the Belgians in Congoe On attainment 
of independ®n@e 9 the Congolese soldiers sat:"1 it as their t'urn to 
lo1~d it over the lBJslgian officers irho had been mistrea"ting them 
for yearso Th.e out coma a.~ we all know 1-1as veey disa,sterou.so In 
ma1,;r other cases 9~e ses th® arnzy- 11recking vengance on their 011n 
peoplso To assert their importance in the society 9 th® army often 
fall baclt on their old enemies. 9 the p@li ticiane 9 whom th®y 1:rere 
taught to .cru.sh and oppresso With the granting of independence 9 
the armw saw these old foes as their new masters;and this they 
could not1 stando Eaing equipped in most cases i;ri th modern i:raapons, 
they sta't'1 nothing standing b®tireen them and pci11ero The abuse of · 
power by these politicians made the temptation to sieze power a-
ll the more irresistablao 
People always wonder whether African military coup d' etats 
are ilo.fectious or· contage,ouso They e1re note The reason behind 
their resemblance is that thay are all patterned the same way. 
Whether the colonial power iras Britain9 France or Belgium9 they 
all had one aim in mind while establishing Armed Forces in 
AfricaoThat aim ·wae to use them (African Armed Forces) against 
. 
th\ir oim. people; in order that th@# (colonialists) could achi~ 
eve their objectives ce====== The Partition of A:fricao 
For this reason 9 it becomes apt to call these African sold-
iers of the era lre are talking about 9 11 Armies of Occupation.' 
Ta.king a look at Ou.inea again9 one sees where African soldiers 
played this very role openly. 
"When Guinea was French, the arrival of soldiers 
... ,U - French or African===in the toims a11d 
villages 9 invariably caused uneas;pnesa ==-=2 = if· 
not outright fearo Soldiers were -symbol of the 
PrtH.ste11ce oolonia].e 9 ix1 them 9 imperial might 
became a reality o Soldiers "t':rere notorious as 
.. 'pacifiers 9 of 0native disturbances O and ne11s 
of their excess spraS1d rapidly o ou 4 
___ IL 
.. ' ·-'·"' :- :- ~ ··-
:> ' . 
·,,... 7 
' - -
In one instance 9 James Smuts of South .Afrioa,the celebrated 
"l hero of 1'1orld t1Jar I 9 admonished the colonial poirers not to a.rm t-. 
he nativesoHis fear 1ms that tho nat~_V®f soldiGrs might rise up a-
gainst 1xrhitGaaman9 not only in South Af1')ica 9 but in the "t"rholo conti-
nent of Africa~and set mother Africa free for ever,from foreign 
dominationoin his book=== 0 The Role of the Military in Underdevel-
oped Countries',--J.J.Johnson quoted James Smuts as saying: 
•1 hope that one of the results of this war will 
.:t>• ·some· arrangements or convention among the na-
tions interested in Cantrel Africa9by which the 
military training of the natives in that area w-ill be prevented, as we have prevented it in Sou-
th Africa. 0 5 
\ 
He said this in I9I7.Th.us again,it goe·s. to show that the nat-
ive Africans were given military training,on]Jr when the colonia-
lists felt that it 1-rajs safe to do soo 
This device iras quite a success 9for African soldiers played 
very little role in winning independence for their own.people. 
Even in Kenya 9 rathQr than organize the people 9 the a~ helped t-
he British in supirasaing th© Mau W~uoNo wonder the al:l1{f has got 
such a very 101"1 status in maey African countriesoThe case of Ken-
ya cited here 9 is not in al"lY 1~y an endorsement of the Mau Mau,but 
· just to shot1 hoi:r isolated the African armed forces were from the 
·"". · aspirations of their 01·m peoplee 
So'far,we have seen why the ·African armed forces never felt 
that it "tJa~ their primary duty to serve and protect their Olm pe-
opleo They also sair nothing 11rong in siQzing poi1er~as they have d-
one in many African co'UlltriesoThere is no effort here to exonera-
te the armed forces 9 in the~e African countriesoOn the comtraJ:7, 
this is meraly an attempt to fi,ad a logical reason as to wlcy:1 th-
ey behaved in this 1ray0So 9 if -c:re blame them for· 1rhat they did,i t 
is also good to bear in mind altra.y~ 9 why they did ito'lhe col0nia-
lists left this evil behind as they sang their political 'Nunc 
Dimi"htis' in Africa. 
f • - wr .. - ,- ·-; . -36-
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The army in itself is not a bad thing to have in a oountry,but 
the reason for having it must be clear g.,.c.,I~ational Dafence and ma-
. 1 
intenance of i!i1ternal se@UJ:i>i tjroAs ire have ~een9 "this i:-l'aEJ faJ: from 
the ~so in the creation of these African armed forces by foreign 
powers. 
. 
It is interesting to note that some African countries are do-
ing something to correct this situation~Those who have neglected 
reforms 9 have Ullf@rtunatsly 9 paid a big price for th~ir negligence. 
Some have paid 1,ri th their lives lik:e Sylva.nus Olympia of:t the Re1-
ublio of Togo;others like Ben Bella of Algeria,have been put in 
prison;and still 9 others like Dr.Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana 9have gone 
into some kind of.exileo 
It ca.,n be said that even · those civilian leaders who are still 
in power 9 are not quite sure how much longer they are going to be 
able to hold on to P<>"t-rero The 1:1asw things seam to be going, coups 
and oou:nter=-cc@ups,seem to be ver.1;1 common in AfricaoThis_ is wh7 
man.v people believe that a revolution. of some sort,is 
ace in Africa. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
THE ImED FOR A NATIONAL ARMY t 
Th.ere are numerous reasons -r1hJjr nations :feel that they should 
have Armed Forces 9 and African nations are no exceptiono Some 
. are genuine J'fe8.,sona others ~re 1r1oto Im the case of maey Afri-
can 00U11tries 9 of great®r practical significance are the effe-
cts of the devel~pment process on the fabric of these sooiet-
iesoThe internal se©Urity problem frsquently assumes levels 
. 
of violsnes too high to be dealt with by a police forceoArm-
.· ed Forces then becom® necese~x-y for internal security purpo-
ses9and the frequent or regular injection of the arntr into 
this situation poses dilemmas about size 9 equipment and cont-
roloif an arnw is in effect to become a police force 9 these 
problems shuuld be treated differently than if it is to dea-
l with external de:f~ta.e~ or even with insurgency problems. 
In the underdeveloped oountries 9armies are thus often cal-
led upon to deal with all three types of .violence necessita-
ting a variety of capabilitiesoSome of these overlap 9 but th-
ere is undoubtedly a deg:.radation factor involved in the tra-
nsfer of forces from one function to anothero A oou11try in 
such a position is limited in its ability to take advantage 
of economic and other benefits of speoialization9unless it 
receives outside assistanceo 0£ oourse 9many African nations 
do reooivte outsid® military asaistanceoit is really ve-:cy- ha-
rd to t0ll whether this has enabled them to talce advantage 
of economic and other ben®fit~ of specializationo 
Chief Obafemi Awolowo of Nigaria9 quaationed the reason 
behind the arms race in Africao He was very much concerned 
about the fact that Nigeria iras spending quite a lot on . 
military equipmentsoH® made hie position on this iaeu® cle-
ar both in debates in Parliament in Lagos,Nigeria,and also 
in his book called 'Awo. ' . 
- ------, 
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Chief Awolowo was on record as sayings 
"There has been a great clamour in recent times for 
the enlargement of our Arrny,and our Navy (such as 
we have() )and for tl1a establishment of a strong Air 
Forceo Whom are we arming against 9 ourselves or our 
neighbours? . 
It is often overlooked that these things cost a 
lot of moneyo Our peopl® are peace~loving9and our 
immediate neighbours are friendlyoNo t®r~itorial 
claims have been mads to @ur soil 9 and present tren-
ds suggest tha .. , no claims a.re likely to be made to 
:,_r our soil in the~ f oreseable fu tureo I am sure tha. t 
we on our part,have no evil designs on our neigh-
bours eithero , 
· Reports that one of our neighbours is making at-
tempts to subvert constituted authority in Nigeria 
must not be discountedo Bu.t the surest way to fru-
strate suQh attempts is the prosecution of sound 
domestic polioies~which redound on the general we-
,· 11-being of our people. 11 I 
Taking a_ closer look at this statement accredited to Chief. Aw-
olowo who is a leading African nationalist,one can reach the f-
01101,ing ·conclusion& There seems to exist a profou.Dd ignorance 
among some African politicians (who had sucoessf\llly followed. 
tAe_advice to seek first the political kingdom) 9not only of the 
function of the Armed Foro®s 9 but even in the vaguest terms,of 
their equipment 9organization9 and capabilitieso 
This becomes more clearly so when one realises that,Awolowo 
is not alone in this hos·tili ty tot1ards the notion of expansion 
of the militaryo Airolo~rousr vie1rs 9held also by other African po-
litical leaders 9especially' in eotu1tries South of the Sahara;mi-
ght explain away the rea~on 1fl\y Arab countries spend more on 
Armed Forces than the rest of Afrioao Thus 9 on® might say that 
Awolowons obsei"tl'ations never fell on deaf earso Ne need not co-
elude that Chief Ai;rolotro and all those rJho think like him beli-
eved that there should be total demobilization in all Af~ican 
countrieso Th® idea simply is that the excessive arms race as 
we see taking pla~ now in Africa,is unnecessary. 
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William Gutteridge expressed his views on Armed Forces in what 
he called ONew Statesio In hia support for the existence of the 
Armed Forces in new nations ,he has this to say: 
"New natione,even more than old,depend for their 
existence on the integrity of their Armed Forces: 
the most intelligent9sxpsrienoed and well meaning government may not survive 9 if the arm;r is corrupt. 
A nation which has just become indspendent of c-
olonial rule is lil~ely to bs faced with a lack of 
internal oohesion,and in the la§lt resort, the army. 
may be the cement to hold the State together." 2 
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·True as this observation of Mr. Gutteridge may be,there is no 
doubting the fact that many African countries are spending more 
on the Armed Forces than is necessaryo The t~sk of maintaining 
internal security and frontier defens® could probably have been 
left to the polioe 9which in both French and British territories 
contained para~milita:r:r units;and which had the advantage of be-
:;/ ing both considerably cheaper and less provocative to neighbou-
ring countrieso Instead, what did we see? With the minor exeep-, 
tiona of Gambia and the pre~revolutionaxy. Sultanate of Zanzibar, 
every African count:Iy has~ far more number of soldiers than is 
necesr:u.=tcyo The inclination in moat of th<ese countries is still ··. 
towards expaneion of the Armsd Forceso P:reaidsnt Julius I\fyerere 
of Tanzania among othera,justified this move by terming it an 
iinavoidable precaution."-He was also on record as saying: 
these times. u 3 
NATIONAL PRESTIGES 
Another factor that is'playing a major part is the 
national prestigeo '!he late President Sylva.nus Olympio of Togo, 
when explaining the rev0rsal of hia decision that Togo should 
not have arzy- a.rnzy" has this to say : 
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·. "lfe cannot be an independent nation without an arlJ\1 
of some sort." 4 
i 
,,··ti 
•I .1 
I 
to indicate that national prestige motivated thi~ It thus gc,es 
.r ' ~ . 
change of heart in the Togolese foreign policy 9 as uell as her 
policy towards armamentso Th.is same feeling of natic:mal prestige 
was reinforced by the United Nation°~ Congo Operation, from which . 
those states .that contributed troops gained considerable kudos. 
. PARADES: 
i1hese days,independence anniversary celebrations in vario-
us African countries look very much like 'May Day' celebrations 
in Moscowo Foreign. diplomats are usually invited to the city a~ 
r·· enters in these African countries to l1i tnsss a sho1r o:f might,The 
pity of it is that they are no batter than toys in the ®yes of 
militar:y experts from developed nationso Even so 911e might call 
,,. them the most expensive toys the 1rorld has ever knownoFu.11 data-. 
·., 
ils as to their cost in terms of .the Gross National Produ~t(G.N.P.) 
will be f@tlhd in 4ppendix Ao 
A country like Ghana under Dr.Kwame Nkrumah was,according 
to this information,speno ..ing as much as $35 million on defense·; 
while Nigeria, undsr Balev1a9 1ias a close runner up 11i th as high as 
1330 6 millio110 't'lli.sn one compares "~has0 two fi~es iii .. th Egypt's 
1320 million9 and Algeria 9s $100 million9 the difference becomes 
staggeringo These funds -c~rere in most oases spent for out--moded 
and out datad weaponso 
One example of this show of might took place in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 9 in M...ay of r9660 Many observers believed that the Emper-
or lra.nted to display morat of his ne-vrly acquired ireapons so as 
to lra.rn hi~ Somali neighbours 9 that ha ~as determined not to gi-
ve up in their border disputeo Guests were invited· from all 
over the worldo The da~ i1a.s declared a public holiday in the wh-
ole Empire of Ethiopia. 
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The Haile Selassie I University had·to be closed also for t
his 
august occasiono One msi.,y askc= = Can a poor· country lik:e 
Ethiopia 
afford this loss.· in manpoi;ier? The ans1ier of courss is i== 
No. 
This is the price that must be paid for national prestigeo 
.·· As one 11ould expsct 9 most of the i:reapons on display t1ere e
ither 
obsolete or very inappropriate for "C:raging th® real i1ars o
:f tod-
8:3', such as is going on in Viet Namo Tb.a very old ones "
t·rere re:p-
ainted to look n@'t"Ye A ferc1 that 1:1ere n®ir such a~ the Super
 Soni_o 
Jet Bombere 9 needed foreign. pilots~since ths Ethiopian pilots
 c-
ould not fly them and the Emp®ror wanted them to appear on th
e 
sho1r veI7 badly o He 1r1as beaming with smiles when these 
ne11ly a-
cquired Jets 9about six of them 9 took to the airo This show
 of 
might 1ras very unnecessary and 1-1hat is more, the whole pp
eration 
cost the Ethiopian government over a million dollars she 
could ~,. 
ill affordo 
Dro Kl~rame Nkrumah an~ President Gamal Abdul Nasser of E
gypt 
have also gone down in histo:cy- as two African leaders who,am
ong 
other things love to parade their Armed Forces as status sym
bol. 
Little by little 9 the African nations began to build up their
 Ar-
med Forceso Appendix Bo tells us how far they went in this v
ery 
\ 
unnecessary competitiono 
Most o:f these mili tacy personnel met the needs of .their 
nat-
ions in various 11a.yso The Nigerian arrey- ·was a good examp
le in 
this respect 9 before they got involved in the JanuaJzy" c
oup of 
I966. An observer made these remarks about the Nigerian arllzy", 
"By the standard of developing countries,the Nige-
rian Army and Navy were very good indeedo In faot., . 
by. aYrzy" eta.ndards 9Nigarians have a considerable r-
ecord in the fieldo They fought ,~:rell in · Ea.st Af-
rica against the Italians~and in Burma against t-
he Japaneseo T14eir :psrformance in the Congo show-
ed that th®y had no equal in Africa excapt possi-
bly the Ghanaian~ in coolness and efficienc.y und-
er trying conditionso · 
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"'lb.eir actions· in aid of the civil power were always 
sup.erbo During the Tiv troubles (Northa1~n Nigeria), 
they retained the respect of th0 local residents e-
ven i1hen the police had l4)st i to 
They could alt1ays be depended on:_i .to see fair pl-
ay at election time 9indeed9 the only thing they cou-
ld not be depended on to do was to see foul play as 
the Western Region election of I965o T.b.eir disgust 
at being expected t.o do this lras,of oourse 9 one of 
the factors in the .subsequent coup d' etat." 5 
. ·; 
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_ KA.TIONAL UNITI: 
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Those who would argue without any reservation that the army 
· creates a foru.m for national unity should look at Nigeria and s-
ee that this is not necessarily soo In the former Federation of 
Nigeria before the· coup 9 one of the chief sources of officers and 
skill~d men was th® Ibo tribeo In I960 9 three quarters of the Af-
rican officers in the Nigerian Army i·re:ra Iboso Complaints and 
opposition from other tribal g??oups resulted in the proportion 
being deliberately redressedo Thia move was not in the national 
interest but was rather a tribal mattero Junior officers were p-
romoted to the posts they ,;rere illc=qualifisd 9 just to pleasG the-
ir tribal g.roupso 'tr1e must not forget that efficiency had to suf-
fero In other words 9 military efficiency was sacrificed at the . 
altar of tribal jealousye 
'Whether it was out of fear of Ibo domination of the Nigerian 
Armed Forces,or a:ny other reason 9 the then Prime Minister was not 
in favour o:r expanding tha Nigerian .Arnzy-o He made a. lengthy sta-
tement in the Nigerian Parliament in defense of this policy. He 
was on record as sayings 
"We in Nigeria regard every country -in Africa as 
an equal 9 big or small 9and we have reasons for s-
ticking to this policyo 
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"In other continents, the countries are not evenly 
divided in size or in population9and this does 
not necessarily mal~e big countries wish to domi-
nate the small oneso 
If l'Je 11ant peace in .Africa 9 it is most importa-
nt that tie should regard the big and small coun=-
. tries according to their present boundries 9 a~ 
being equal to ourselveso If we conduct ours®lv-
es w®ll 9 and if w® appear well meaning to the oo-
untriss of Africa 9 there is no reason why they s-
hould not give to us our recognized position by 
virtue of our siz® and population 9but it is not 
for us to go out to sho,;;; to the smaller nations 
that 1·re are big in size and population and the-
reforG they have to come trailing behind us. I 
think that it is a 't·rrong thing to doo 
All that ire pray for in Africa is that there 
will. be peace and stabili tyo If there is to be_ 
peace and stability 9 the countriss in Africa mu-
st maintain the closest f~iendly relations with 
one anothero As I have said before,I have seen 
no point at all in Nigeria having to station t-
roops along the border between us and Dahomey, 
betr1een us and the Chad Republic 9 or bett1een us L~.-~ 
and the Niger Republico 
lfe in the Federal Government believe ·that 
all oountria~ in Africa should be given a cha-
nce to develop in the 't'ray they think is right 
for them9 and it is not our business to interf-
ere in the internal affairs of these countries. 
But it is our policy that we should do our be-
st t~ bring about closer und®rstanding9 to bri-
ng about more exchange of visits and ideas be-
tween the countries of Africa." 6 
'; 
' ' ' "'9 
' '· ,' ' .-. ,,_' 
Obviousl.7, the Nigerian A?aJ.Y was not helping in any ft7 to un-
ify the oountryo Hoirever,Balewa was very si11cere in his policy 
towards th@} arrrzy-o ~ne strength of the Nigerian Army before the 
coup testified to his sincerityo :Before the ooup 9I\figaria boast...---
ed of on.]Jr six battalion~ of infantry 9plus a reconnaie~ance sq-
uadron with ferrat carso Its Navy consisted of only six warshi~ -
ps 9 th~®e of them coastal launches. Its Air Foroe possessed no 
com.bat airc:=craft whatever. 
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It 9omprised some twenty six piaggio trainers 9 ten dorniers 9 twe-
nty seven colllm"U11ication airc:ocr.afts, ten noratlas traneporta 9 and 
four dakotaso Nigeria possessed no tanks,few armoured cars, and 
no bombers or ~ighters. 
AMBITIOUS LEADERS: -
' \ 
. Some African leaders proved to be very ambitious. To achieve 
some of their ambitions 9 they have to have a large Armed Forces. 
Nasser of Egypt is one of such leaderso His amb·i tio:a:1 -v;ras Arab 1-
eadershipo To achieve .. this 9hs has to drive the Jews into the sea. 
This requires a veI7 large Armed Forceoif w0 may match Nigeria's 
milita:ey might against that of Naeeert1s Egypt,then one can see 
the differenceo Egypt with a population of only about 26 milli~n 
has a total Armed Foree- __ of a.bout I30,000? 11hereas Nig'eria at the 
-
same period,with a population of about 56 million,had only 9,000 
. strong. 
Nkrumah of Ghana was another ambitious leader. While Bale-
. wa of Nigeria was talking of mutual understanding among African 
neighbours 9Nkru.mah on the other hand was aiming at bringing all 
the other African nations under the leadership of Ghanao To do 
this 9he needed a strong A:i:ll'ey' and a powerful Air Forcso The deci-
sion to raise a Ghana Air Force had ,to be folloi-red up by the es-
tablishment of a Flying Training Sohoolo Praside~t Nltrumah open-
ed th0 ~chocl officially on Sept0mber !Ith !959 9 although the 
pilots 0 course actually started on July 20th 1959. Talking about 
the Ghanaian Armed Forces,Nkrwnah once said: 
· "The Ghana Air Force is the latest addition to our 
defense forces 9 and completes "t:1ha t is generally re-
ferred to as the conventional armso Since tha att-
ainment of independence, no effort has been spared 
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''to develop our Army' and to establish the two sister 
arms ==r=the Na,;y and the Air F~roe Cl3:Z!)both of which 
are being developed as rapidly as possible. u 7 
. j 
'!he President himself once admitted that the civilian and the 
commercial aviation of Ghana had been naglected,while he pursued 
his military ambi tiono This is the pa th 1ib.ich he ought to have 
explored and developed,for it is the on® most likely to boost 
the econonw of Gha;n.a. He was not obviously trying to impress 
anyone when he said; 
:) 1.,,-._' 
"So far, the relatively unexplored field of 
aviation in this country (Ghana) has in 
the main been confined to @ivil and comm-
. ercia1 flying 9 by a compara ti ve-J.y· samll n-
ucleus of Ghanaian aircrew in Ghana Airw-
ays. " 8. 
' .. 
lfi th regard to the leadership of Africa through the use of Gh-
'$,na 1 s Armed Foroes 9 Nkrumah made sure that he spent heavily on 
Arm&m®~toWith a population of 7 million, Nkrumah made sure that 
Ghana had 9 9 000 men in unit ormo Th.is lcjae the same number that 
Nigeria had with eight times the population of Ghanao More deta-· 
ila of the ambitious armw rae® among African countries are given 
in ~ppendix B and Appendix Co The information in Appendix E was 
obtained in ~he.;_:_Ffilloltl.th:..9f.-~,Augu.tSt I964oA"t that time 9 a poor count17 
like Dahomey was spending $I 9 I009000 on dsfenseo In April of I9 
66 9 according to Appendix C9Dahomey was spending$ 4,0709 000 on 
defense.o 
Sinse the overthrow of Nkrumah 0a regime in Ghana,the new 
military regime is no longer thinking in terms of African lead-
erships The Time magazine issue of January I2 9 I968 ifrote an 
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article about the new regime in Ghana and their adopted policy. 
~e magazine made the following observations: 
. . J ' 
... , 
:-i., 
),, 
"Some politicians who are eager to return to active 
politics have started exploiting the emotional le-
tdoim from ~,he years 1:rhen Nlcrumah promised Ghana 
the leadership of all Africao They have charged A-
nkrah tri th tu.rning the com1t:r:y into a provincial 9 
beggar nation9 made such an issue out of an agreem-
ent that gave Abbot Laboratories of Illinois cont-
rol of the State pharmaceutical oorporation9that 
Abbott daoiced last month (Daco !967) to leave Gh-
ana. 
To chcl.,rges that Ghana is becoming an African · 
baokwater9 John Harlley 9 vice chairman of the Liber-
ation Counoil98.1nswers ~ 'lie want it. that Titayo Lea-
ding a continent it;J expensive,and we haven't got 
the money z e 9 
This is a new approach which in the glorious days of Nkrumah 
would be unheard of e Things have changed in Ghana. Let us hope 
that they have changed for the better • 
BORDER DISPUTESa 
Anotijer factor that must not be left out in talking about 
arms race in Africa is the problem of border disputeso Quite re-
cently 9 this :ra.otor has fea tu.red very promin~ntly as one of the 
reasons why many African countries feel that th®y naed an a~. 
There have be®n border disputes between Somalia 9 Ethiopia and Ke~ 
:nya on one hand9and Morocco and Algeria on the othero Somalia s-
ees he_r struggl® as a means of correcting the colonial ill that ·· 
has befallen all Somalia peopl®o In the colonial days 9 ths Somal-
i people had the irorst of fateso They i:.rere car,red up into fc11r 
groupse One group fell into the hands of the British and became 
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' I known as the British SomalilandoTh.e one that fell into the han-
ds cf the Italia11S also became k:nown as the Italian Somalilando ) 
The other halves fell into the hands o~ the Ethiopians and the 
French respectivelyo After th® Uorld War II 9 the people of Soma-
li demanded that all their paople be united into one oount:cy-0 
In his testimony before th® °Four Power Comm~~sion of Investiga-
,. 
tion' in ·r9489 Haji Mohamed Husaien9President of the party known 
· as the 0Somali Youth League·9 said: 
"We wish our country to-be amalgamated with.other 
Somalilands and to form one political,administr-
ative and economic unit lrith themoli'e Somalis are 
one in eveey riray o 'tfe are the same racially and 
geographically 9 ,1e have the same r~iligiono There is 
no future for us except as part of a Greater Som-
aliao 
The present international frontiers are artif-
icial and the divisions are placing an unfair st-
rain on the political,administrative and economic 
welfare of the oountryo T.b.e axistance of s~veml 
-:foreign official langu.ages ·within the several te-
rri t~ries, ie snough9in itself,to make us aliens 
out of brothers of the same race 9religion and 
r countey; and.put back our national advancement in-
definitelyo 
We want it (Unity) and the Somalis of the other 
terri torias also want i to :By this union only 9 vie c-
an have the opportunity to give full expression to 
our national spirit and i;rork out our dastixw as a 
nation of normal beingso Union with the other So-
malilands is our g-reatest demand irhieh must take 
Priority over all other considerations., H IO. 
This philosoplcy" of Greater Somalia is responsible for the wart-
hat has been raging bet1,:reen Somalia Republic and her tv10 neighb-
oUorsoBecause of this irar brought about by the border die1pute 9 a 
regional arms race has bean going on in the 'Horn of Africa.' 
TERRITORIAL Ar®ITIOI\f: 
When a smaller nation is struggling for its survival,it 
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is often compelled to .expand its Armed Forceso This happened in 
I' 
I 
Togo Republic under Sylvani.is Oljrmpioo At that time,DroK1,1ame l\Jk~ 
ru.mah of Ghana ca.me up ·t-ri th the idea that Togo i::1as too small b-
oth in size and in populationoHe thersfo~a suggested that Togo 
should cease to be an independent country~and become a part of 
, ..:.:: Ghan&9 . }Jhen the Togolese Gov@rnment turned thi~ do1rJn9?xflcruma.h 
decided to use forceo This made poor Togo resort to expansion (.;." 
of her Armed Forces@ 
In another instance,we see poor Mauritania being harassed ~=· 
by Morocco who has laid claims to all of MauritaniaoAbova all, 
Morocco has succeeded in getting this claim endorsed by the 
great majority of independent Arab Statee of Afrioao Armed ra-
ids by irregular forces from Morocco entering Mauritania thro-
ugh the deserts of Algeria or Spanish Rio de Oro (for Morocco 
has no official common frontier with Mauritania),had to be. re-
pulsed by the :French troopso 
Since independence 9 these pressures from Morocco have not q-
uite abatedoTo meet this danger9 the Mauritanian Government has 
_increased i .. ts ez:pe._p.di ture on the Armed Forces 9 as 1·1ell as seek-
ing aid from her former colonial mastero Tb.is remark made in 
the African Report showed that this is not a comfortable sit-
ua tion to be in. The report says : 
=::, i 
"When.in the Spring of I962 the Morocco Govern-
ment etepped~up its campaign for what it calls 
the liberation of Mauritania9 and Moktargs gov-
ernment calls subvertion9 it looked a~ though 
the fr8.,il ns1r state might i,ell be di~ruptedo 
Although the imuritanian Govarnment spends 
nearly a third of _:its r®venues on its Armsd 
Forces and Polioe 9 thes® alone are far from 
enough to maintain order in the vast 11ildern-
ess of the northo ~e Mauritanian Government 
accepted the need to deploy some French Fore= 
es once aga,in9 even tho"Ltgh this aroused old f= 
ears and resentment and lent force to th@ ar= 
gument that Mauritania was just a French pu-
ppe~te °' II 
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Whatever people may choose to term i t,no one will deny the fact 
that whenever there are two svils 9 one is alira.ys well advised to 
choose the lesser on~o In this respect 9 Mauritania chose the les-
ser of the t1r10 evils and accepj;ed French aido 
Th.1.,1.S far 9 the effort has been to point out some :reasons why ma-
rzy- African nations deem it necessary to have Armed Forceso There 
is no effort here being made to support or condemn this id®ao 
Most of the reasons sound very convincing and so hav® some vali-
dity o The trouble with Armed Forces b~gins ho~ever~when they gr-
ow out of proportion~and also when politicians want to use them 
to achieve their political ambitions. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
t iG e; ? ZT"'~ 
MILITARY AID AND AR?v1S RACE IN AFRICA: 
,:n - = s. ,a; :-- e : : s 
,} 
Probably?more than any other continent at any time in the wo-
rld history?Urica is led by pen=tJ'ielding intellectuals 9rather t .. 
han by the modern equivalent of saber-rattling men on horse-back. 
AR:r.mn FORCES : 
In I963
9
only seven of the thirty four independent Afric-
an states had armies of over IOjOOO men9and ten had Armed Foroes 
of I,000 or lessoTb.e per oapita annual military expenditure was 
less than $5 in 27 ( twenty seven) of th& 33 ( thirty three) states 
where data was ava.ilable 9 and less th.an ~~I in II (eleven) other 
eases.Comparing ·what the United States spent on defence in I965 
with that of the whole continent of Afrioa,H.Ki tohen wrote in t-
he Africa Reports 
;,. .. 
·· ''The continent as a. whole (with a population .. 
of 270 9000 9000 I965) spent slightly over $800 9 000 9 800 on defence 9 compared to over S50 billion for the United Sta.tes,with a po-
·pulation of about I92,000,000o "I 
. It is interesting to note that well over half the African to-
tal was aooounted for by only two states--~the United Arab Repu-
blic (Egypt) and South AfricaoFor details 9 see Appendix:8.'.~pages 9 
and II (eleven)eT'b.ese two pages will give more details about th-
ese two oountries 9 and how muoh .they spend on defence as compared 
to other African countrieso 
Despit~ th@O® statistics and the fact that one of the contin-
entus ti:ro politico=military jun .. taa 1ras replaced by a civilian g--
overnment in late 1964 9 the role of the military cannot be ignor-
ed in modern Africao 
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IITLITARIS)f ' nr AFRICA: 
In the first place 9 it seems likely that the present oonditi~ 
_onm are only temporary 9 and that Africa. lsJill be oome increasi11gly 
-
mili tarizedo Colo11.ial governments f(?ught their ba·ttles largely in 
d 
Europe and.maintained relatively small garrisons in their overs-
eas out posts,mainly for internal security purposesoindependenoe 
.. ' •... ~ ... 
reopened all of the conflicting territorial claims of ·the colon-
ial period 9 and transf0rred the foci of these conflicts from Lon-
don,Bru.ssels and Paris to ifairobi$)Aoora 9 1.[ogadisco and Addia Ababa. 
Arms races 9if not wars 9 are likely to result from regional di-
sputesoSecondly9a number of special circumstances mak:e African a-
/ 
rrmies 9however small,a particular fascinating object of political 
analysis during ... ,he period of rapid transi tion 9from dependency to 
sovereigntyoThe pity of it is that each nation keeps on-increas-
ing its Armed Forces by spending more and moreoTb.e poor country-
, 
i 
of ~_a.uritania,mentioned before,is a case in point. 
· - "In I963, the size of Mauri·tanian Armed Forces was 
500;with an approximate annual defense budget of 
. -14,000,000. "2 
- In a period covering 'about two years, the leaders of this Af-
ri oan nation saw the need to increase their Armed ForcesaWriting 
in Adelphi Papers of April !966,David Wood made the following o-
bservations : 
"The size of Mauritanian Armed Forces rose up to 
I,000 while the estimated annual budge-t-al-se ro-
se up to $4,060 9000$ n 3 · 
The Republic of Ghana under the leadership of DroKwame Nkrumah 
is ·another·---interea ... ,ing exa.mpleoHere is what· happenedo 
• 
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"In I963,Ghana had a total Armed Forces of 89000 
and the am1ual defense budget was ~i35:P300 9 000e n 4 
In a space of two to three years,the whole situation changed v-
ery rapidly and radically tooaHere are the changes • 
. "Ghana's total Armed Forces rose up to I7,000 
while her annual defense estimates rose up to ' 
. $42 ,OOOs,OOOo H 5 · 
This rapid.increase or· expansion of Armed Forces is true of 
ma:n;r other African nations as welloMany of these countries invo-
. 
-lved have different reasons for indulging in arms raceoFor Nkru-
mah is Ghana,it was a matter of prestige rather than of national· 
securityoFor Mauritani~ on the other hand,it was a question of s~ 
~rvivaloUntil Morocco abandons her claims ovar Mauritsnia 9 the ch-
ances are that she (1dauri tania) will continue to increase her Ar-
med Forceso 
In the case of most of the oountries,one can see that the Arm-
ed Forces is not worth the money spent on itoLet us take the case 
o.f Chad as an exampleoThia country has only 400 men in its army, 
and spends close to $2~000~000 annually in order to maintain them. 
The truth is that an army of 400 men is not an arrrw at all in the 
usual sense of the termo I .. t has limited capability 9 and so mu.ch mo-
ney should not be spent in order to achieve so littleoCooperation 
with her neighbours for.defence purposes would be of far greater 
help to Chad and countries like her~than an arroyo 
For detailed informations on increase in defence budget and a-
lso in the Armed Forces of African countriea,se~ Appendix A and 
Appendix ]3 ... ~nd also .Appendix C0 
Since no African nation manufactures its o~m. weapo11.S,the next 
thing we have to do is to find out ~~ere these arms that are be-
ing po1tred into Africa oome fromo 't'lh;y are mili taey and other a.idfl 
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being given?We shall now try to find out. 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATES: 
It is on record that over ti·renty countries give military aid to 
African countries,to a greater or lesser degreeoMany African nat-
ions Qhoose to diversify their mili te1ry aid so1.,1rceso There are ma-
ny reasons behind this met~od of approachoOne of th® age old rea-
sons9being to prove both in words and in deeds 9 that they (the Af-
rican countries) are srtictly
1
nonc=ialigned0Commenting on this iss-
ue,President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania has this to say: 
.. ~ 
"Ideally,! would have preferred to see our Ar~ trained 
by a joint Commoni1eal th missiono If the Commonireal th 
and the smaller powers are u.nwilling or otherwise un-
able to help,ntr duty t·1ae to ensure that I would not p-
, ut ~ country into the hands of any single major pow-
er for military assista.nce 9 The need therefore,-cras to 
secure some kind of balanceeThe arm;r that proved its-
elf disloyal to rzy government 1rasn°t the one that was 
trained by the Chineseo 
I 
There is al11ays soma element of risk about having 
an army at all in an underdeveloped countcy 9 but since 
you cannot do without an army in these days 9 the task 
fs to ensure that the officers and men are integrated 
into the government and party 9 so that th0y become no 
more of a risk than,say. the civil service.". 6 
· As far as mili ta:cy aid· to Africa goes, Catherine McArdle in her 
report on 9 Tha Role of !iilita:cy .Assistance in the problem of Ar-
ms Control',oame up with the convinotion that: 
--·~ 
... 
"By :far,the largest and most significant amounts of 
militacy assistance tentered by a single nation a-
ppear to be those provided by the United States." 7 
'. . 
' i
t 
J 
f 
! 
':' \_,, 
.. - .. . 
- . Lb_ 
----~~- -~- -~~--:~::-:-c 
!P 
____J_ L ;d --b ---=-. , 
,, i, I I 
-26-
Professor JohnoGoStoessinger,in his book,'The Might of Nations' 
seem to share the same views with Miss MeArdle,when he -wrote: 
.\ 
"The administration of American foreign aid has been highly complexoAlmost 85% of the arm.ual budget.apJ-roved for forei·gn aid has been earmarked for mili t«= 
. a:cy- equipment· and defenseo The other I5% is design.a== ted as·economic aid for development or defence sup~ ortoSuch support i,s in part military aid in disgui-
· sed form." 8 
Eesides the·United States,other countries that give substantial 
military aid tm Africa include the United Kingdom,France,West·a-
erma~9the Soviet Union9 Red China and ItalyoSome re~sons have b-
een advanced as to v1ey these developed cou..ntries etre al1-1ays verr 
eager to pour in arms into less developed countriesoCatherine M-
cA~dle gave 'the :following eloquent reasons,as to 'tih;sr developed 
nations have become so generous in their military aid.She said: 
'.. ,,·, 
.s 
' 
"Few of the developing states are sought as present or potential military allies capab-le of adding significantly to the armed st-
rength of donor nations against an actual 
. . .. .. . !j . 
or expected enerey-o 
The primary purpose now seems rather to c . "'-::; . develop milita:ry client states 9 to build up military~political strongholds through whi-
ch to preserve or upset regional balances, 
or to maintain favoured regimes against in-ternal subvertion or revolt." 9 
'! ; 
Another opinion oomes from Mr.M,J.V.Eell.Writing in th~· Decemb-
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er issue of Adelphi Papers in I964,he gave the following reasons, 
"niere may be more self-interested motives behind the provision of aidoit is believed9 for instance 9 that m-any- African countries ma:y fall under military contr~ o1 9 =indeed9 army attitudes are bound to exert great influenc~ on internal politicso It i~ clearly desir~ able the.n that officers should by training and out-look9 be favourably alignedo Seoondly 9 in the attempt to buy intern3tional supp-ort,militar-y aid ia a continuation of eoonomic aid bf other meanso 
Thirdly 9 the Russians in particula~ have attempted to gain easy political credit by pr~viding arms to countries queirr<aling 1ri th thsi:r :neighbours 9 such as Algeria,Somalia or the United Arab Republico A specialized form of· thi~ is the disburs~ment of - . military aid in return for bases=in terms of value,_ this has been the most pressing motive for both the 
, United States and l3ri taino 
Finally,it is feared that 9 if a reqiie~t f'or aid is refu.sed 9 someone else lnll consent to provide it.The justification for this pernicious doctrine is that our opponents irlll use their 01niequipment as a sort of Troja11 horse for gaining the erltree into nation-. al armies,with disastrous results.n IO. 
'!here is no doubting the fact that military aid to African cou-
ntries serves the selfish interests of the.donor countrieso Afr-
ican countries gain nothing except to acquire dangerous i·reapons 
with whioh to destroy themselveso vfu.at is more 9 the little resou-
rces they ~ould have spent wisely in order to improve the lot of. 
their citizens are wasted over arme pu.rcha~eso . 
Miss Corll:c.Ardls gave a lot of credit to the UoS0 Seoretary·o::f 
State, Mr.Dean Rusk,when she made the ·following observa.tions: 
"Requests for mere sophisticated weapons have been repeatedl.y and.often dsniedoTo cite only one exa-mple9when Nigerian Prime Minister9 Balewa in I96I 
ll'" ••• 
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"asked for the grant of a jet fighter squadron,Secre-tary of State Rusk 9strsssed the unsuitability of su-ch equipment for Nigerian defense needs;and pointed out that the cost of suoh a squadron and its annu.al maintenance approaoheds>if not equalled the cost of educating five million lii@rianso '° II 
If other leaders in these developed countries would be as hone-
st as Secretary Rusk9arms control in Africa would become a real-
ity in due courseoMroBell said it well when he observed thats 
"Whatever be the dangers of letting our oppo-
nents take advantage of our refusal to sell arms 9 it seems clear -that attempting to meet them by outbidding rivals ·will benefit few 
except the donor•s arms industries". I2 
'· . 
1 Of course, it could be said that some times donor governments 
· su1 'sidize m~litacy aid&One can also argue that,if they are all 
that altruistic9 they might as well spend the same amouJ:1t on sch-
olarship awards or economic aid rather than on militaryoFull de--
. 
taµ.l of irhere most mili ta:ry aid. to African nations come from, wh.et-
at they cost and how these costs are met;will be found in Appen-
dix «) • 
. Today,we might say that we have two types of politics na.m-
~ ely,poi-rer politics and 'tielfa:re politi·osoE:ich political leade~ m-
ust decide which one he will like to go foroSince power politics 
can easily lead to wars and destru.ction 9 it behoves African lead-
ers never to cast as much as a glance in its directiono Several 
years ago,Chief Obafemi Awolowo in his autobiography sounded th-
is horn of lrarning to all African leadersoHe said9 
. • ·I 
ttin this nuolear~rooket=and=dollar=dominated world, we ha-~e no ghost of a chance of making any mark at all in this fieldgThe paraphernalia of this type~of 
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. -. 
"politics are in themselves bewildering:a mighty array of armed forces whose claims must take p-ride of place in the disposal of public fina~c~ es, territorial ambition;an arrogant and blust-ering attitude in international affairs;-trell s-taffed and luxurious embassiea in the more imp-., orta.nt countries of the i:·rorld;.a. foreign. policy that· is motivated by cu.nning9 chicanery and bad faith ;a,n over-po't·rering desire 9 stemming from s-heer insenstate national aggrandisement 9 to out wit,out shine or humiliate the other nations of the world;and so on and so forthoThis kind of politics will not do Nigeria any goodoit w-
·ould bring miseries to our people at home 9 and notoriety to our nation abroado Monies which could have been spent in cat-· ering for the welfare and prosperity of our p-eople would have to be diverted to diabolical· and fruitles~ channelsoin any case,we are too late in the race and we just have not got the 
resources to indulge in it." I3 
i I· 
! 
. \· 
. l . 
i 
' .. i 
' ., -~ 
. I 
\ 
Though Awolowo was here talking to a Nigerian audience,bu1. he 
was in effect speaking to the whole of AfricaeAn arms race is a 
luxu.cy 1re all cannot affordo'We have all heard a -great deal of th-
at summit whereBritain9 the United Sta,es 9 the Soviet Union~Franoe 
and noir Red China9 love to maetoFrom all aooounts 9it is a very ch-· illy and precarious rendezvousoThe foothills of tha summit are· c-
omparatively obscure;but there is no doubt that it is quieter and. _.......::_--"-' 
· safe·r. thereoAll the same,we must ;note that, 'He tha"t is down need 
~ - - ::::.!.:- ··-=-- . 
fear ll0 fall 12 o 
What are the effects of the arms race in the developing countr-
ies? One sees that these leaders often bring perpetual fear and 
heartache to their peopleoTaking a quick look at the Dominican R-
epublic under Trujillo;it is on record that: 
"In those daysjthe Dominican Republic spent 50% 
of its total annual?.revenue on the e.,rmed forces 
· in order to bolster up Trujillo 0 s dictatorship." :1;4_ 
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This led to economic chaos and the overthrow of Trujillo's regi-
me. l'Te have so far discussed wbJr developed countries give milita-
ry aido These developed nations 9 i11JGent on cul ti va ting net:r Slpheres 
of influenoe 9 and on widening the areas of th0ir ideological empi-
re,dangle all sorta of bright and attractive objects before the 
·eyes of 1J.nderdeveloped countriesoThose countries which have fall-
en prey to such advances have so far as the general good of thei-
r people are concerned9been lured to their doomo 
The unf~rtu.nate wars that have been taking place between the 
' Arab nations of Egypt 9 Jordan and Syria on one hand,and Israel on 
i the other;could be said to be an out come of the opinion express-
ed aboveoNo one doubts the fact that these J~ddle East wars are· 
the direct out-come of the arms race going on thereoEx];)ressing t-
he hope that Nigeria would learn from the mistakes of Egypt,Chief 
Awolowo went on to say: 
_ "fhe underdeveloped countries like Egypt have left 
their people to wallow in the mire of poverty,igno-
rance · and disease as 1rell o It is my submission that Nigeria should regard power politics as a poison, 
and should es ohetv it as sucho l . 
',iJ{,, ... 
If we choose welfare politics 9it will be well 
with usoin a developing oo\mjgey with slender mea-f:1S ~- suoh as ours 9 lirelfare politics and po~rer poli t-ies do not mixoA choice must be ma~e between but-
ter and bullets; 1re cannot have both as they have 
managed to do in the United States of America and . -·-· '_,.,. ........ . ,. 
. Great Britain. n I5 
·/ : 
-Jr 
.~,t'-
~o follow this up, it has been observed that Communism breeds on 
poverty 9 ignorance and disease o Only sound e eonomi c a.id trill help 
. developing 001..mtries get rid of all .,,heseoSo 9if ... Ghe developed co-
untries really want to contain Communism in Africa 9 they should 
not try to do it by pouring in arm$o0nce more 9emonomic aid 9void 
. of ·economic exploitation is the· answer to these terrible handic-
aps. 
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"' The arms race will lead to bitterness and env,frustration,ago-
ny and uarsoAll these will then create a breeding ground for Co-
mmuniam through revolution and subvertiono 1~rel:fare poli tics,not 
power. politics 
Africa.· 
\ 
•.• 
l <f·. 
,-(_ 
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is the only possible answer to the ills plagueing 
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CHAPTER THREE: .. 
THE FRAIDI\fSTEI!J lli!ONSTER: 
Many factors were responsible for the expansion of the Arllfili 
,.· 
ed Foroes in manJr African oountriesoOne-suoh factor was the idea 
of a militarily strong United States of AfricaoThis 1-ras rrhy 9 in I-
96I,some African leaders met in Oasaablanca,Morocoo,and took this 
decisions 
. ) 
J 
"!l'here,they joined with .Morocco and the United 
Arab Republic in a decision to establish a N. 
A.ToOo-type~Afrioan=Organization,to ensure th-
eir common defense and the consolidation of li-
, berty in Afrioao 
Tb.air plans envisaged the creation of a Joint 
African High Command· comprising the Chiefs of 
Staff of the Armies of the participating states." I 
. 
Noble as this goal may seem,it is doomed to failure.One of the 
reasons being that the bond of unity between these leaders is ch-
iefly based on emotion9 and not on carefully articulated common 
interestmo President Nasser of Egypt 11ould~fo~ exampl~ 91rant Afr-
icans and the rest of the world to beli@ve that he is dedicated 
to the goal of African UnityoChief Awolowo ef Nigeria 9who had w-
orked 11i th him closely in-·the past doubts this very mucho Talking 
... 
about Nasser and his so called dedication to African Unity,Awol-
owo said: 
I . 
... 
. ' 
"It iS true that peysically and geographically, 
Egypt is in AfricaoBut apart from the fact th-
at her entire political heart is in the Arab 
world 9she has never regarded herself as havi-
ng any social and cultural affinity 1nth the 
black races of AfricaoTh.e U:nited Arab Republ-
ic,the pet crec;l~J,lre of Nasser9which has one 
foot in Africa and another in the Middle East, 
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"is the ve-:t:y anti thesis of a l'rorkable African commu-
nity o With his undisgi1ised totalitarianism~and his 
territorial am.bi tiona in Africa and the ]Jioslem 1·1or~ 
ld 9 effective cooperation i:ri th Nasser in aey field 
at all would be possible only if the black races 
of Africa i:rere prepared to remain as satelli teSJ in 
Egypt 0s orbit as Syria now i~o Eesides,there is no 
similarity in substance in the economic and social 
problems of Egypt and ours.n 2. 
) ... ..\ ..... -· -~ ..... 
Before common defense becomes feasible,there must be mutual u-
nderstanding9common goal and needs 9both social and economicoEmo-
tional ties are ve~ ephemeral 9 and are insufficient reason to 
turn the whole continent of Africa into a war camp. 
'llJE ORGANIZATION ~: OB AFRICAN UNITY.2AND ARMS RACE: 
. To make this dream of a United States of Africa. come tru.e,Af'r-
ioan Heads of States met in Addis Ababa,Ethiopia in May- of I963. 
As a result of this celebrated conference in this city of the 
world 1s oldest state 9 an organization designated as the 1 0rganiz-
.. ation of Africa11. Unity' (OoAoUo) came into beingo 
The aim "tiae to bring about African Unity through political m-
eanso Instcaad of tl1e expected Unity 911s ses colossal failures in. 
_ most of the OoAoUt~\s undertakingso .Among other things 9 it created 
a media where by.military personnel from various African count-
. ries could meet and excha11.ge ideaso The result of this type of 
contact soon became everything but cordialo Milita:cy- officers 
from countri®s in Africa Sou.th of the Sa~a~a suddenly realized 
that thsy ~ere V®r:f far behind their counterparts from the 
Arab countries of North Africao 
Th.ey noticed also that the balance of power in Africa 
has tilted in favour of the Arab countries of North Africao The 
Arabs had more and better trai:rr.a®d ~oldiers 9 more sophistica;tad 
weapons 9and therefore more po111er and ·more pres·tigeo The others 
therefore resolved that this had to be off set. 
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so for the first time,we find the politicians and the military 
officials working hand~in-glove in intensifying the arms race in 
AfrioaoThey started first by sending their military personnel to 
various parts of the irorld for trainingo The 110xt move i:res the in-
troduction of all sorts of sophisticated and modern weapons into 
AfrioaoAgain 9 the big queijtion is~~ lJh.om were they arming against? 
Little did the politicians kn.01·1 that they 11ere diggix.1.g their o-
wn poli tioal graveso They did net realize then that they t"Yere arm-
ing their deadliest enemies as events later sho11ed0Had they been 
aware of the danger 9 the arming of their enemies would have been 
out of the questionoThe army should have been the last thing th-
ey ought to have expanded,let alone arming it with the most mod-
ern weaponso 
THE FRANKENSTEIN ~10NSTER: 
Without wanting to 9and without realizing it in time,the 
African leaders created a Frankenstein Monster in the continent 
of Afri_cao:Before they realized it?and ·started doing something a-
bout it 9 it was too lateoThe result now is that many African lea-
·ders have either lost their lives or their privileged positions 
of leadershipo These ill omens came as a re.sul "t of ma.king the ar-
my- so powerful and so formidableoT.b.ose civilian leaders who are 
still in power do not trust their Armed Forces any moreoSeveral 
\attempts have been made in such countries as Ethiopias,Ee;rpt 9 Ken-
ya, Tanzania and Uganda as well as Sudan,'by men in uniform to si-
eze po11er0Hov1 long these civilians ~rill remain in power is hard 
. to tello 
_Long before-·--·Dr. Nkl'UDla.h was overthrown,he realized that he 
could :no longer count on the Ghanaian army to achieve certain of 
his objectivesoTall~ing of the Ohanian arIIW" at this time 9 Jon Kra-
us iras on record as saying: 
"Certainly9 the army had little identification 
with the CoPoPfs (Convention Peoples Party) 
efforts to restru.cture the society and the· 
\ -1·· •. : 
~ r, . , 
I , 
\: .. 
•;:.,, 
d .... 
-35-
"eoonomyeGhana•s milit~17 remained a colonial insti-tution9enlarged and Afrioanized but never fu.lly' de-
. colonizedo n 3 
.After an abortive attempt at the assassination of Nkrumah in Aug-
ust I962 at Kulungugu. 9 this distrust of the arrngr and the police g-
rew much biggeroAs a rssult 9I~ah decided to expand what some 
people choose to call his private armJ7 9 the Presidentus Ot1n Guard 
Regimant(PoOoGoRo) ;to tvro battalions for sec11ri ty and ceremonial 
reasonsoHe also detatohed them from the arnzy-oHowever,the events 
of 24th F~bruary I966,proved that he did too little too late. 
THE YEAR OF THE GENERALS :· I966: 
While the Chinese have their om1 reasons to celebrate I968 as 
- the 'Year of the !ionkey 0 9Afriean countries equally,have good re-
asons to remember and celebrate I966 as the 9Year of the Generals.' 
The first month of the year saw three major ooupsoOn the New Year 
day,January I 9 I966 9 the world woke up ·to learn that a coup had ta-
ken place in the Central African RepubliooPresident David Daoko w-
as replaced by Colonel Jean -Be~el Bokassa 9who was the army' Chief 
of Staff and cousin of the deposed Presidento 
Two days later9 on ~anuary 3rdo I966 9 the arDzy' overthrew the r-
egime of President Maurice Yameogo of Upper VoltaoHe lTaB replaeed 
by his army Chief of Sta.ff 9 Lto Colonel Sangoule Lamizana. ,, 
:"'· A.gain 9 on Janua:r:y I5th !966 9 the Baleira regime in 1\figeria was ov-
erthro1vn by a military coup d~ ~tatoHe was replaced by Major-Gene-
ral Agu.iyi IronsioThe military- takeover in Nigeria shocked those 
who refused to stu.d;y her proble·ms,but lcept on telling Nigerian l-
eaders the/t their regime 1ias very democ:ratico The leaders of the n-
ew regime in Nigeria said their reason for the military coup was to 
end corruption,nepotism9 gang$teriam and viclenceo 
I 
Another major coup of the year took place in Ghana on 24th of Fe-
bruary I966oDro K1·rame l~ah 1,1as on his 1;ray to Hanoi 9 and in his 
absence,the Ghanaian Armed Forces siezed poweroAs head of state,Dr. 
Nkrumah -was replaced by Lto · General Josepl) .Aru:era.h. 
D 
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·Th.ere were other ~o~ps before the ones which took place in 
I966oFor example 9Ben Bella was replaced by Colonel Houari Boume-
dienne9as a result of the Algerian coup of June I9th I965o 
Also 9 Lto General Joseph t~obutu replaced President Joseph Kasa-
vubu,after the coup of November 25th 9 I965 in Congo Kinshasa(Leo-
poldvills)o On December 22 9 I965 9 General Christophe Soglo replac-
ed President Ta.hirou Conga,cou of Dahomey as head of stat®o 
'lha year I966 9 however9 saw the greatest number of coups and 
counter coups ever known in the history of AfricaoT.b.is is the r-
eason wby 1966 could properly be designated as the 0Year of the 
Generals' .Full detail of the coups will be :found in Appendix E, 
' ·• ' ~ 
REASONS FOR THE COUPS: HOW VALID? 
/---GHANA: 
------ Let us now examine some of the reasons advanced by these 
;Generals as to w}zy- they staged these coups and see. if they are a-
t all credibleoAfter the overthro11 of Dro Kwame Nkru.mah9 0olonel 
(later Major-=General) Emmanuel Kotoka made the follol·ring statem-
ents in the Africa Report of April I966, as reported by- Irving 
Markovitz: 
_- .: . ~·I __ ~ ~'-_...,._.~ -- . 
·. ,, .-
. ... '- ~ 
. 
"Colonel E.K.Kotoka,Commander of the second ariq 
. brigade at Kumasi 9and leader of the coup annou-
nced on the day of the takeover;that the army w-
as motivated by Ghana 0 s serious economic and po-
litical situationo 
It was un~hinkable,he said on Radio Accra 9 tha.t 
Ghana 0s eoonom;y had developed in the last three 
years at a rate of only three per cent per arnn-
um9given its vast potentialitie~oHe accused Iilt-
rumah of runx1ing Ghana as his pereon~l prop®rty 
and bringing the countr.y to the brink of ba:n1rr-
uptoyo \JO 4 
There were DlSJzy' of courae,who believed that Nkrumah was not e-
ntirely respon$ible for Ghana 0s ·economi~~ill. 
I 
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01jhers believed that Nkrumah's profilgacy has been exaggerated 
while his achisv~mente had been pla.yed dovmo rub:'oTh1arkovi tz shares 
the later view and he voiced his opinion in this wa;sr: 
· "Granting that millions were 1 spent on prestige 
projecta 9 the key quastion remains unanswered • 
What percentage of ths government 0 s total ex-
penditure did these projects represent? 
The assertion that Nkrumah brought Gb.ana to 
the verge b:f banl,cruptcy does not take into s-
ufficient account the catastrophic drop in 
the price o:f cocoa on the t·iorld ma.J::l(:et 9 and 
ign.ores long=range 9highly productive projects 
such as the Volta development scheme 9which a-
re coming to fruition years ahead of schedule 
but 1·1hich had until noir been a d.rain on the 
economy"o . 
It turns a blind eye to what Ghana got for 
its money 9 an extsnded life expectancy from 
fundamental improvements in medical services, 
nutrition and hygiene; a huge educational sy-
stem serving a larger percentage of school 
age children than in a~ other Black African 
country; the creation of thousands of jobs, 
and an economy at the threshold·of self-sus-
·taining development." 5 · 
• 
.. ·. . ' ' . . .... ~ 
In addi tioD to these two vie,rs, the tol·lcnring should be added. 
Nkrumah and the militants of the C.P.P would argu.e that these 
accomplishments were achieved not despite 9 but because of the 
political persuasion and manipulation and an ideology to guide 
the selection of objectives and stratsgieso To th~m 9independence 
from the British9unity within the state and financing for the 
Volta project were equally political objeotso They believed that 
without a sound ideological and political foundation, Ghana cou-
ld not hope to prospare 
· Nkrumah 1;-1ent i1'.rong in his ardent belief that ideological and· 
· political four.B.da tions 1,:rere foundamental for Ghanaian prosperi v.,. 
Whereas these might b~ sound foundations fe~ development in a 
well educated society, they might not be so in the Ghanaian society. -
,· 
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More emphasis should have been laid on sou:nd economic foundat-
iono Tb.e resources spent over the establishment of 9I{1-:rame l\Jkrumah 
Ideologie~l Institute 0 9 could have been used in other ways to st-
rengthen the nation's eoononzy-o 
Without accepting ~11 the reasons ad-vanced by the army for sie-
'si.ng poue~ in Ghana 9or rejecting them all~one is inclined tor-
each this conclusiono Ghana 0e real problem on the eve of the co-
up iras deeper than the threat of economic bankruptcy'.'fo1~ nation-
al productivity iras still increasing as the econonzy- began to un~ 
look its potentialo 
A more basic issue was the system of decis~on making legiti-
mated by _Nkrumah 9for 11hich· he i;m.s held personally responsible by 
the bureaucratio eliteso:Nkrumall saw himself in the historically 
appointed task of 11 ~11eeping a;~ray the fetters on production~·9eli-
minating Vfeudal elementsf and neocolonialism9 so that the iprod-
uotive foross of the society could be liberated 0 o 
>= ,,-c·.s '~·-·.-'" Ironically,the ne~ technicians,though they used a different 
·vocabular-y9 saw themselves as performing the identical tasks,fre~ 
· eing the economJ? from the iiaste and inefficiency spaimed by way-
ward ideologists and corrupt politiciansoin their eyes 91ntrumah 
had become the chief fetter on the forces of productionoif this 
was a grevious fault,likrumah has long since answered tor it. 
·NIGERIA: 
With regards to the Nigerian coup,the arnw promised amQng 
other things to end tribalism.One of their high ranking officers 
was quoted as saying: 
, I . 
"Nigerians today are glad and grateful that they 
see this day 9 th@ bsgi:inning of an era in which t-
he agents of corruption 9 gre@d9 nepotism and tri-
balism sh.all be s11ept awray for all time. 
. . .
I 
( I 
I 
~. 
t 
~· I 
I 
I 
1! 
IJ 
l 
il 
! 
! 
1 
.! 
I 
ii 
i 
:.! 
J l 
·-· 
--=-__....-~~· 
-39-. 
"In the mean time,we appeal to every citizen to 
cooperate with the new regime; let us put beh~ 
ind u.s our o~-m excesses=== political intoler~ 
anoe, thuggery, greed, and lairlessnesso" 6 
, I 
.... !~" . 
-----=---:---.-.-._-.-...-_-____ -~_; . __ -,·~- ·.·-' - - - 'I 
In fact 9 the Nigerian arn,y led by men of Northern origin staged 
a counter coup 9 motivated by tribalism and lust for poweroFirst 
of all 9 they attacked Southern o~ficers =---= chiefly Ibos 9 and lat~ 
er on they attacked civilians,men9women and children;all from t-
he SouthoThe very men who aoous~d politicians of tribalism9 eeem 
· now to be engaged in civil irars,pogrom and genocide,with tribali-
sm as the chief cause of these ordealso 
In July I966,when Yak.u.bu Gowon came to power after the blood-
. iest coup in the history of modern Africa9 he accused his predec-
essor Major General Aguiyi=Ironsi of what he termed ~Over Centr-
alizationvoFor this offence of tJcy"ing to keep Nigeria strongly 
united 9hs (Gowon) and his fellow northerners passed a death sen-
tence on Ironsi and sxeo~ted it swiftlyo Now 9 after he has got 
all the power he i-ra.,nted 9 he advocates ths sams 'Over Centraliza-
tion° ;having re jaeted oonfederation 9 loose federation or seces-
siono Tllus9 like Ironsi before him9he is commiting the ~ame crime 
I 
namely 9 i Over Centralization v o The difference noi;r is that he st-
ill lives irhile General Ironsi paid iii th his 01m lifeo 
These self=contradictory statements could be detected in m~ 
any other instances where the s.,rmy has siezed p·oi:ero It has th-
erefore become clear that African soldiers have not be~n able 
to convince the world that they have sow.1d arguments to back 
up·their actionso At best,one would say that they are well=me-
aning citizsns-of th®ir reapectivs 00~1.ntries who in:ongly thou-
ght that they lme111 all the answers to their countryijs illsoOnca 
ce in
1 
po1·1sr 9 they began to see the full extent of ths problems 
and become so overt·1helmad that they :fin0.,lly become co111fu~ed 
also and this in tu.rn often led to counter coups0 
. . .. , 
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The leaders of African armies are discovering tha-t pot·rer is e-
asier to sieze thr~n to use successfullyaWe can therefore conclu-
de t·wo -things :from the cases studiedoFirst 9 1·J"he11 an African state 
builds up a large Armed Foroe 9 the army is likely to sieze poi-:rero 
The other conclusion is that out of the fear of such ooups 1 oivi~ 
lian political leaders will try to do a~ay with those social and 
· political ills that often bring about coups and internal disord-
After the attempted coup of I96I in Ethiopia 9 the Emperor ca-
rried out many reformsoCertain social injustices have been oorr-
., 
: eoted,and. un.employment reducedo The same is true of I{enya 9 Uganda 
and TanzaniaoAfter the unsuccessful military ooups tJJ,. these East 
African oountries,the salaries of these soldiers improved while 
some social injustices ware oorrectedoPresident Jomo Kenyatta of 
Ken;ra is now talking of resigning as the President of .his oount-
ryoHe no longer talks of being the President for life like Presi-
dent Nkrumah of Ghana and Ben Bella of Algeria;who had since be-
en OVerthrO't·7llo 
One thing the politicians failed to·understand is that in ma-
rr:, new nations of Africa,the word 'Nationg or 9Cottntry' is not 
fully Ullderstood by majority of the citi~ensoThis is true of the 
civilians as well as the Armed ForcesoBecause the politicians t-
hemselves did.nut fully wrlderstand the meaning of the word 9 they 
1---=~~-~:~-.1,_."-·..T, 
·used their poli tioal po11ers for thei~ ov1n selfish ends 9·instead 
of serving their countIYoEqua.lly9 the Armed Forces 9instead of us-
ing their power in defending their count]:Jr9have 9 possibly witho-
ut vranting to 9used· it in destroying their countryoThi~ is true 
now of the lfigsrian Armed Forceso It is thita lack of · a se11tse of 
purpose which led to the failure of civilian rule in many Afric-
an oountrieso 
African Generals that have siezes power from the civilians m-
ust realize that &the arnzy- is .i:rained to £igh.t and no..,,, to govern., 
When circumstances foroe them to assume power9 they mu.st do all 
they can to retu.rn political power to the politicians without m~ 
uoh delay0 
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When they usurp the job of civilian politicians,the result is 
· only co1lfusion;for they are t;r,ying to do the job they are least 
qualified to dooThe solution of African political~economic and 
social ills does not lie in military ooupsoin faot 9a milita:ry t-
akeover simply adds to these illaolf they really love their cou-
ntry .. as they a ..11 profess they do 9 the Armed Forces must stay cle-; 
ar of politics.An effective job of government can o~ly be done 
by trained and qualified political figures who can p~vide exec-
-~ 
utive and administrative leadership. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
•.'.~ ' : . 
BUTTER liOrI1 BULLETS : 
Everybody agrees that the developed countries of tke world 
want to help their less fortnir1nate fellow human beings in underd-
eveloped countriesoin order to do this ve~ effectively 9 the dev-
eloped nations raust first of e .. 11 find out 1·1hat the needs of the-
se developing nations really areoTheir priority·needs must be m-
et firstoThey are unde~de~eloped in the sense that they lack te-
·chnical v1enow~how 0 and as a result 9are technologioally behind t-
heir counterparts in developed countrieeoWhat they need therefo-
re is the sort of assistance that will help them advance techno-
logicallyoTo do this 9 they must be educated and given economic a-
id in order to help them raise their standard of living. 
Taking Ethiopia as a case study,one finds that economic aid 
is trailing fe~r behind military aido Thus,·while many Ethiopian f-
armers are still till-ing thei1~ farms 1:ri th tools close to those 
used by the ancient Egrptians 9 the Ethiopian Armed Forces on the 
· other hand9are now using the most modern weaponsoThey have all 
sorts of anti aircraft guns 9super sonic jet bombers and others-
ophisticated 1·1eapons0If 11e realize that just less than t~renty y-
ears ago 9 these very same soldiers had to fight Wmssolini and his 
Italian soldiers with primitive weapons such as spears and bows 
and arro·w19 9 ,;ra can better imagine hol'1 rapid the change has become. 
If the Ethiopians could learn so quickly the use of these hig- , 
hly sophisticated weapons~the same will also be true for their 
learning to ma.lee use of modern farming equipmento Ethiopian soil 
is good for corn growing as well as £or growing such grains as 
· tef 9wheat and riceoThus 9aid in the form of modern agricultural 
· tools would be of great help to agricultural productionoEoonomi-
.o assistance- might not necessarily mean a total stoppage of mil-
itary aidoAll it entails is that more emphasis should be laid on 
economic aid and not on milita1.70Professor John Stoessingsr has 
told us that as of -·-now, the United .. -~_i_a tes gives more mili ta:cy aid 
' _ _:_; , . ' ' •i 
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than economic aid. He went on to assert thats 
"Eighty five per cent (85%) of the UoSo aid to 
developing nations are military~and only fift-
een per cent (I5%) or even less are economic, 0 I 
... 
. , ' \' ' 
The right policy therefore is to reverse this percentage.Mili-
tary- aid9WS have been reminded by MroMoJoVoBsll benefits few ex-
cept the donor~s arms induatrieso So 9if ·the developed countries· · 
really 11ant to help the underdeveloped countries secure porgress, 
the emphasis must shift from milita1zy2 to economic aido 
Aid to developing nations should cease to bs exploitive.Rail 
roads should be built to facilitate internal t~ansportation and 
not merely for the purpoas of extraction and exportation of raw 
materialsoin ma11Y African oountries 9 thie 9 un.fortu.nately is still 
the caseo This should also be t:rue of all other means of transp-
ortation such as highi1'ays 9air ports and sea portso For the Mars~ 
hall Plan to succeed 9 it needed an organiza tiono T.b.e·re:fore 9 if all 
the much talked of foreign aid is to succesd9 there must be a 
body oreatad ithioh is charged l1it1' th® duty of studying the nee-
ds of those nations requiring to be helpedo 
Different nations 9 lilt® individuals 9have different needs. It 
·. ·is improper for officials in lYashington for example 9 to tell the 
people of Kenya what their needs areoT.he psople of Ksnya know 
best l-1h~$ their Iil®@ds are more than amiy outsid@ro Even iYh~re it 
< . 
happens that the out~ider_knows batter what a given nation needs, 
ther~ should be no imposition of any kindo JJ.[arzy- a time 9 this pol-
icy of aid with tag leaves the "VJJaderd®Veloped countries no choi-
eeo lfua t they are confront®d lri th is = talc® . it or leave i to 
Increased economic aid in the form of fertilize~ 9 modern farm-
ing tools,instead of sophisticated u®apo~s iJill help African 
nations produce more food to feed their people. 
.  
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Today in many African countries, close to 80% of the entire pop-
ulation are tied to agricult'L1J:1>e0Still 9 they do not ~roduoe enough 
food for their people 9due to primitive tools and farming techni-
que o 1tfua t Africa needs badly is no·t a modernized Armed Force 9 but 
modernized means of prod.uctionol!odernized African Armed Forces 
will only help the Africans destroy themselves and finally,perh-
aps,pose a great threat to the peace of the world. 
HIGHLY. INDUSTRALIZED AFRICA: 
Highly industralized African countries would be a bic bless-
ing to mankindoin the fi-rst place 51 thera tiould be no need :for fo-
r.eign aid9 since these nations irould be able to take care of the-
mselveso Secondly9 peace would be restored to many parts of the 
w.orldo This is so for as people eat l':ell 9 they 1irould be leas and 
less belligerento This is so because 'tve are a1'1are of the fact th-
at a hungry man is an angry manoA technologically advanced Afri-
can blocl<: of nations 'tvould become an asset to the 1·10:rld organi~ 
ation such as the United Nations;rather than a liability as most 
of them are no1-r o 
The independent African nations should be kept out of the co-
ld war and the arms raoecForeign troops and foreign military ba-
ses should be removed from the Afri~n soiloTo many- Africans 9 th-
e developed nations use their military aid to keap some corrupt 
and unpopular regimes i11. poiieroSuch corrupt regimes in return h-
elp foreign enterprisers and fortune hunters in exploiting poor· 
AfricansoSuoh leaders use the money meant for developing their 
countries 9for their own priv~t@;.endsoBecause such oorJMJ.pt regim-
es suit the intentio:r1s of thes€D foreign enterprisea==the argwneem1 
nt goes on== the foreigne~e have in many cases fruf.rt;ratad the P-
opular desires of the populace to rid themselves ·of these regim-
esoSince facts and figures are often not available to support or 
de~ st1.ch allegations~ the only thing one luould hope fJor is tha1t 
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the de·veloped nations 1·rould make sure that their behaviour does 
not help to mal~e these allegations cr~dibleoThis is the more re-
ason why efforts should aluays be mad® to ascert@in the true ne-
eds of the peopleoLeaders come and go but the people remainoif foreign aid is aimed at yielding permanent fruit 9 it should be a-imed at meeting the needs of the poopleo 
'IBE ISSUES :BEHIND FOREiillT · AID=UoSo A CASE STUDY. 
Foreign. aid 9especially economic aid is of mutual benefit to b-
!· oth the donor countries and the receiving countriesoHere are so-
me of the reasons why many people believe that foreign aid is u-
sefulo First,there is the economic argument== advanoed in the U-
nited ·States as early as I952==>that the ~underdeveloped lands 9p-
ossess many of the ingredients of·eoonomio and strategic streng-. ; theThe nature of the United States 0 economy has made it depende-
nt on these areas for critical raw materials 9 and so the United States must participate in the continued development of these r-
esources9a vital basis of its po'treroLiberia is a case i:n J?O_int 
where the Bethlehem Steel Company has a vested interest i~ the 
rich iron=ore deposit of LiberiaoAgain9 the American Firestone T-ire and Rubber Company heavily depends on vast rubber plantation 
of Liberiao 
A second line of reasonong maintains that foreign aid is at-ool in the East-West struggle 9an important ~eapon in the compet-ition 11i th the Soviet Union :for th® support .of the 0neutrs.list• 
countriesoThis argument 9 a fovourite of Congressmen °selling0fore-
igi.1 aid to their constitueneies 9assumes that economic ai~ b~s g-
rataful allies;and is th®refore a highly effective defense again-st th~ Communist infilt~rationoSincs Com.miBism feeds on poverty, this argument holdsjraising the standard of living should prove the be~t way to comba:·'G · and prevent the spread of Commu.nismo 
A third grotu.1~ on which aid is justified is the hop® that it 
will contribute to the establishment and strengthening of democr-
aeyjor at least prevent a state from -tu.ming to Commu.nismo 
I 
i 
, I 
I 
' 
·! I 
;. .I 
,/ 
,I 
... ,\ 
1 
,, 
l ( 
' 
'l 
l ' ; 
I -
i l . 
'' i 
,. 
~ 
\ 
~1 
( . 
\ 
' 
I,: 
·-· ~., ,_ ni . 
.ri' • 
.;:_:; ' ... 
' ':' - ; . 
) . 
- i. . 
/.' 
1,;;,+-,--,,,f,,IMM•f•'"Fl•IM:E ------------------· -~-·~- --------------··-
. ' ·' -46-
This hope is rooted not only in considerations of power.Rather 
as is true of th@ Soviet Union as well 9 the United States feels 
flattered and reassured when it sees its onn type of institutio-
ns apparently vindicated by being adopted and made to ,;,rorlt else-
wherei o Xf for that reason alone 9 it ~ould prefer the world to be 
covered with as many democratic and as few Communist societies· 
as possibleo 
Fou.rth 9American foreign aid is in~ended to help provide a sou-
, 
nd economic and social basis for the political stability and mi-
litary strength of the United States 9 allieso 
An impressive synthesis of moat of the above arguments in fav-
our of foreign aid has been advanced by Professors Millikan and 
Rosto,;v 9 in a 'Report to the Senate Special Committee to Study the 
Foreign Aid Program. 'Here is part of their recommendation. 
.. ~· 
'' ·.~.i . -
-' .. 
,- ·. . 
ttAs their main thesis,the authors recommended that 
United States e.mploy its resources to create and 
encourage conditions for self~sustaining economic 
growth in the underdeveloped countrieso 
Such gro"t-1tb. they hold 9 't"rould lead to the evolut- · 
ion of politically stable and viable democratic 
societies that could not easily be victmized by 
·Communist promises or intimidation. 11 2 
· The key words in this recommendation must be re-examined.The:, 
are: 'That the United States employ its resources to create and 
encourage oondi tions for self-sustaining economic growth in the 
underdeveloped countrieso 0 
Many- countries that give economic aid over-look this fact.ot-
ten9their aid is to help th~m(the donors) exploit the natural r-
eso~ces of the UJO.d®rd®veloped cotu1tries for their oim selfish 
endso Th.is leads to making the rich countries ric~er 1,rhile the 
poor oot1ntries remain pooreroAid should bs used to bridge the 
gap that now exists between the have nations and the have nots • 
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THE POLITICAL USE OF ECONOMIC AID: 
It is on record that despite the intensity of the economic 
competition bet11een East and 11Test 9 the tw·o super=po1rers have not 
directed their resurces and economic strategies primarily again-
st each otheroRather9 both the United States and ths Sovi~t Uhion 
have become increasingly convinced that to vrin ult,imata victory, 
they must gain the allegiance of the world 0s tn~committed nations. 
As a result 9 the competition between East and Wast for the favour 
of these neutralist states has steadily intensifiedoThis has led 
George Liska in his Qook, 'The New Statecraft•,to say quite cle-
: .. ·.·. ~ 
a~l.7 that:· 
"Global politics have come to resemble more and 
._ 
.more the domestic politics' of a two party syst-
em." 3 j 
It might be v~ry interesting at this point ·to take a l:oo& at· 
·· what John Stoessinger has to say on this iesue.He said: 
' . - : . 
'\ 
"The uncommitted countries play the role of ·the 
often crucial independent voteein order to win 
this floating vote 9 both parties promise prospe~ 
rity and economic welfareoBoth parties encou..rsage 
industralizati~noBoth partiGs attempt to appeal 
to the vital centsro 
The United States da~emphasizas its traditio-
nal associations with paternalistic colonialism, 
while the Soviet Union disclaims·its revolutio-
naey mili tanoy o I11 short 9 both sru.per==po11ers a tte-
mpt to appeal to the neu nationalism on whatev-
er grounds seem mostly likely to elicit a favo-
urable responseon 4 
It has been observed that ID&l\V' underdeveloped countries are not 
making good use of the aid they getoMos~ of them rather indulge. 
in the dangerous game of playing one power against the other. 
•'J 
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Writing in his book,'The Might of Naticns',Professor Stoessin-
ger made the following observations. 
' . . . 
.... : ; 
I \ . 
·. 
"At the same time, the new nations themselves, 
having become fully aware of their strategic 
position9 have increasingly used the East=We-
st struggle to advance their 01m causesoin,, 
the procesa 9eoonomio aid 9like atomic ener{JS', has developed into a m@jor instrument in the 
interna..ticnal power struggle and one that a-
gain clearly illustrates hotr extensively and 
intimately the ttto chief phases of tha~ str-
uggle -==the East~West.and Colonial-anticolo-
nial - are interdependent. u 5 
It is ·really unfortunate that developed nations see things in 
this lightoit is wrong for them to use their aid as a means of 
-b~ing friendship among the underdeveloped countriesoFriendship 
cannot be bought 9 it can only be 1;-rono It can be iron by a more hum-
an· and altruistic approach rather than by a selfish and narrowly 
conceived policye 
Not every leader among:·-the underdeveloped countries indulges 
in this dangerous gameoTo those who do,Chief Awolowo's warning 
is very- apt here. Writing in his book 'Awo',he said: 
"There is a policy which appears to be in vogue 
amongst some of the developing countries of th-
e·worldoin their quest for financial and techn-
ical assis.,tancs 9 they adopted the tactics of t100-
ing the nations _of the t-u10 blocs at the same t-
ime, in the hope that in the a'.fllXious bid for~new 
supporters·· or converts 9 they ( th@ developing co-
untries) would get the best of the two worldso 
I consider these tactics to be both disreput=-
able and dangerouso Disreputable in the sense 
that it amounts in my view9 to diplomatic doub=-le-d®alingo If we want help from more than one 
nation, by all -means 9 let us seelt i to 
, 
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"But it is immoral to play two opposing forces aga-
inst each other.in the processoit is this kind of 
diplomacy that is responsible for the fall of many 
nations in the past 9fo~ the mal\Y wars and inoalcu~ 
·1abl0 miseries,which have afflicted manlcind2and f~ 
or the tormenting fears and the mortifying distr1.1~ 
st among nations ;-tihich the irorld is 11o·w lri tnessingo 
The tactics are dangerous because acts of double 
dealing~ whether diplomatic or other1-1ise- never P= 
ay in the endoTh®r® are times when even th@ great~ 
est tactician in diplomatic cunning is out=claased 
in his oim gams o 
It is then that he discovers that all that he t-
-. hought he had gained is but loas,and that i,rhat is 
left of national honor and dignity is bucJ6 ·the sha.-
dovr of an illustrious past that ha;s gone for ®ver, 
or of a potentially great feature that will never 
C0m8o Vi 6 
In oonclusion,one might draw the attention of the underdevelop-
ed countries of .the irorld to 11ha t is happening in boJGh liorth and 
South Viet 11am no'tfoBoth North and South Viet Nam a.re no't1 in a s-
hambles,simply because they allowed themselves to become the ce-
nter of attraction for the ti:10 super~powerso 
It 1;.rill be a sad omen for the whole mankind if the nei~ na ti-
ons of Africa, by their ottn foolishness end. up bsing the battle --
grQund for the super~po~rersQTh.e continent of Africa need not be 
a laboratory fo~ testing modern weaponsoTo say the least 9 these 
new African nations 1;-:ill have nothing to gain~ but eveeythi11g to 
loseo This must be averted by a sane and moral foreign policy,es-
.peoially with regard to foreign aid. 
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! • CRAFTER FIVE: 
GAil;JFUL UTILIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES: 
ARMY Al1TD NATIO]JAL DEFENSE~ 
The primary purpose of military forces. is to provide for 
both the external and internal security of their count:ryoThis m-
eans tha. t men in armed ae:rc.,.vias must ba prepared to give their 1-
i ves in defense of their oountryoEach nation~in order to be able 
to defend its territorial integTity 9 and protect its citizens fr-
om aggressive 111eighbou.?s 9 sees the need for a standing a .. rmyo 
The United Nations is working hard to make the day come soon 
when· national armies lrould not be essentialo l1hen this day comes, 
the United Nations 1:,1ould be able -through its pea_ce forces 9 to ma-intain ·pes~ce all over the -vrorldoTo assist the United lifations in 
its efforts in this direction9many cotU'ltries have been tcying to 
find other means of utilizing their Armed Forces other than in 
the battle fieldo 
'· However, in a. ~1orld of sizable standing military forces, the con-
cept of the supplementary peaceful use of such forces along con-
strtl!otive lines of benefit to the oommlll1.ity at large,deserves e-
xploration and definitionoin deed 9 in ma!\Y' African countries 9 such 
' use is an inte~al part of attaining national security and not a 
pure supplement. 
HIGHLY SKILLED MEN IN THE ARMY: 
It is true that mar.w African countries lack men with techni-
cal kno11c=,horr in manJr fieldso This handicap has kept Africa backw-
ard for yearsoTh.ere is no doubting the faot that ma?ljr of thes® s-
kills .irhich are lacking in many areas of national advance do ex-
ist in the Armed Foroeso There are skills required in modern mi-
litary structures that are capable of being used for non~milita~ 
ry purpoaes;akills that in some areas of the world are in short 
supplyoTo be found in milita.rjr forces today are individuals and 
units skilled in engineering9medicine 9 communications,transporta-
, 
tion 9 proourement,.,and distribution techniques and adul.1; training 
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and educationo)ien trained in leadership 9 enduranoe and well disc-
iplined can also be found in t-he armyoFurtherJthe period of rllil-
ita:ry service provides an opportunity for gwneral education and5 
for ·training in field i:rorko It also provides the basis for furth-
er training upon release from armed seJ:VioeoWe shall see hou Af-
rican nations are using their Armed Forces f@r purposes other t-
han waroMany Africans are aware of the fact that the cream oft-
heir youth and the best experts in their oountries 9 instsad of p-
utting their efforts into construotive endeavour for their coun-
triesu advancement are prevented form doing so by having to ser~ 
ve fruitlessly in the milita:cy' machinee 
Though the above is often the oase,this will not be enough r-
eason to conclude that~ there are no exoeptionsoOn the contrary, 
· , · many African leaders have bsen thinking of the use of their Arm- . 
ed Forces for sooial,economic and other purposes beside~ the wa-
ging of 1nir0To such leaders,the existence of Armed Forces in th-
l 
eir countries is a necessary evilo They irould like .,,o disband the 
Armed Forces if they could be gu.arantee.d protection of their na-
tional territoriesQT.b.is prompted Siro Robert.H.Soott of Great-B-
... 
ritain to make the following observation: ·, 
·"For most of the new leaders of African states, the 
problem of their Armed Forces were both unexpected, 
be cau~e in the pursuit of political po,;rrer9 they had 
assm1u1~d that after independencs,neither internal 
ae1mr1 ty nor exter-nal defence ,;,;rould cons ti tu.ta gr-
ave threats ;and untJelcome because they ,;,rould have 
P:eferred to devote resources to social and econo-
mic ends. 0 I · 
STEPS IN THE. RIGHT DIRECTION: 
It is not just enough to be aware ot a problem it 
. ' is equa-
lly important to do something about it 0 Guine~ und~r the leaders-
up irith a. ve-;ry pragmat-ic appr,ga.ch to hip of Sekou Toure,has come 
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the solution of the problemeHe has tried to make the army feel 
part of the nation and haa also made the people look upon the a-
rmy as suchoAfrica Report ~f January I963 tried to assess Sekou 
Toure and hi_s achievements in this direstion: 
"In independent Gu.inea, the citizen's view of the. 
·military is being radically alteredoThie is pa-
rtly because there are no longer any foreign w-
hite troops in GuineaoBut still more important 
is Sekou Toure 9s successful integration of the 
army in the 11or'c&: of nation~l reconstruetiono 
The army is today engaged in socially produ-
ctive work whose ben®fits to the Guinean people 
as a whole are es~sily seeno Soldiers cultiva,te 
rice fields in Ko\Uldara~build schools in Conak-
ry,and open roads in the forest region of Guin-
ea just as.their President and Commander-in-Ch-
ief said they would." 2 
. If we analyse this report very carefully, it co~;~ be called a 
~;-tep in the right directiono '!he army can in this way help in fe-
eding the populaceoAs a matter of faot 9hun.ger 9 ignoranoe and dis-
ease are the deadliest enemies that face a.ey African nationo li'i th 
enough food and good education 11hioh th.Q. Armed Forces of G'l1i1>1ea. 
· Republic are helping to provide 9 the p®ople of Guinea. tiill stand 
a better ohance of winning this battle against these f~eao 
Another i~portafil\t :factor that l:r®akens the efforts of maey Af-~-
rican nations in achieving some of their political ambitions is 
tribalismolt divid®s a nation into different antagonistic :facrti-
oneoAga.in9Selcou Tours is using his .Armed Forces to 11a.ge 1iar· aga-
inat this eneIIJY ot progreasoArrica Repo~t again mad® the follow- · 
ing observation about thca ;QJfforte of Guine~n Armed For©ss to mo-
ld their different tribal groups into a stron~ nation. 
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" 
''In this public service prog1ram,Fou1ah 9Soussou,and. 1-~linke (Guinean ethnic groups) conscripts have worked shoulder 
to. shoulder and ·b0come al1are of a comm@n purpose t the st-
rengthening of their infant Republic9waa.k internally and 
cotmting fe1,1 reliable· :friends on the outsid®o 
A hitch in this harde:s~,yor1-cing9 sociallyc;,conscious arnw prepares the soldiers for the future when out of service, 
they irould be · called on by the Party to join °Citizens n 
Volunta~ Labour Brigades 0u.nder the various pro~ams of 
'Investissement Humaine n 3 
.. To lessen the chances of milita17 coups as a result of misunde-
rstanding and distrust between the army- and th$ politioians,ma.ny 
countries believe in this old sayings 
"Keep the army out of polities,and politics out of the ar~." 4 
This is no longer the case in Tanzania and in Guinea. For examp-
le, in Guinea,at every level 9 the a.rllijf is intimately associated w-
ith and i~luen<tked by the Partyo Both officers and men are memb-
ers of the PoDoGo (Guinea Democratic Party)o 
. The closeness of the Arey-c:oParty relationship should not however, 
be construed as a cordial collaboration of tlio equals sharing s-
imilar interes .. tso The Party keeps a close rein on the arn.w 9 just : 
as it does on every other national institutionoPresident Sekou 
Toure ones made an unequivocal statement on the PeDoG~~ suprema-
<;,1' over all else when he said: 
"We often said that in our eyes,there are no soldie~s, 
no · civil se~nts 9 no ii~ telle ct"Uals ·; there are only su-
~porters of the Partyoit is among the supporters of 
the Part7 that the standards of value 9faithfu.lness,of 
courage are o ; ., ~·,, 
T'ne Party is and must remain the directing organo 
The supremacy of the_Perty is not a formula but a re-
ality and wst develop itself consta11tlyemo 5 
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Why is Guinea doing so well with this type of arrangement?Th-
ere are several answers to this questiomo Here are some possible 
~xplanation.s g Becat1se of the absence of a traditional mrAili taey 
caste in.the modern sense of that term 9 and because of the ve~ 
neimess of the Guinean army· itself 9 the armJr is a highly malleab-
le entity;to be given form according to the dictates of the Par-
ty. Tlle priority of the revolution== the national nwatique· -
and of the PoDoGo 9 which began it and perpetuates it,is well ill-
ustrated also in the oath eaeh new officer swore: · 
) . 
"I swear to be loyal to the Republic of Guinea, to 
its people 9 and to its Great Party,the Guinea Dem-
ocratic Party9 the symbol of African emancipation; 
to give 11\Y life for the defense·of .the country a-
nd the·constitution;never to abandon this flag;to 
give complete obedience to the orders of 11\1' supe-
riors in the sense of our national revolution;to 
qbserv-e perfect discipline;and to do everything 
that is required by the honour9 ths dignity~ the happiness and the independence of the country,·! 
swear." 6 
• 
- So far, this remarkable Guinean approach has not,u:nfortunately 
been practised elsewhere in West Africao In Ghana under Kwame 11-
. kru.mah 9 the arm;y was used for prestige purposes and territorial 
ambi tiono All the officers 11ho 11ould not accept this fell out of 
Nkrumah's favouror-iany irere dismissed~ othsra t-rere demoted am.d ot-
hers still transferr®d to l®ss prsstigeous posteo 
Again9 in Nigeria 9 inste~d of using the army to bring about nat-
ional unity~ Chief Obafemi A1-rolo1·ro in_ I962 and later Ab.madu :Bello, 
the Sardaun& of Sokoto and Chief Samuel .Aki~tola. 9 tha former Pre-
mier of tfestern Nigeria; 1:ranted to use the army to achieve "their 
personal political ambitionsoThis led to the death of the Fader~ 
t,. 
ation of' Yigeria as we know it prior to !966,as 1rell as to the'. 
civil "t-1ar tha"'t is noir going ono 
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In the East Coast of Africa,President Julius Nyerere of Tanza-
nia has his 01m ideas_9vary close tw those of Sekou Tottreo In I9--
649President ].Jyerere expressed his viei1s about his country@s Ar-
med Forces in this way: 
"My duty was to ensure that I would not put rq · 
country into. the hands of one single major p-
ower for milita:ry aesistancsoThere is always 
some element of risk· about having an army at 
all in an uriderdeveloped country 9 but since f.,. 
ou ca1m.ot .do without an army in these times, 
the task is to ensure that the officers and 
· men are· integrated into the government and 
party so that they become no more a risk th-
an say the oivil service. "· 7 
\. 
..... , 
Although the actual fighting role of the Tanzanian ar!IG'" at pre-
.sent is minimal,its potential for aiding the process of economic 
development remains grea.to T.his hope iras echoed by FlrQKambona w-
hen he was se:rving as the Minister of Defense and vice-chairman 
of the ltiilitary- Forces Council.of Tanmnia. He was on recotVd as 
saying: 
"Our army shall make its own maximum contribution 
to development as all other sections of the com-
munity are doingoin this uay 9 the arm;r will beco-
me an integral part of the society." a· 
.. 
Both men in Tanzania are a:nxjous to reduce the risk involved in 
having a standing arll\V in time of peacao It might be too early 
to dra.1"1 aey conclusion iJi th regard ~to the success or failure in 
I 
ei th.er Tanzania or Guinea;in the 1:ray they have chosen to handle 
their Armed Forcsao 
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" 
At aey rate, the ... fact tha.t both countries still have civilian 
government cou.14 be. tak:en as a., success rather than failure for 
their policiesolJhile we may.not quite fully approve of this mar-
riage of conve!(J.ienoo beti1een ~the army a11d the politi~l parties 
in some .lfrioan countries 9 it·is equally important that we appre-
ciate their achievements. 
· .FROZEN ASSETS·•'.: 
Ri.ght ncrir 9 the Armed Forces in Africa can best be described 
as .frozen assetao ruli tarily speaking9 they are too few in number 
and too 1ieak i11 strength to i:mgs any major tJaro The fabulous am-
ount spent on them for their ve~ little activity is not ~orth · 
it. It is a living fact that ma:tzy' African nations employ most of 
their youths in the arll.\Yo This affects the economy- very adverse-
ly- due to the lack of competent and adequate man~power supply in 
the labour marketa 
To make good use of the able bodied youths now serving int-
he ar1DJ1 9African nations need not embark on demobilizationo There 
are other trays of doing soo There are roads to be builto .Since 
most of these African Armed Forces have efficient engineering u-
nits9these units could be used in road construction to imprmve 
or create a transportation syste~o An improv®d transportations-
ystem would go a long way to assist Africa in her economic deve-
lopmento 
Each year9 we see millions of dollars spent on the arms race. 
These scarce resources could be devoted to researcho The army m-
edical units cooperating uith civilian doctors and scientists in 
African Universities 9 could use these millions of dollars to com-
bat some of the dioeases ravaging many parts of Africa todayoTh-
is type of joint effort ~ill rid Africa of such dangerous disea~ 
sea as Malaria 9Yellow~fever9Yaws 9 Dysent11"~L~prosy and Measleso 
Through this type of cooperation betire®n the Armed Forces and t-
he civilians? the arnw i1ill be helping the African populace to 
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underst@nd what national uiiiizy',sel:'Vioe and dedication to the na-
tion meanoin Africa where oo:cy1petent -human labour is comparative- __ 
ly scarce and e:Kl)ensive 9 tying a larg® percentage of th® employa-
ble youths to the Armed Forces t1ill have adverse ®ffects on the 
continento~ economw as we have n©tedo Ther~fore 9 if the arn.w sta-
rts playing a bigger role in th® oemraunity d@velopment 9 this pro-
blem will be eliminatedo CiV'ic action work should be made an ill-
portant military ftuletione An example of ho~ the armw could be 
made to be more useful to the community might be found by looki-
_ng at Israeli arnw. 
A LESSON FROM ISRAEL: 
Whereas it is true that many African nations are not 
threatned by hostile neighbours as Israel is,they are threatned 
by enemies from withing faar9 ignorance,hunger and diseaseo The 
arntr can help them in fighting most of these as the Israeli arm-
y has helped her in meeting many of her needso In Israel 9 they h-
ave an organization called NAHALo Wiro Hugh Hanning in his book 
--~- · called v The Peaceful Uses of Military Forces' , defined :N.ARAL as · 
follows: 
-
. . \ 
"l'ARAL is a bra~oh of' the Israeli defence forces 
,that combines military training with preparati-
on for a life of oo=operative agriculture in o-
ne of Israel 11 s frontier settlements." 9 
As-a result of this farming work,NAHAL _is almost unique among 
the world 0s military organizations in paying for itself and eve-
n bri11ging the army a small inoomeo If Israel could malte soldier 
farmers out of her arntr 9 it would be equally advisable for mal\V' 
African countries to do so with their oim Armed Forceao 
1 
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The importance of this cannot be over-emphasized sin·ce most of 
these countries do n@t produc® enough food for thei~ populatione 
From what we have discussed so far 9 there is ample evidence to 
assert that the exampl®s of Israel 9 Guinea and Tanzania in gaillf'-
ul use of their Armed Forces 9 mua~G be follo't,rsd by th® other Afri-
can cotuitriesoThese are the only ways their Armed Forces could 
cease being liabilities and become invaluable assets. 
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CONCLUSION: 
Thee essence of ,mat we have been discussing so far is not ne~ 
eseerily ..,,o single 01.,1.t developed nations 9and blan1e them for ~11. · 
the ills that have befallen Ul.llderdevelopsd natioJrn.So ~a® crucial 
issi1e imJ that here 't'ra have a critical problem oon.front:ing ma11lti=-
ndo Th.is is th® problexn of.··self<=lpreservati@no Fo&e mosJG im. the 
min~ of many leaders both in developed and underdeveloped oou-
ntriem is the presarvatio~ of their 01filll peopleo Th.sy show this 
in ma.miy tray~ 9 one of ,;rhiob. is by inc~eaaing food production9 ton 
ensure adeqtiate f\sedingo The other is by organising a strong A-
rmed Force for the defense of their c®untrieso This often leads 
to an arms race 1·rhen countries begin to fear and di_strust · .their 
neighbour-so 
With these in mind,we can easily understand wley" many African 
leaders immt military aido Aga,in,we have to realize .that the.or-
iginal aim of the advanced countries in giving military aid • l.S . 
very noble and commendableo Their aim nae to assist these helpl-
ess independsnt African nations in self defenseo They soon lost 
sight of the original gcalo Th.e arms race accelerated9 developing 
a competitive momentum and ju.st as important 9 it became involved 
in domestic power struggleo The result was an incrsasingly expe-
nsive arms raca 9border i1ars 9 civil wars and economic chaosQ 
The question of defense against ones enemies is vital to an-
y nation and military aid9 supposedly 9 is a ormcial means of comb-
ting this menaceo T'n.e big issue notr is that due to the 't·my thin-
gs have developed?to t17 to settle any conflict by th~ use of 
4~ed Force could bring about untold hardships 9 agonias and ruin 
to friends and foes alik00 Th.ere is no wisdom in destroying a 
country in order to save ito Once this idea is clearly understo-
od and accepted,the good intentions of developed countries to a-
ssist underdeveloped ones 9 would become more fru.itf\tl and more 
effeotiveo 
Looking further at the issue 9whether Armed Forces ar~ inheri-
ted from a colonial past 9 indig~nously genarated9 or the re~ult of 
co-optio1r1 into the cold 11ar9 they are among --tha attribu"tsa of a 
nation ===state hood ~~eagerly sought by young DB~tions 0 
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In the majority of African oountrias,both the civilian polit~ 
icians and the Armed Foroea1 are not yet tJell organizedo !in. most 
cases 9 they do not even lnioir tJhe./tG their responsibilities to thair 
11 
country €l~reo As a resul t 9 the mili ta:ty 9 once astablished9 have fre~ 
quently intervened in the politi~al affairs of their countries 
as the year I966 demomstratedo 
To m&DiY Americans and other developed democratic vTestern co- . 
untries~this has represented~- vexing policy problema '!hey have 
also vier~red it as a dist"o.rbing departure from the liberal democ-
ratic tradition which they would like to sea embraced by these 
young African nationso The developed countries must be at--rare th-
at th~i~ military aid has brought this situation abouto If this 
is to be avoided from nolr on, there must be a realistic examinat-
ion of the security requirements of these countrieao 
Mro HoRoberts Coward ooIDmenting on this issue in his report 
on ' !vlili tary Technology in Developing Cotmtries' made some sug-
gestionso He 1ras of the opinion that 1-rhether one 9s approach .. 1S 
with a view to oont~olling armaments or of arming for seou.ritiJ at 
least three inputs are relevant to whatever policy one adopts.He 
stated these three inputs as follows: 
-_"The first is careful analysis of the requirements 
of the emerging nations for both externa1 and in-
ternal securityo A better understanding of milit-
ary- needs can better define the rang~ of goals f-
or those na ·tions o 
Secondly9ho1Jever 9 i t is necessary to have a pic-
ture of Gthe current stage of a count17's milita-
ry- development 9 including its ability to absorb 
new techniqueso The ability of local forces to 
cope l?i th moderii ii'ieapons technology and the rel-
ationship of ~tha/·t technology .!Go indigenous p1~ob=-
lems needs to b~ better understood 9as do tha ma~ 
ans for acquiring such technolog-;yo 
rrhe third is 'the rolsa played by the military 
i11 the emerging countrieao v In .. -api te of the st-
art that has been made in looking at this problem, 
much of it remains at the broadly theoretical st= 
ageo OB I 
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Mr. Coward is of course right in maintaining that unless one 
knows what a countlzy' really needs~one o~n?lot be of much helpoM-
'ili tary aid to many African countries is not based on real need. 
U~ortunately~it has a political motivationo The Mid,clle East is 
a case in point where militaiiy aid is a at~ong weapon for winni-
ng alliess,a technique 11011 b@ing used by both East and r1esto One 
must admit that this is a. dangei'l)ous approach to aido The young; 
nations of Africa are likely to make the mistakes of young cou-
ntries and set dangerotw ·goals for themaelveso It behov~a the 
older nations to advise and influenc~ themoTb.is is not necessa-
rily .... interferring 1-rith their sovereignty 9u.nless it is overd~ne. 
There is hardly any sense in spending millions of doll~rs on 
weapons which the Armed Forces of these nations cannot use eff-
eotivelyo To say the least 9 .,,hesce millions of dollars could be 
used in other ways to meet the basic and more pressing needs of 
African nationso If tha developed countries will be prepared to 
cooperate in this respeot 9 it will go a long way to heal the ills 
ot the underdeveloped countries. 
MODERNIZING THE ARMY AT THE EXPEISE OF '!fiE lJATION''S 
·ECONOrffs 
Much effort has been put forth to modernize the Armed 
Forces of many African countries. Such evidence as has been aoc-
umulated,suggests that the concentration of power and organizat.-
ional skills represented by the military in societies that are 
short on these oommodi ties makes mili tacy siezure of po11er high-
ly probableo This faot has been f\.1lly deal""& 1:1i th in this essay. 
In most cases 9 1,1e have enough evidence to believe th.at at least 
' some coups are neither inevitable nor desirableo 
It is saddening to observe that African Armed Forces are 
being modernized at "'Ghs expense of ·the 11ational eoononoroA case 
in point is Ethiopia 1rhere the government spends close ~to 84I m-
illion a11nually to modernize her Armed Foroes,while her technol-
ogy is still primi·tiveo l!i th regard: :to Armed Forcas,Ethiopia is 
mode:rno 
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Africa If.sport of October I963 has· this to say of the Ethiopian·,. 
Armed Forces g 
• J 
.. 
; . 
"Since I953,a United States military assista-
nce mission has helped train and equip Ethi-
opian Armed Forcsso Ethiopian troops served 
with distinction in both Korean con£1ict an~ d the Con__goo Tb.a land forces now include th~ 
e Imperial Gttard (a.b·out .§ 9000 men) ,a rogula==-
r Army of about 20 9.000 m®n9 and the Territor ..... ials 9 the· Armed· iurregulars of thei·: provinoeo A squadron of·I2 F~86 jet fighters is the 
nucleus of the Ethiopian Air Force 9which al= so ie said to include five T~33 jet trainer= 
s, a transport squadron of DC~3s and C 47 s, I8 Saab ~9I training craft,and two squadrons 
of Saab es I7 light bombers." 2 
Can we say the same of her economy? The answer ·is no. Farmers 
·still plough with cows in Ethiopia and over Bo% of her populati-
•·...=1""""'1 
-
on are engaged in agricultureoThere are ve:cy-. fsl1 industries 9 few 
schools for vocational training as i1ell as a poor transportation 
systemoUnless situations like this ~re changed9African countri-
es 't·rill be in for more troubleso This is vrhat all lovers of Afr-
ica mus "G lrork hard to avoido 
The essential point this essay has stressed is the fact that 
empha.,sia should no"Dr shift from modernization of the military to 
modernization of agriculture 9 education~transportation and other 
means of commtmica tio11.o 'Elis is 1ih.ere the morality behind mili t-
ary aid comes into questiono 
Both Eaer'i'; and l'Test among other things, use their mili ta:cy- a.id 
as a means of exploiting developing and dependent nationso Refe-
rring to the much publicised Soviet aid used to try to bring the 
Yougoslav economy 9 includi.11g na""Gional defense 9 u...11der ·the control 
of the Soviet Union, !viarshall Ti to once sa.,id ~ 
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11It is true that we received some army equipment, 
but· this cost so much that if t·rre had continued· 
to buy from Russia, o'Ul:' irorkers and peasants 1,rouc=a 
ld have had to devote most of.their work to pay~ 
ing for this brotherly aido Of the 220 gune tvb.ic:D 
ch the Soviet U11ion should have sent us 9 85~rt·rore 
obsolet® but repainted 9 some of ~,he ta.ruts wera ir-
orn out and 30 mobil® tank=repair=shops were in-
. , .. oompleteo ~--... 
The field telephone units were and still are 
unworl-cableo Other supplies were equally worn,ru-
sty and useless.ta 3 
Whoever still believes that the Soviets are giving both milite... 
ary and economic aid to African countries to assist them in fig-
. hting 0Imperialism 0 9 should stop believing soo Soviet aid is giv-
en for political and military purposeso T'4e Ru.saians wanted a •:a-
~g-brotherQ image to exist bettiaen them and the independent Afr-
ican oountrieso Tb.is statement accredited to President Nasser of 
United Arab Republic 9 goes a long way to u.n.derscore this Russian 
image in Africa~ The New York Times quoted him as saying : 
.... : ., 
'. 
"Mr. Nasser also asserted that the large quantities 
of Soviet planes 9armor and other military equipme-
nt that had come into Egypt since the war (June I9 
67) were 'not a gift' " 4 
. It is now clear that both Fast and West pour arms into Afriea 
for strategic and political reaaonso The philosophy of 'Ne have 
no choice but to destroy the city in order to save it 9 ° cannot 
work; in Africao The Africans are not asking the rest of the "fr1or-
ld to help them in destro~ing the continent of Africa in order 
to save it; possibly from Communism~ 
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. DEFENSIVE WEAPONS: 
A possible way out will be for the developed countries to 
supply only defensive weapons to underdeveloped African nations. 
This then will justify the claims of these nations that they are 
arming for defensive purposeso Defensive weapons will in this c-
ase include the .follo1itingg !fire-guided anti=tank misslas 9 Accu-
rate anti=aircraft weapons like the Rapie~ and tha R®d=®Y®o The-
se weapons will increase the protection of groun~ troops against 
air attacko Weapons like these should give ~ell founded reassu.r-
ance to developing coit.ntrieso Since they are fundamentally defe-
nsive nothing but good could come of 6their v:rider ciroolationo If 
these policies were followed 9 the ~ontinent of Africa could bes~ 
aved from the ordeal of becoming a laboratory for the testing of 
., 
new weapons made by the developed countries. 
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A~ THE COM!\iONW'EAlL TH 
Defence As % of Estimated 
Budget Gross National 
(rvmlion $) Product 
Ghana • • • ••• • •• ••• 35.0 2.2 
Kenya . ' . . .. ' •••• • •• 8.4. 1.3 
Malawi • • • • •• . .. . .-.. 1.1 0.5 
Nigeria . . . . . . ••• 33.6 1.0 
Northern Rhodesia • • • ..... 7.0 1.5 
Sierra Leone ... ... • ••• c 2.2 1.2 
Southern Rhodesia .... 
···-· ~ 16.1 1.5 
Tanganyika .. Zanzibar • • • . ~-. 7.2 1.0 
Uganda . . . • • • ••• ••• 4.1 1.0 
l 
TOTAL 
.',·· COMMONWEALTH 
B-THE FRENCH COMMUNI1Y 
Defence As % of Estimated 
Budget Gross National 
(Million S) Product 
The Camerouns • • • ••• ••• 16.0 4.4 
Central African Republic ••• 1.0 0.8 
Chad • • • ••• •.• . ••• 1.9 0.6 
Congo, Brazzaville ••• ••• 3.7 2.0 
Dahomey ... ••• • •• ' .. 1..1 0.6 
Gabon • • • ••• • •• • •• 3.1 5.5 
Ivory Coast ••• 
··~ • •• 
11.0 3.0 
Madagascar ••• ••• ••• 5.0 1.0 
Mali • • • ••• • •• ••• 8.8 2.2 
Mauritania ••• .... • •• 4.0 0.5 
Niger • • • •••• .. " • •• 4.0 1.2 
Senegal • • • ••• • ••• • •• 11.0 3.7 
Togo • • • ••• ••• • •• 0.5 0.9 
Upper Volta. ••• •••• • •• 2.8 0.7 
,TOTAL 
FRENCH CoMMUNrrY 
.... 
.. ' - • • ·.-.;,-. r, ... ··~ '.'x-~ ..... T . ··. ' __ , ,,., ,.. ' '-"I- I-• 
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Total 
Am1ed Police 
Forces I ! . 
9,000 9000 J. l 
' 
1 
3,000 11,500 l . ;, ii ,' ,, 
i 
1 500 5,900 ! 
' l 8,000 23,000 l I 2,250 4,000 l 2,000 2,000 ~ 
4,300 6,400 ~. r, :~ 
I~ 
c. 2,000 1,350 !I. a .
2,000 5,500 ~ ~ /j 
;~ 
~1 
i~ 
34,050 68,650. I,• .. I, 
; 
Total Genclarmerie 
Armed and 
Forces Police 
2,800 5,900 
1,200 800 
400 2,000 
800 500 
1,000 2,000 
600 900 
4,CXX) 2,300 
2,700 5,900 
3,100 1,250 
500 400 
1,200 1,350 . 
2,700 4,000 
1,000 300 
l ,(X)() 1,400 
23,000 29,000 
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Algeria ••• • ••• 
Libya ••• • •••• 
Morocco·. ••• • •• 
Tunisia ••• ••• 
United Arab Republic 
. I 
. 
Ethiopia ••• ••• 
Kenya • • • ••• 
~1adagascar ••• 
Somalia • • • ••• 
Tanganyika-Zanzibar 
Uganda • • • ••• 
• 
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A- NORTH AFRICA 
..... 
. 
. . 
Deface As o/0 of Estimated 
Budget Gross Natlofilal 
(Million$) Product 
100.0 4.2· 
14.0 10.0 
93.0 4.3 
11.4 1.5 
320.0 7.7 
TOTAL N. AFRICA. 
' 
B - EAST AFRICA 
I .. 
Defence As o/0 of Estimated 
Budget Gross National 
(Million$) Product 
18.0 1.3 
8.4 1.3 
5.0 1.0 
3.9 4.8 
7.2 1.0 
4.1 " ' 1.0 
TOTAL E. AFRICA 
. ' 
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'·; ', ...... 
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Total Gen.dannerie 
Anned and 
Forces Police 
70,000 10,000 
5,500 11,000 
36,500 24,000 
19,500 4,600 
130,000 150,000 
261,500 199,600 
Total 
Armed Police 
Forces 
34,000 29,000 
3,000 11,500 
2,700 5,900 
7,000 4,800 . 
c. 2,000 1,350 
2,000 5,500 
J 
50,700 58,050 
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Defence AB % of Estimated 
IB1udget G1r<rdJ National 
(Million$) Product 
Chad . . . ••• ••• • •• 1.9 0.6 
Dahomey ... . . •. . ' . ••• lJ 0.6 
Ghana . . . ••• ' ... • •• . 35.0 2.2 
Guinea ... .... • •• • •• 6.0 3.4 
Ivory Coast .... • •• • •• 11.0 3.0 
Li~:'ria • • • .. . . ••• ••• 2.4 1.4 
Mali . . . .... 
••• • •• 8.8 2.2 
Mauritania • • • . ... ••• 4.0 0.5 
Niger . . . • ti. 
' . • • • • •• 4.0 1.2 
Nigeria . . . ....•. .... • •• 33.6 1.0 
Senegal ·11.0 . 3.7 . . . ••• ••• .. .. 
Sierra Leone ••• .... • •• 2_.2 L2 
Togo . . . ••• 
·-· . 
• •• 0.5 0.9 
Upper Volta 
• • • ••• • •• 2.8 0.7 
.' 
TOTAL w. AFRICA 
J 
~ "! • 
D ~ CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 
I! _. .. t·· • 
Defence As 0/o of Estimated 
Budget Gross National 
(Million$) Product i 
Burundi ••• ••• ••• • •• 1.2 0.7 
The Camerouns ••• ••• • •• 16.0 4.4 
Central African Republic ••• 1.0 0.8 
Congo Brazzaville ••• • •• 3.7 2.0 
Congo Leopoldville ••• ••• 10.0 0.8 
Gabon . . . 
• • • ••• -... 3.1 5.5 
Mala,-vi • • • • • • • • • • ••• 1.1 0.5 
Northern Rhodesia .... -
••• 7.0 1.5 . 
South Africa ••• ••• • •• 294.0 3.2 
Southern Rllode11ia ••• • •• 16.1 1.5 
Sudan • • • • • • • • • ••• 21.0 1.8 
.,-
. . 
Total 
Armed 
Forces 
400 
1,00-0 
9,000 
5 50-0 
' 4,000 
3,800 
3,100 
500 
1,200 
8,000 
2,7()0 
2,000 
1,000. 
1,000 
43,200 
Total 
Armed 
Forces 
800 
2,800 
1,200 
800 
30,000 
600 
1,500 
2,250 
26,500 
4,300 
12,000 
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Genda.rmerie 
and 
Police 
2,000 
2,000 
9,000 
3 300 
' 2,300 
700 
1,250 
400 
1,350 
23.000 
~ 
4,000 
2,000 
300 
1,400 
53,000 
Gendarmerie 
and 
Police 
850 
5,900: 
800 
500 
15,000 
900 
5,900 
4,000 
29,600 
6,400 
10,000 
. ' , 
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-~ AmCAM ml?~C 
Gnt,rcl J?cipwfltion: l ,250,ftOO 
Totan·~ett f{Orrces: 1,200 
Defel.llce' budgeG:: ~ 10000,000 
Suengm: 50-0 
S~: 7(l0 
Gttu/mm~ Sttengili: 450 
Poli#· Strengili: 330 
.hm)' 
.Polit, 
. Ntll!1 
-G,,wal 
Anl!1 
(CJHfAD 
Population: 2,750,000 
Total mrm.ed forces: 400 
Defence budget: $1,850,000 
Strength: 400 
Strength: 2,000 
· CONG@ {ID~VILLE) 
Population: 1,000,000 
Total armed forces: 800 
Defence budget: $3,700,000 
Strength: 700 
Strength: 500 
Strength: I 00 
. 5 patrol boats 
CONGO (LEOPOLDVO.I.E) 
Population: 15,000,000 
Total armed forces: 30,000 
Defence budget: $10,000,000 
Strength: 29,000 · 
-.~ 
An extensive programme of moderni-
zation is in hand 
Air Fon, Strength: 600 
6 twin-engined transports 
7 light aircraft 
N• Strength: c. 200 
7 patrol boats (5 of these are designed 
for river patrols) 
Poliel Strength· 15,000 
DAHOl\fEY 
Gmn-al. Population: 2,250,000 
· Total armed forces: 1,000 
Defence budget: $1,100,000 
A~ Strength: I ,000 
Gendarmtrie Strength: 1,000 
Police Strength: 1,000 
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-~ca,~ 
Population: 20,0~0,000 
TomU m~ed forces: 34,000 
Defence budget: $18,000,000 
Strength: 29,000 
9 imamtry battalions of the Imperial 
Guard 
23 infantry of the line battalions 
4 artillery battalions 
I airborne rifle battruion 
· I armoured squadron 
(These line units are organ~ed into 
3 divisions. One of these is now 
engaged in internal security opera-. 
tions in the Somali district.) 
Strength: 4,000 
1 fighter squadron with 12 _F-86F 
1 transport squadron with 10 Dakotas 
and some SkyrtULSters. This is used 
for paratroop training, for logistic 
support, and to supplement civil · 
. . 
air services 
20 Saab-16 trainers 
About 50 other light aircraft in-
cluding T-28 and T-33 trainers . 
Strength: 700 
1 18,000-ton ex-l.~ S seaplane tender 
with a 5-in. gun; built in 1944 
5 100-ton ex-US patrol cutters 
2 60-ton ex-Yugoslav torpedo boats 
(speed 40 knots); built 1951 
Strength : 28,000 plus · 1,200 in a 
frontier guard 
GABON 
Population: 500,000 
Total armed fore es: 600 
Defence budget: $3,100,000 
Strength : 600 
Strength: 900 
GHANA 
Population: 7,000,000 
Total armed forcN-: 9,000 
Defence budget. 1_; 12,500,000 
($35,000,000) 
Strength: 8,000 (plus 4,000 in .the 
Volunteer Forces) 
I brigade with 3 infantry battalions 
A second brigade is not yet at full 
establishment 
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Air Force 
, ·1 I ... ,.._ 
Air FMtl 
Na1!1 
Poliu 
Polit;, 
l reccmn~ce sq11adron with 
· St:!ladira airmoured cam 
&irne Army Volunteer Force Units 
Sttengdl: c. 1,000 
50 light transport, liaison and training 
aircraft 
6 helicopters 
A light jet ground attach squadron is 
to be formed ewenru.ruly 
Strength: c. 300 + Volunteer Forces 
1 500--ton coi"Vette ( a sister ship is 
being huilt in Britain) 
I 360-ton minesweeper . 
2 120<Mton inflhore minesweepers 
· 2 120-ton patrol vessels 
}I.B. - ~1any support functions are 
carried out by the army on· behalf 
of all three services. Pay, records, 
transport, ordnance, medicine and 
basic training are among them. 
Basic military weapon training has 
been announced for the Workers, 
Brigade 
Strength: 9,000 
GUINEA 
Population: 3,000,000 . 
Total armed forces: -~,500 
Defence budget: $6,000,000 
Strength: 5,000 
Czech arms including 105-mm. howit- · 
zers 
A small air force is being established 
A small navy is being established 
Strength: 3,300 
IVOmY COAST 
Population: 3,500,000 
Total armed forces: 4,000 
Defence budget: $11,000,000 
Strength: 4,000 
Strength: 1,500 
Strength: 800 
KENYA 
Population: 7,300,000 
Total armed forces: 3,000 
Defence budget: £3,000,000 
(18,400,000) 
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Strengtll: s;oao 
3 infantry battalions vlith light mor .. 
tarn and light transport 
Brit.am gives technical ng-sfutarru::e 
The Kenya Air Force was inaugu-
rated in June 1964. JBritam is t~ 
supply 6 Chipmunk, l l JJJefiv&r, and 
4 Caribou light aircraft 
· It is planned to establish a small 
naval force 
Strength: 11,500 including a light . 
plane wing 
LmERIA 
Population: 1,400,000 
Total armed forces: 3,800 
Defence budget: $2,400,000 
Strength: 3,600 
Strength: 200 
l 750-ton yacht 
. Some coastguard cutters 
Strength: 700 
IJRYA 
Population: 1,200,000 
Total armed forces: 5,500 
Defence budget: $14,000,000 
Strength: 5 ,00-0 
Strength: c. 200 
6 light aircraft and a Dakota transport 
Strength: c. 100 
2 120-ton inshore minesweepers built 
in Britain 
Strength: 11,000 
., 
MADAGASCAR 
Population: 6,000,000 
Total armed forces: 2,700 
Defence budget; $5,000,000 
Strength: 2,600 
Strength: 100 
l Dakota 
6 light aircraft 
Strength: 5,900 
MALAWI 
Population: 2,750,000 
Total ·armed forces: 1,500 
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Polia 
Am!,. 
Air Force 
Poli&, 
Air Fore, 
, · PoliCI 
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• 
Dereooo budget: £383,000 ··. 
· · (O! ,@7~,000) 
Sm-~gth: 1,500 
· I ,i1rS~t:Jry batftalion 
. · Strength: 5,900 
1Ml4il 
·. Population: 4,500,000 
Total armed forces: 3,100 
Defence budget: $8,750,000 
St1rength: 3, Il 00 
Strength: 650 
Strength: 600 
., 
MA'V!UTANIA 
Pop~tlon: 800,000 
Total armed forces: 500 
Defence budget: $4,000,000 
Strength: 500 
The I Dakota and 2 light aircraft are 
at present French manned 
Strength: 400 
MOROCCO 
Population: 12,500,000 
Total armed forces: -36,500 
Defence budget: $93,000,000 
Strength: 35,000 
18 infantry battalions 
· 1 paratroop battalion 
An airportable light motorized 
security group equivalent to 2 to 3 
battalions 
A composite armour battalion with 
100 armoured fighting vehicles 
including AMX tanks and T-54 
tanks 
About 5 artillery batteries 
H.B. - The number of military ve-
hicles in service exceeds 1,500 
Strength: 1,000 
12 MiG-l 7 fighters 
2 11-28 bombers 
30 liaison and training aircraft 
Strength: 2iJO 
1 650-ton corvette launched 1939 
1 325-ton patrol vessel launched 1942 
1 345-ton patrol vessel launched 1964 
Strength: 24,000 
- '. . . 
' .. 
_ _, __ 
Army 
Gendarmerie 
Polit, · 
General 
Army 
Air Foru 
Police 
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NIGER 
Population: 3,000,000 
· ..·. Tomll armed forces: 1,200 
Defence budget: M,000,000 
Strength: l,200 
Strength: 1,000 
Strength: 3?0 
-NlIGJERL\ 
· Population: 40,000,000 
. ..- ' 
Total armed forces: 8,000 
Defence budget: £12,000,000 
($33,600,000) 
Strength: 7,000 
c. 6 infantry battalions 
I reconnaissance squadron 
Now being · formed with assistance 
from 50-man \Vest German training 
• • DllSSIOil 
1963-64: $1,200,000 voted 
1 Heron transport and 5 liaison air-
craft have so far been purchased 
Strength: 850 
I 120-ton patrol boat built in Britain 
1961 
2 85-ton minesweepers built in 
Britain 
1 350-ton landing craft built in 
Britain 
Strength: 23,000 
General 
NORTlHIERN RHODESIA 
Population: 2,500,000 
Army 
Air Force 
Police 
c.. ~' -~;·i· ·,·, , j\ ' .• :' 1, ·,_ 'r 
• . ' , • ~- - , ' r . '! ' , ·.- ~. 
. ·. 
Total armed forces: 2,250 
Defence budget: £2,500,000 
(S7 ,000,000) 
Strength: 2,000 ( excluding reserves) 
2 infantry battalions. A third is soon 
to be formed; this will increase the 
army activ_e strength to 2,700 
A Territorial Reserve has been 
formed. In January 1964 this 
in~luded 500 Europeans but only 
15 Africans. All the 125 army 
officers are l~uropean but about 20 
African offic~r cadets are now being 
trained 
Strength: 250 
4 Dakotas and 2 Pembrokes 
The intention is to form 2 transport 
and reconnaissance squadrons 
Strength: 4,000 
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Ab ffeorce 
• 
Populnl?ion: 3,500,000 
Totru arm©d forces: 2,700 
Dffl'nce budget: $11,000.,000 
Strength: 2,500 
Strength: c. 100 
2 Dakotas 
6 iight aircraft 
Strength: c. 100 .· 
l 10-ton patrol boat built in the 
USA in 1942 
l 75-t:on pafl:1rol boat built in Fr~nce 
in-1958 
Gendarmerie St~x·ngth: 1,000 
Police Stren~th: 3,000 .,. 
General 
Army 
_Navy 
Police 
General 
Ai,·Force 
S~ JLEONE 
Population: 2,500,000 
Total armed forces: 2,000 
l)efence budget: £750,000 
($2,20~,000) 
Strf>n~th : 1,850 
Strength: l 00 
The Sierra Leone Marine has 
several small craft in use for routine 
harbour duties 
Strength: 2,000 
SOMAUA 
Population: 2,500,000 
Total armed forces: 7,000 
Defence budget: $3,900,000 
Strength: ~,000 
This is at present equipped with 
weapons of World War Two 
vintage 
Strength: 1,000 
F:.5} D Mustangs 
Dakota transports and a few light 
aircraft 
Early in 1964 some MiG-l 5 trainers 
arrived but these may not yet be 
. . 1n service 
Poliu Strength: 4,800 
It has good American equipment 
N.B. - Late in 1963 the Somali 
Government rejected a $10,000,000 joint offer of military aid from the 
USA, Federal Germany and Italy. 
I ' 
Gen,rol 
Anny 
AirForc, 
.I 
It then accepted a $25,000,0-00 
offer from the USSR. The rreported 
intention is that tl1.e army shall· be 
bufillt up to 20,000 men and the air 
force etpanded 
S0\UTJJH1 ~.IFL~.IRCA 
Population: 3, I 00,000 Europeans 
13,000,000 non-Europ-
eans . 
Total armed forces: 26,500 
Defence budget: £105,000,000 ($294,000,000) 
Strength: 19,000 active. 5,500 of 
these are regulars and the rest 
Citizen Force trainees 
40,000 of the total Citizen Force of 
50,000 are ground troops. They 
include men who have done at 
least 3 months full-time training. At present 16,500 men are called 
up each year and given 9 months 
full-time training followed by 4 
years part-time training 
· There is, in addition, a 51,500 part-. 
time Commando force that is 
intended for the maintenance of 
security in rural areas. Members 
are now required to sign on for 4 
years. During this tune they do an 
average of between one and two 
weeks full.,.time training per year. 
There are 210 Commando units. 
Each one is highly mobile; it 
includes infantry and armoured car 
sections and has an air section 
attached. The air commandos are 
being organized into about 12 
squadrons; they have a total of 250 
aircraft some of which are privately· 
owned 
Active strength : 4,000 
(a)_ 1 squadron 1,vith 18 Sabre Mk. 6 
interceptors ( another 20 Sabres are 
held in reserve) 
I squadron of 16 Mirage III C fighter-
bombers equipped ,vith Nord 
AS.30 air-to-surface missiles 
1 training squadron ,vith 6 Canberra 
B-12s 
7 Shackleton maritime reconnaissance 
aircraft 
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60 he!rooprt1;m (come of which will be 
in' .. ~ ·· A.ix Comm.ando section 
' ' 
· ref~,red to) 
. 18 Bc:.cc~ev M[k. 2 aircraft are on 
o:rdeir from the United Kingdom 
· (b) Tiie Citizen Force ·operates ~ 
'___J_ 
· completion of basic training Ire-
emits aK'e attached to an active 
.. Territonal battalion for the reat of 
their 3 ! year period of training 
li~bilityo Afterr that they are placed 
on the !t'~erve 
squadrons with about 200 lhroo/td Air Foru 
aircraft each able to carry 8 l9lb. 
Regular sttength: 900 
15 Vampire day..,fighter/ground attack 
aircraft · fragnientatlon bomoo. Appro,d-
mateUy 300 Harvards are in storage. 
Two other squadrons each with_ l 5 
Varnpire FB-5s are operated by the 
Citizen Force 
.- Active strength: 3,500 
· 2 l, 700-ton destroyers built 1940-42 
3 2, l 0-0-ton frigates built 1960-62 
12 Hwater 9 day-fighter /gro~d attack 
aircraft · 
10 Ctl'ilberra B2 light bombers 
2 Canberra T4 light bombers 
12 Provost T52 light aircraft 
8 Alouette III helicopters 
1· -Dakota transport squadron 
I 2,100-ton frigate built 1942-44 Police 
· 2 l ,4©:ton frigates built 1943-45 
( l is UJ;ed as a training ship) 
Strength:. Europeans, 2,000 . active 
2 1,000-ton ocean minesweepers built 
1942-45 
l O 360 ... t;on coastal minesweepers built 
1957-59 
· 5 120..ton seaward defence boats 
N.B. - All these vessels were built in 
Britain, which still has a naval 
agreement with South Africa ·· 
Strength: 29,600 + 6,000 reservists 
430 riot trucks and 80 armoured cars 
so~ muHI<OI[l)JESRA 
Population: 3,200,000 including 
220,000 Europeans 
Total regular forces: 4,300 · 
Defence budget: £6,120,000 
(S 16,130,000) 
· Regular strength: 3,400 
l Special Air Service squadrC?n- This · 
has 150 European parachute-
trained troops 
2 infantry brigades each vdth 1 · 
Regular and 2 active Territorial 
battalions. One of the Regular 
. battalions has European officers, 
the other is c.:oznposed of Europeans 
There are, in addition 4 reserve 
TerritoriaJ ha ttalions. 
All residents other than Africans 
bet,veen the age of 18 and 23 are 
liable to 4! months' continuous 
... 
military service, followed by three 
years' part-time training. After the 
- .. ;"''" 
'y .. 1 
anq 21,000 reservist; Africans, 
4,4()0 active and 7,500 reservist 
Gm.al Population: 12,500,000 . 
·Total armed forces: 12,000 · 
Defence budget: $21,000,000 
Army . . Strength: 11,000 
An efficient force with British 88-mm. 
fie~d artillery and British and 
Soviet armoured cars and armoured 
personnel carriers 
Air Force Strength : c. -500 
20 light transport, liaison and training 
aircraft 
Nlll!1 Strength: c. 200 
&tablished in· 1962. Has 4 l 00-ton 
patrol boats built in Yugoslavia . 
1961-62 
Polia Strength: 10,000 
TANGANYIKA.,,ZANZIBAR 
(a) 'JI'amigannyru!:xa 
Gmm-al · Population: 9,400,000 
Total armed forces: 1,500 
Defence budget: £2,600,000 
($7,200,000) 
Army Strength: 1,400 
2 battalions which are being re-
organized after the mutinies of 
January 1964. A Nigerian battalion 
is in Tanganyika but is due to 
depart soon .1i 
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'A1 Ge • • • YYest 1"1nany JS starting to tram 
about 20 pilots and is to supply 
Tanganyibl with ·some transport 
and liaison pianea 
Strength: 1,350 ( about 300 of these 
are at pre2ent serving in Zanzibar) 
(h) 7lmimmi~ 
Population: 350,000 
There is a Peoples' Liberation Army 
of 550 men equipped with Soviet 
light artillery and machine guns. 
. About 250 ~f them are currently 
. being trained in Tanganyika 
TOGO 
Population: 1,500,000 
Total armed forces: 1,000 
Defence budget: $500,000 
Strength: 300 now becoming 1,000 
A company is being expanded into,,a 
battalion by the enlistment of 700 
ex-French colonial troops 
Strength: c. 200 
1 river gunboat 
4 patrol vessels 
Strength : 300 
TUNISIA 
Population: 4,000,000 
Total armed forces: 19,500 
Defence budget: $11,400,000 
Strength: c. 19,000 
Strength: c. 200 
12 Saab-91 trainers. 
5 other light aircraft 
Strength: c. 250 
. i '-..... 
l 650-ton coivette built in France in 
1935 
1 7 5-ton patrol boat built in Fr~ce 
in 1958, 
Strength: 4,600 
UGANDA 
Population: 6,500,000 
Total armed forces: 2,000 
Defence budget: £1,465,000 
(S4, I 00,000) 
Strength: 2,000 
2 infantry battalions 
Strength: 5,500 
.. ·. ::: ...• ~- · .. ~>.:".,_,,,. ,:,-•-· ·., ........ •"··--~··· ~,.- -....,.· .... '······ •..... ' .. 
THE UMrfflD ~ RJEPUEUJ.JI<C 
Glll!ITal Population:26,000,0-00 
Totml armed forces: 130,000 
Daence budget: $320,000,000 
A"'!)'· Strength: 10,0,000 of ivhldli 35,000 
are in the Yemen 
· 3 infantry and ! rumoured division 
Another armoured and another in-
fantry division are being formed 
50 Stalin IIJra 
400 T 0 34/85s and 200 T .. 54,s have 
. been delivered. It is probable that 
most of them are operational 
There is, in addition, . a National ., 
Guard of 50,000 men 
. Air Fore, Strength: 20,000 
·25 Tu-16 Badger medium bombers 
100 Il-28 
50 MiG-2 l fighters 
I IO MiG-19 fighters 
150 MiG-17 fighters 
c. 10 batteries of Soviet built SA-I 
Guideline ground-to-air missiles 
N.B. - The aircraft inventory is ba.,ed 
on deliveries. It does not take 
account of the fact that some of the 
planes received have crashed, that 
others have been cannibalized to 
obtain spare parts, and that some 
have been Mthdrawn from service 
on grounds of obsolescence. It is 
likely that the number of I1-28s 
still in service is significantly lower 
than the number quoted. Approxi-
mately half the MiG-I 7s are opera-
tional 
NtJ1!1 Strength: I O,ooo· 
, , r: • • 
1 : • • ~'· ··.' • •• 
4 Skoryi, class destroyers of 2,000 tons 
built in the USSR 1950-52 
t 6 escort vessels of 700 to I, 700 tons 
J displacement built in Britain 1940-
44 
8 ex-Soviet W-chm submarines of 
1,000 tons 
14 minesweepers 
Smaller craft include 5 75-ton fast 
patrol boats with surface-to-surface 
guided missiles of IO to 15 miles 
and c. 40 motor torpedo bo~ts 
N.B. - c. 250 mobile single stage 
ground-to-ground missiles have 
been built. They include the Al 
11 
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-<,q/at · which carries a 1,000.lb. 
w21rheo.d come 235 miles and the 
Al· Kakt!iN whlch carries a rather 
larger "varhead up to 375 mil~. 
There is no evjdence that they have 
a mod.em guidance system. 
. Strength: 150,000 
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UP'~ VOLTA 
Population: 5,00-0,000 
Total armed forces: 1,000 
Defence budget: $2,800,000 · 
Strength : l, 000 
Strength: 1,100 
Strength: 300 
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PART I:. THE MAGHJR.EB COUNTRIES 
Gmeral 
Popul~tion : 1 I, 700,0.90. 
, I ... 
Vobin1mcy military service. 
Tota! armed forces: 48,000. * · 
D3fence estimates 1965: 490 million dinars 
( $ IO I ,000,000 ). 
r otal expenditure 1965: 4,418 million dinars. 
Army 
Total strength: 45,000. 
I n\otorized division. 
Up to 50 independent infantry battalions . . 
4 ·artillery battalions. 
'There are about 200 T-34 and T-54 tanks, 30 
SU-100 assault guns, and 150 armoured person-
nel carriers. . 
It is hoped to form another Soviet-style division 
when trained men become available. 
Some surface-to-air missiles. 
Navy 
Total strength: 1 ,ooo (including those training 
in USSR). . 
3 submarine chasers (ex-Soviet). 
I coastal minesweeper. 
8 motor torpedo boats (ex-Soviet P-6 class). 
Air Force 
Total strength: 2,000. 
About 40 MiG-15, MiG-17, and MiG-21 jet 
fighters. 
12 Il-28 light bombers ( 1 squadron). 
7 An-12 and 6 ll-14 transports. 
About 20 helicopters and a · number of other 
· aircraft, including 30-40 Yak trainers. · 
Gendarmerie 
Total strength: 6,000. 
('ivil Police 
Total strength: 30,000+. . 
The popular militia, which totalled· 30,000, is 
now b,eing disbanded. 
0 Unless specified otherwise, the figure for the total 
armed for1..-cs excludes the Gendarmerie and the Civil 
Police. 
.. 
• 
A ~ ' -lu ''ii-,r,:,\ 
Many. Algerian Anny and Air Force officers 
have received training in the USSR? and a few 
naval cadets in Britain. France has had only a 
minor role in the tiraining and equipment of the 
Algerian armed forces. Under the Evian agree-
ment of March 1962, France was given five-
year rights to the nuclear and other test sites in 
the Sahara, facilities for five years at certain 
airfields, and use and control of communications 
systems in Algeria. She was also given a 15-year 
lease of the Mers-el-Kebir naval base, and the 
right to station troops in the country until July 
1965. Most troops were in fact vvithdrawn from 
Algeria by June 1964, though 4,000 French 
servicemen remain at Mers-el-Kebir and about . 
'2,000 at the Saharan test sites. 
Libya 
General 
Population: 1,610,000. 
Voluntary military service; a consc·ription bill 
is to be introduced during 1966. 
Total armed forces: 7,000. 
Defence estimates 1965 : £L5,ooo,ooo 
(S 14,000,000). 
Total expenditure 1965: £L85,801,4)0 . 
Army 
Total strength: 6,000. 
1 armoured and 5 infantry battalions equipped 
mainly by Britain. 
2 artillery battalions equipped by the USA. 
Navy 
Total strength : 200. 
1 corvette. 
,_,::~· 
2 inshore minesweepers. 
Air Force 
Total strength: 800. 
6 light aircraft and a C-47 transport. 
2 T-33 jet trainers. 
Some more T-33s, about 6 C-47s, and 2 helicop-. 
ters may be supplied by the USA. 
Police 
Total strength: 12,000. 
In Cyrenaica the Police (CYDEF) is a stronger 
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military force than the regular army. It· has · Civi/Police · 
recently been given the responsibility of guarding Total strength: 14,000. 
oil installations against the threat of sabotage. 
Aid· 
Army personnel ·have .had training from the. 
British · and US military missions in Libya, 
some Naval cadets have been training in the 
UK; and about 50 pilots in Germany and the 
USA. A few military personnel are also being 
trained in the Italian, Greek, and Turkish 
forces. 
, I, . Morocco / 
General 
Population: 13,435,000. . 
Voluntary .. military service; a conscription bill 
is to be introduced during 1966. 
Total armed forces: 44,800. 
Defence estimates 1965: 315 million dirhams 
($62,000~000 ). 
Total expenditure 1965: 3,006 million dirhams .. 
Army 
Total strength : 42,000. 
1 motorized inf an try brigade and 15 inf an try 
battalions. 
1 armoured brigade, with T ·54 medium tanks, 
AMX- 13 light tanks, and Pa'!hard armoured 
cars. , e ,• •, 'CC 
i light security brigade, inc{Uding a parachute 
battalion. · 
Navy 
Total strength: 800. 
2 frigates. 
3 patro I vessels. 
1 tank landing craft. 
There is also a small coast-guard· force, which 
is not under naval control. 
Air Force 
Total strength: 2,000. 
14 MiG-15/17 jet fighters. 
50 liaison and training aircraft, including Yak-9 
and M agister jet trainers. 
20-30 transport-communication aircraft of vari-
ous types, including 6 C- 1 19 and 6 c~47 given 
by the United States .... _ 
Aid 
American military training for · the Army has 
almost been completed, but is still in progress . 
for Air Force personnel, especially on the 
transport aircraft supplied by the USA. 
All French troops were ,vithdrawn from 
Morocco in 1961, but many French instructors, 
NCOs, and technicians have remained to train 
the armed forces, especially the Air Force. 
France is said to provide 'considerable logistic · 
support' for the Moroccan armed forces. In 
addition she delivered some Fouga Magister 
aircraft in 1963. probably as ·a gift. In 1964, 
358 Moroccans were receiving military training 
in France. Britain gave 25 locally assembled· 
Land Rovers to the Anny in April 1964. 
Tunisia 
General 
Population: 4, 700,000. 
Military service: one year (selective). 
Total armed forces: 17,000 .. 
Defence estimates 1965: 4.3 million 
($8, I 80,000). "--~f 
Total budget 1965: 105.3 million dinars. 
Army 
Total strength: 16,000. 
7 inf an try battalions. 
1 mixed squadron, including M~41 tanks. 
1 artillery group. . . 
Navy 
Total strength: 500. 
1 escort vessel. 
6 fast patrol boats. 
Air Force 
Total strength: 500. 
u 
dinars 
15 Saab 91-D Sa.fir and 12 T-6 Te.tan-Harvard 
advanced trainers. 
8 Aermacchi B-326 jet trainers. 
2 A/ouette helicopters. 
Some other light aircraft. 
Gendarmerie Gendarmerie 
Total strength: 2,000, plus 14,000 auxiliaries. · Total strength: 5,000. 
There are also some companies of Royal Guards. ··About 6 battalions. 
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Civil Police 
Total strength: 4,6bo. 
-....Aid 
There is a small American military assistance 
team in Tunisia, and it is believed that some Tunim 
sians have received training in the United States. 
Some American military equipment was given 
between I 960 and I 964. France has supplied a 
small amount of air training, and left a small 
LJ _L___ __ 
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team to provide instruction on the facilities of 
the Bizerta base, which. was handed over to 
Tunisia in 1963. France also gives son1e naval 
trainingo 
Sweden supplied a small mission for training 
on the Sa.firs supplied in I 96o-61, and Italy will 
similarly help with training on the Aerniacchi. · 
A military aid agreement ,vas signed with the 
United Arab Republic in I 96 I, under which 
the UAR was to send military supplies, but Jittle 
~r nothing seems to have come of it. 
. . 
PART II: THE8RANCOPHONE COUNTRIES 
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Cameroon 
· . General 
Population: 4,900,000 . 
. Voluntary military service. 
Total armed forces: 3,500. 
Defence estimates: 3,900 million CF A francs 
($15,800,000). 
Total budget: 19,959 million CFA francs. 
Army , 
Total strength: 3,000. 
3 infantry battalions. 
1 annoure·d car squadron. 
Engineer and support companies. 
Navy 
Total strength: 200. 
2 patrol vessels. 
I river gun boat. 
Air Force 
Total strength: 300. 
I C-47 transport and 2 light transports., 
Gendarmerie 
Total strength: 3,000 .. 
There are also 1,800 mobile police. 
Civil Police 
Total strength: 5,900. 
Aid 
· The French military installations at Douala and 
Koutaba have been handed over to the Carner-
. \• 
. ,,. '' ·, ....... 
.'' .. '· '-', .·_ 1; ,_}.:., ' 
l ..... 
oun armed forces, .and all French troops have 
left the country. There is no defence treaty 
. between France and the Cameroun, but there 
is a Technical Assistance . Agreement, under 
which France has provided funds and handed 
over military equipment. · 
The United States has given some grant aid 
under the Military Assistance Programme and 
has also made some surplus equipment available. 
Central African Republic 
General 
Population: I ,500,000. 
Military service: 2 years. 
Total armed forces: 6oo. 
Defence estimates: 575 million CFA francs 
($2,325,000). 
. Total budget 1965: 7,244 million CFA francs. 
Army 
Total strength: 500. 
I infantry battalion . 
Air Force 
Total strength: 1 oo. 
1 C4 7 transport. 
3 light aircraft. 
I helicopter. 
Gendarmerie 
Total strength: 500. . · 
.I. ~ 
There is also a Republican Guard of approxi-
mately 700 men. 
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Civil Police 
.. · Military service: 2 years. 
Total strength: 330. 
Aid 
The Central African Republic is· linked to 
France by a bilateral defence agreement, and a 
. small French garrison has been stationed at 
Bangui or Bouar. JFranoe has provided basic 
equipment and technical assistance for the 
armed forces, and the United States has supplied 
some equipment for the internal security forces. 
Chad 
General 
Total armed forces: 1,800. , 
Defence estimates: 925 million CF A francs 
($3,758,000). 
Total budget: 10,462 million CF A francs. 
Army 
Total strength: 1,400. 
I infantry battalion. 
Some· ·'youth volunteer' units. 
Navy 
Total stren~h: 200. 
5 patrol vessels. 
I patrol boat. 
Air Force 
., . 
i"'.· 
Population: 2,900,000. 
Military service: 2 years. 
Total armed forces: 900. 
Defence estimates: 1,426 million. CFA francs 
. · · Total strength : 200. 
1' DC-3 transport. 
...... 
· ($5,835,000). 
. 
Total budget: 10,500 million CPA francs. 
Army 
Total strength: 700. 
I inf an try battalion (4 companies). 
Air Force 
Total strength: 200. 
I C-47 transport., 
3 light aircraft. 
I helicopter . 
Gendarmerie 
Total strength: 550. 
Civil Police 
Total strength: 1,950. 
Aid 
' . 
Chad is linked to France by a bilateral defence 
agreement, and there is also a regional defence 
treaty with France, the CAR, Congo (Brazza-
ville), and Gabon. About 1,000 French troops . 
are based at Fort Lamy, and a French military 
mission with up to 200 men has been reported. 
France has provided Army and Air Force 
equipment, and French military aid in 1964, 
excluding this equipment, was worth about 
NF 6 million. 
Congo (Brazzarille) 
General 
Population: .875,000. 
8 
. ' 
.. 
3 light aircraft. 
1 helicopter. 
Gendarmerie · -, -· 
Total strength: 1,400 . 
Organized in 20 companies . 
Civil Police 
Total strength: 500. . 
Aid 
_ .. ,'l 
··;. .. 
' . , . . 
·congo (Brazzaville) is linked with France by a 
bilateral defence agreement, and there is a 
regional defence treaty with France, the CAR, 
Chad, and Gabon. 
France has provided Army and Air Force 
equipment and French experts. In September 
1964, a 7-man military mission went to Peking, 
where an offer of arms may have been n1ade. 
There is a considerable Chinese military mission 
active in Brazzaville. 
Dahomey 
General 
Population: 2,375,000. 
Military service: 18 months. 
Total armed forces: 1,800. 
Defence estimates: 995 mi11ion CFA francs 
($4,070,000). 
Total .budget 1965: 8,268 million CFA francs. 
Army 
Total strength: 1, 700. 
· 3 infantry battalions. 
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Air force 
Total strength: 100. 
I C-47 transport. 
2 light aircraft. 
Gend,1r1nerie 
Total strength: I ,200. 
()rganized in 8 companies. 
(~ivil Police 
Total strength : I ,ooo. 
Aed 
I' 
' 
I)ahomey is linked to France by a · bilateral 
defence agreement, and there is a regional 
Jefenc.e agreement with France~ the Ivory Coast, 
and Niger. The French base at Parakou has been 
handed over to Dahomey, and the last French 
troops left in March I 965. 
France has provided basic Army equipment, 
and the United States has given token assistance 
of a few light vehicles. 
Gabon 
General 
Population: 630,000. 
Military service: I year. ,- · · 
Total armed forces: 750. 
Defence estimates: 625 million CF A francs 
($2,540,000). 
Total budget 1965: 8,236 million CFA francs. 
Army --. ' 
Total strength: 600. 
1 battalion (2 c<;>mpanies oJily). 
· Navy 
Total strength: 100. 
2 patrol vessels. 
Air Force 
Total strength: 50. 
I or 2 light aircraft. 
Gendarmerie 
Total strength: 6oo. 
Civil Police 
Totals~: 900. 
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Aid 
Gabon is linked to France by a bilateral defence 
. agreement, and acceded to the regional defence 
agreement v,ith France, the CAR, Chad, and 
Congo (Brazzaville) in 196 I. France has given 
equipment for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. 
There are around 60 French officers and NCOs 
serving in the Gabonese Gendannerie. French 
military aid was worth NF 4 million in I 964. 
Ivory Coast 
General 
P J • opu ... at1on: 3,925,000. 
Military service: 6 months. 
Total armed forces: 4,000. 
Defence estimates: 2,175 million CPA francs 
($8,825,000). 
Total expenditure 1965: 31,875 million CFA 
francs. 
Army 
Total strength: 3,500. 
3 infantry battalions. 
Marine and support companies. 
Navy 
Total strength: 200 .. 
2 patrol boats. 
Air Force 
Total strength: 300. 
' . . 
•• • L :..,. . ...:.. '~ • 
1 C-4 7 transport, 4 Broussard light transports. 
2 Alouette helicopters. 
Gendarmerie 
Total strength: I ,500. 
Civil Police 
Total strength: 800. 
Aid 
Ivory Coast is linked to France. by a bilateral 
defence agreement and has a regional defence 
agr~ement with France, Niger, and Dahomey. 
Some 600 French troops are stationed at 
Abidjan (including a detachment at Niamey, 
Niger), and there is a military air base at Port 
Bouet, a suburb of Abidjan. There is a French 
military mission of 200-250 men. 
France has given a substantial amount of 
equipment for the armed forces, and in I 963 
9 
,..- ··-·' 
.Israelis_ ivere ~rganizing an Army School for. 
• • • • CIVJC aetiOIDlo 
The USA has given a small amount of grant 
aid. 
General 
Population: 6,zoo~ooo. 
Military servic~: compulsory military or civic 
service of x 8 months. · 
Total anned forces: 4,000·. 
Def enoo estimates: 2,250 million Malgaches 
francs ($9,130,000). 
Total budget 1965: 25,509 miUion Malgaches · 
francs. 
.Army 
Total str~ngth: 3,500. 
3 infantry battalions, plus an armoured squadron, 
· an artillery battery, and some transport. · 
Navy 
Total strength: 100 • 
. · 1 coastal escort. 
I patrol vessel. 
Air Force 
Total strength: 400. 
3 c .. 47 transports. _ 
7 Broussard light transports. 
2 helicopters. 
Gendarn1erie 
Total strength: 3, I oo. 
Civil Police 
Total strength: 5,900. 
Aid 
The Malagasy Republic is linked to France by a 
bilateral defence agreement, and is the centre-of 
a zone d' outre mer. Approx,imately 2,500 French 
troops are stationed at Diego-Suarez, with small 
detachments at Ivato and Antsirabe. 
France has given substantial military assist-
ance, which was worth over 50 million francs in 
1964, and has trained over 100 anned personnel 
in France. West Germany has made an offer of 
military assistance, which includes 30 jeeps and 
5 coastal patrol boats; some Malagasy seamen 
have trained in West Gennany. 
10 
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Mall 
General 
Population: 4, 7 I 0,000. 
Military service: ·2 years. · 
Total armed forces: 3,500. 
Defence estimates: 2,175 million Mali francs 
($8"825llooo). 
Total budget 1964-65: 10,025 million Mali . 
francs. 
Army 
Total strength: 3,5·00. 
3 inf an try battalions. 
I paratroop company. 
· Air Force · 
Nil. 
Gendarmerie 
Total strength: I ,ooo. · 
Civil Police 
Total strength: 6oo. 
Aid 
·, .' ~ . 
All French troops left Mali in 1961, and Mali 
does not have any defence treaty with: France. 
Mali has received military equipment from the 
USSR and Eastern Europe whose value is 
estimated· at about $3 million; this is mostly in 
the form of light arms. Some officers have 
trained in the USSR. 
The United States maintains a small per- _ 
manent military aid mission, in addition to 
which visiting missions have cornplcted assign-
ments that included the training and equiprnent 
of a paratroop company, at a cost of more than 
$2l million, and the training of a n1obile 
engineers team in 1964. The current _value of 
American military aid is estimated at $500,000 
a year. 
Mauritania 
General 
Population: 1,000,000. 
Military service: 2 years. 
Total armed forces: 1,000. " 
Defence estimates: 1,000 mHlion CF A francs . 
($4,060,000). 
Total budget I 965: 5,58 I million CF A francs. 
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Army 
Tota) strength: 900. 
1 para-commando company. 
Some mobile squadrons with motor vehicles .. 
A camel corps. 
Navy 
Nil. 
Air Force 
Total strength: 100. 
1 C-4 7 transport. 
2 light aircraft. 
Gendarmerie 
Integrated with the army. 
. Civil Police 
Total strength: 800. 
Aid. 
Mauritania is linked to France bv a bilateral 
' 
. . 
defence agreement, but the detachment of the 
Dakar (Senegal) garrison, previously maintained 
at Atar (one of France's main West African air 
bases), has now been withdrawn. The Mauri-
tanian Army and Air Force have been built up 
with French assistance and personnel, and 
French military aid in I 964 was worth 6 miHion 
francs excluding gifts of equipment. All Army 
and Gendarmerie units, with the exception of 
the Flying Training School, are now com-
manded by Mauritanian officers. 
. Niger 
Gener~! 
Population: 3,3 I 2,000. 
Military service: 2 years. 
Total armed forces: 1,200. 
Defence estimates: 900 million CFA francs 
($3,650,000). 
Total budget 1965: 8,386 million CFA francs. 
Army 
Total strength: I, I oo: 
5 inf an try companies with supporting services. 
1 armoured car squadron. 
1 para-commando platoon. 
Air Force 
Total strength: _100. 
I .l 
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I C-4 7 transport. ,. -·· . 
3 light aircraft. 
Gendarmerie 
. -8I-
TotaJ strength: 1,300 (including ·1,000 National 
Guard). 
Civil Police · 
Total strength: 400. 
Aid 
Niger is linked to France by a bilateral defence 
agreement, and also participates in a regional 
defence agreement with France, Dahomey, and 
Ivory Coast. 
The French troops in Niger, other than an 
armoured squadron at Niamey, have been 
evacuated. The armed forces · are French-
equipped, with French advisers. 
Senegal 
General 
Population: 3,490,000. 
Military service: 18 months ( or five years' civic 
service). 
Total armed forces: 5,500. 
Defence estimates: 5,200 million CF A francs 
($2 I ,050,000 ). 
Total budget 1965-66: 45,948 million CFA 
francs. 
· Army 
Total strength: 5,000. 
4 motorized inf ailtry battalions (5 companies 
each). . 
... 
1 There is a parachute, an engineers, a signals, and 
an armoured car squadron, this last with 
AMM-8 vehicles. 
Navy 
Total strength: 200. 
3 patrol vessels. 
Air Force 
Total strength: 30Q. 
2 C-4 7 transports. 
6 light aircraft. 
2 helicopters. 
Gendarmerie 
Total strength: 1,500 •. 
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Civil Police 
Total strength: 3,000. 
Aid 
Senegal is llinked to France by a bilateral ·defence 
treaty and is the centre of ·a zone d'outre0 mer. 
There are at· present 2,000 French troops sta-
tioned at Dakar; iliese include 1,000 Anny, 
6oo Navy" and 300 Air Force personnel. There 
is a French military mission of about 150 men, 
and France has supplied equipment for all three 
services of the Sermegalese forces. 
The United States has given .over $2 million 
of aid to Senegal, of which a part went to 
training millitary units for civic action. There is 
a small American military aid group. · 
Senegal has in addition a defence agreement 
with recently independent Gamb~a, whose land 
frontiers it entirely smrou1uis; this provides for 
mutual assistance to maintain external security, 
a joint · Defence Committee with a permanent 
Secretariat, ·and Senegalese assistance in training 
any · Gambian military or para-military unit. 
I 
Toao 
· ·General 
Population: 1,618,000 .. 
Military ~rvice: 2 years. 
Total armed forces: 1,450. 
Defence estimates: 672 million CF A .francs 
(S2, 757 ,ooo ). 
Total budget 1965: 4,974 million CFA francs. 
Army 
Total strength: 1,200. 
1 infantry battalion and supporting services. 
Navy 
Tqtal strength: 250. 
I fiver gunboat. 
3 patrol vessels. 
Gendarmerie 
Total strength: 1,000. 
Civil Police 
Total strength: 300. 
Aid 
·, 
. ' 
Togo is linked to France by a defence and aid 
agreement which ·was signed in July 1963, i.e. 
12 
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after the military coup ,ii1hich overthrew Presi-
dent Olympic irr January of that year. She had 
been receiving some military aid and French 
advisers before, a1md . under the agreement she 
received increased aid and some Army and 
Police officers were seconded to her forces. 
It is believed that the 700 ex-French Colonial 
troops, whose discontent was partly responsible 
for the 1963 coup, have been re-enlisted in the 
. Togo forces. 
Upper Volta 
General 
Population: 4,785,000. 
Military servi~: 2 years. 
Total armed forces: 1,500. 
Defence estimates: 700 million CF A francs 
($2,819,000). 
Total budget 1965: 4,974 million CFA francs . 
Army 
Total strength: 1,200-1,500. 
I infantry battalion. 
I reconnaissance squadron. 
A paratroop and an engineers company are 
being formed. 
Air Force· 
Total strength: 50. 
I light aircraft. 
Gendarmerie 
Total strength: 1,500 (including 1,000 National 
Guard). 
Civil Police 
Total strength: 300. 
Aid 
Upper Volta has refused to sign a defence treaty 
with France or to accept French bases on her 
territory. She has, however, signed a technical 
co-operation agreement, which provides for 
, French military assistance, and France has 
recently supplied equipment including 5 ar-
moured cars, 316 other vehicles, a number of 
6o-mm., 75-mm., and 80-n1m. mortars, and a 
light aircraft. 
The United States has given a small amount 
of grant aid, which was intended for equipment 
directed towards civic action. 
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PART TWO 
This study deals with bilateral aid to th_e 
. independent African states. It does not include 
details of clandestine aid to guerrilla or freedom 
movements, nor of multilateral aid to the Congo 
through the United. Nations. Under each country, 
a note has been made of defence agreen1ents, 
bases and foreign garrisons, of · the principal 
arms suppliers and their terms, and of technical 
training abroad and by foreign missions in the 
country. In this last all training given to the 
armed fore es is included, even if it be in non-
military civic-action. 
ALGERIA 
France. Under the Evian agreement of March 
1962, France was given 5 year rights to the 
nuclear and other test sites in the Sahara, fae,ilities 
· for 5 years at ·certain airfields and use and control 
of communications systems in Algeria. She \Vas 
also given a 15 year lease of the Mers-el-Kebir 
naval base and the right to station troops. in the · 
1 ,-· country until July 1965. All troops were in fact 
withdrawn by June 1964, though 4,000 French 
troops remain at Mers-el-Kebir. 
France has only a minor role in the training 
and equipment of the Algerian forces;. almost 
all ~e 300 Algerian officers in the French fore es 
declined to serve in the Algerian army but France 
has sold MTBs to the Algerian navy. 
UKo Britain is training l O Algerian· naval cadets 
at a cost to Britain ·of £8,000 in 1964-65. 
UAR, USS1Flo Both the scale of Russian and 
Egyptian military assistance and the degree of 
co-operation between them are uncertain. Russia 
and the u AR have played the greater part in buiid-
ing up the Algerian forces s_ince the days of the 
ALN. One report put the number of ALN soldiers 
training in Communist countries in Octoher 
1960 as high as 250, while another claimed that 
more than 80 pilots had been trained in ·the 
Soviet Union in 1961-62. The Russian attitude to 
the FL N was exceedingly cautious, and it was 
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only in the closing stages. of the ,var that she 
began to supply heavier equipment to the Algerian 
rebels in Morocco and Tunisia. 
The border fighting with Morocco in mid-'· 
October 1963 brought a stream of circurnstantial 
reports of the landing of large numbers of Russian 
tanks and other equipment. Ho,,·ever, as Le 
Mo1Jd~. remarked at the time~ the nature, extent 
and terms of foreign aid rernained uncertain: 
it is indeed inhcrcfltly improbable that sub-
stantial arms shipn1ents could ha \·e started 
arriving from C~uba or the Soviet Union only a 
fortnight after· the initial clash, while rVehrkunde 
for March 1964 placed Algerian ~irmoured 
strength at no higher than 6 AMX and 10 H.ussian-
built tanks. The evidence is probably best ac- · 
counted for by assuming that the u AR sent forces 
(admitted by Al Ahratn), to cope \vith the im-
mediate crisis, equipped with their ()\VO Russian 
tanks, and that the first substantial shipn1cnts 
of equipment from Russia did not begin to arrive 
until May 1964. Estimates vary widely of thr. 
present strength of the Algerian army. · 18 fak-11 
trainer/fighters have been given by the Ilussians. 
At least 50 tanks have been delivered; though 
the real figure may be bet,veen 150 and 200 
I'-54s and l'-34s. The armoured division at 
present in the process of formation \vill ulti1natc I y 
require up,vard of 200 tanks. It is reported that 
most of i\lgeria's $74m oil royalties are being 
spent on capital equipn1f'nt. Srveral hundred 
.. \Jgerians are rect .. j\'ini:, tra1ning in the tL\ R. 
Russia or East Europe. 
BURUNDI 
Belgium. There were plans at independence in 
1962 to build up an army of 1,200 men by 1965. 
There are 50 Belgian advisers (to be rP-duced to 
33 in 1965). 
, The cost of the programme in 1964 ,vas 12m 
Belgian francs ($0.25m); the t'stimate for 1965 
22m Belgian francs ($0.44m). 
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~..JhilER<Of[ID! stationed in different countries ( Chad and 
The security crwis caused by the activities ~f , CAR) under the ne\v reorganization . 
the terrorist organization, the Union of Cameroun- France has provided army and air force equip-
ian Peoples ( u Pc) has eased since the departure of ment, and French experts. 
its leader Dr Felix Moumie and the setting up of a 
legitimate wing of the UPC in 1962. 
FmL:ilceo There is a technical assistance agreement 
but· no defence treaty. The base at Douala has 
recently been handed -over to the Cameroun 
forces. 
'The. -creation of an army and small air force 
and navy is reported to have cost '.France about 
$7m p.a. since 1961. . 
USAo The Military Assistance Programme gave 
$247,000 of grant aid in 1962-63. $4,000 \\i'Orth 
of surplus equipment was also made available. 
The equipment included vehicles and a C-47 
transport aircraft. 
CENTRAIL AFRICAN REPUBUC 
France. There is a regional defence treaty \\'ith' 
Franct\ Congo, (~had and Gabon. Under the 
forthcoming r{'deplovment, there is to be a 
.detachment of tht' F. 1rt Lamy garrison at Bangui 
or Bouar. France h.~"{ provided basic ~quipnicnt 
and technical assistance. 
USA. The L~ nited States provided $200,000 of 
equipment ih 1962, for an internal security 
assistance programn1e under A.I .D. 
... 
CHAD 
France. There is a regional defence treaty with 
France, CAR, Congo and Gabon. Apparently un-
moved by the denunciation of the defence treaty 
by the Chad National Assembly, the French 
have announced that under their regroupment 
to be completed by June 1965, 1,000 troops (less 
detachments in the c AR) are to be based on Fort 
Lamy, one of Fra11cf:s 111a)or bases in sub-Saharan 
.\frica. 
France has provided army and air force equip-
mtTi: 
A 200 man military mission is reported. 
r 
CONGO (Brazzaville) 
Otfna. In ·september 1964 a 7 man military 
miuion went to Peking, where an offer of arms 
may have been made. 
. Fnmceo There is a regional defence treaty with 
France, CAR, Chad_ and Gabon. Congo is the cen-
tre of a zone d' outre-mer. Unlike the remaining 
ZOMs, the French troops concerned are to be 
\.. 
' ·• . 
aJONGO (lL~~@Il©lwfillle) 
ImceDgiimi.mrau rfhe direct military presence of Belgium 
ended with the handing over of the I{amina and 
Kitona bases to the Congolese government in 
March 1964 .. 
Although Belgium had provided bilateral 
military aid since 1960, after General Mobutu's 
appeal of June 1%3 it \\'as increased more than 
eight times to a value of 38.6m B. francs ($0. 7m) 
in 1964 and will rise again to 56m B. francs 
($1. lm) in 1965. 
This aid for the most part takes th~ fi)rm of 
technical assistance designed (a) as a stop-gap to 
keep the Congolese Army ( AN C) viable (' Oj,era-
tion Survie') and (b) to set up a training centre 
where the ANC can be systematically retrained 
unit by unit. 1,here were 187 Belgian army 
officers and NCOs in the Congo in mid-October. 
1964; the total should reach a ceiling of 300 by 
the end of I 965. 
Belgium is also co-operating with Italy in the 
training of an air-arm. The 15th Wing of Belgian 
Transport Command, of 137 officers and NCOs 
( due to rise to a probable maximum of 150) 
is operating . the Kamina air base'I · flying aircraft 
(20 DC-3s and 6 helicopters) provided by the 
United States, and training Congolese pilots. 
445 Congolese have been trained in Belgium, 
442 are undergoing training and 340 should be 
sent next year. 
Little equipment is being provided and that 
mainly small arms ammunition. However, when 
refusing President Tshombe's request that Belgian 
officers should take direct command of Congolese 
troops in August 1964, Belgium agreed to send 
more material aid . 
. Israel. As a result of General Mobutu's appeal, 
Israel agreed to train paratroops and paratroop 
instructors. 250 were trained in Israel in 1963; 
a iurther 100 arrived in October 1964. 
Italy. Italy agreed to form and train an air-arm; 
providing aircraft, equipment, spares and training 
expepses to a value of 300m lire ($480,000). 
UK. Britain has given vehicles, spare parts and 
river transport equipment worth £30,000 and 
supports 2 Congolese cadets at Sandhurst. 
USA. $4.8m of grant aid and $7,000 of excess 
stocks, given under a bilateral agreement of June 
. 9·. 
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1963, which promised a total of S6m grant aid 
and $95,000 e1rcess stocks, had been provided 
by June l S64. This included l O G4 7s, 10 heli-
copter-a, 6 T-2&, over 300 vehicles emd com-
munications equipment, worth in all $ l .5m. 
Another $l.4m was provided in training and 
$1. 9m in pay for the AN c ( including mercenaries). 
Since June, 4 c .. 1303, 3 helicopters and a small 
nwnber of JB..26s have been despatched while 
3 C-1245 are running a shuttle service from 
Europe.· 
There were in September 1964 20Q military 
and air force pernonnel in the Congo; Of these 
106 ( 40 paratroops, l O army, 56 air force) came 
with the C-l 30s. There is a permanent MAAG . 
of IO; the remainder are accounted for in tem-
porary mobile training teams of 13-20 men 
staying 4-20 weeks. 
ID>A1ffi<O>JMOEY 
Franooo There is a regional defence agreement 
with France, Ivory Coast and Niger. The French 
base at Parakou has recently been handed over to 
Dahomey. 
France has provided basic army equipment. 
US.Ao The United States gave token. assistance 
of $62,000 of grant aid consisting of 8 . jeeps 
and 8 trucks in 1962 and 1963. 
.. 
India. After the revolt of December 1960, Indian 
instructors were brought in for . the Imperial 
Guard and for the Military Academy at Harar. 
Kenyao A defence treaty ratified in December 
· 1963, provided for mutual aid if either was 
attacked by a third party. 
Norwmya A naval training mission of about 20 
officers and petty officers is in Ethiopia. Ethiopians 
serve· on Norwegian ships after receiving basic 
training in Ethiopia. Finance is provided by 
Ethiopia. 
Swooermo Swedish military assistance dates from 
1934. A Cadet School was organized by Swedish 
officers in· 1946. In 1956, at Ethiopian request, 
a group of officers, 15 strong at its largest, was 
sent to organize an Office of the Chief of Staff 
of the Imperial Armed Forces. This task was 
completed in 1962, but 3 Swedish officers remain 
to assist the Chief of Staff. 
When Ethiopia bought Saab B-17s in 1946, 
Sweden provided instructors and technicians 
for them and for the later Saab Safi.rs. The 15 
officers and 50 technicians in Ethiopia in 1959 
JQ.,., 
.,,_.' ;-.' ~ 
. , .. 
·- . -.. -·- .• J __ L__ 
have mostly completed their work. Only 5 
technicians remain. 
All these officers were paid for by the Ethiopian 
government. 
UK.It Britain provides some naval training facilities 
and financial support for cadets in Britian. 2 
army and 30 B,~val cadets are training _in Britain. 
US.&.o There. are 1,300 military personnel at 
the Kagnew communications station. Ethiopia 
has received more American aid than all the 
other countries of Africa together. A total · of 
nearly $74m of grant aid was given between 
1953 and June 1964, with a further $8.Bm alloca-
ted. In addition -$13.Sm worth of excess stocks 
has been given. The army is equipped with 
American weapons; the air force and navy have 
considerable quantities of American equipment 
(see Adelphi 12, -African Military Balance p. 6). 
There were 94 military and 3 civilian MAP 
personnel in_ Ethiopia during - 1964-65.. The 
United States has provided technicians and 
instructors for the air force, and instructors ti 
for the army, including the staffing of the Army 
Parachute Training Centre at Debra Zeid by 
a Mobile Airborne Training Team. 
GABON 
· France. Gabon acceded· to the regional -defence · 
agreement with France, CAR, Chad and Congo 
in 1961. France gave equipment for both · an 
army and a small air-arm. · 
· There are 13 French officers in the Gabon 
forces. 
GHANA 
Canada. Under an agreement signed in 1961, 
Canada has provided 30 officers to assist with 
cadet and administrative training. 
China. Part of the Chinese loan agreement 
signed in October 1962 was to be used- to se~ up 
two arms factories. None of this credit was ever 
used. 
hn~. Until 1960, Ghanaian air force training 
. \vas directed by an lnd\an officer. Some cad~ts 
still train in India. 
Il:§rro<.ello The air pilots school was- set up \'\·ith 
Israeli assistance in 1958--60. 
Pmk.n§ru.rum. Some cadets have trained in Pakistan. 
UK.a Britain provided basic army equipment 
before independence. Until 1961 there were over 
200 British officers and N COs. seconded to the 
Ghanaian armed forces. During 1961 and 1962, 
the Chief of Pefence Staff was replaced by a 
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G~2naian and an agreement was signed under tions in December 1963. Training facilities in 
~vhich Britain provides and contributes· to the Ethiopia have been offered to the !{enya aimed 
00:1 ·of a Joint ,Services Training Team, now. forces. 
comisting of 203 (rl-Hcen; and NCOs. A small lioroeil~ 30 army officers and 5 pilots "vvere trained 
RE detachment remains · in the country o 242 in Israel in l 963 (before independence). 
Ghanaians are training in the. United Kingdom, tUHKo Britain's base in I{enya was evacuated by 
awnd Ghana has bought both air force and naval 12 December, 1964. Under an agreement of 
{;"qUipment in Britain. Britain has recently agreed March 1964, the British army ,Nill,_,continue to 
Ito bt~_ild a frigate, for which she is providing a train in Kenya, and the RAF and RN will use 
,._ ...... ) 
credit. of 90 per · rent of the cost, expected t9 i;.,- Kenya facilities. Britain has agreed to provide 
an1ount [ o £Sm. . · air, logistical and technical support for the 
USAo The United States provided token training operations on $e N.E. frontier. There were in 
facilities worth $27,000 in 1962-63. March 1964 IO(f.troops involved in escort duties 
USS1Rlo 68 cadets were sent to the Soviet Union on the northern frontier and 140_ engi.neers 
on a 3} year course in October 1961. Russia l;>u.i_lding __ r9c1:ds. These are to be withdrawn 
I·: .. - ~-
has provided equipment, including patrol boa~, independently of other British troop~ in I<.enya. 
and some technical 'assistance. The Kenyan army was provided with basic 
Yugo§Jlmwnae Yugoslav aid and credits have been equipment from Britain before independence. 
employed in · the construction of a naval base. Britain· recently agreed to give £3.5m of arms, 
Germany. In 1963 Gcermany agreed to train 
and outfit 3 en~ineer companies and expand 
road and comrnunication networks at a cost of 
DM I Om ($2.37m). This programme· has been 
so successful that a second, of DM 20m ($4.7m), 
is to be undertaken. 
USSR &Mmdl CE{c(Clm@mlovatidmo Since March 1959, 
,vhen the Czechs sent a military mission . and 
gave_ 2 -shiploads of arms as an unsolicited gift, 
the Guinean army has been equipped with arms 
of Soviet origin, including AFV s and 122mm 
guns, worth well over £lm. 
France. Regional defence agreement with France; 
Niger and Dahomey. The Ivory Coast is the 
Centre of a zone d'outre-mer. Under the redeploy-
ment, 600 troops (less a detachment in Niger) 
will be stationed at Abidjan. 
The nucleus of an army was provided by the 
handing. over of the 24th Battalion, Overseas 
Infantry, enlisted in ~he Ivory Coast, in 1961. 
France also gave 3 planes for an air force. . 
equipment, vehicles and ajrcraft for expansion 
and modernization, (with £8.5m worth of British 
military assets in Kenya, mainly land and including 
the RA:F base at Eastleighs). She has also agreed 
to give up to £l .3m to establish a navy - £!m 
for 3 patrol craft to be built in Britain, the rest 
for training, anq. establishing a base at Mombasa:. 
There are 165 officers and NCOs on secondment 
to the Kenyan armed forces. It is expected that 
these will shortly form a Joint Services Training 
Team. An air tr~ing scheme is under way, 
for which £ l 08,000 ( I 964-65) has been allocated; 
and in October 1964 Britain agreed to send a 
naval training team, provide training facilities 
and lend a ship until Kenya obtained her own. 
There are 54 Kenya army personnel training in 
Britain. A 200 man parachute company is being 
trained in England in batches. 
USSJR aim.di E. Eunrr@}?eo Some of about 100 
students sent to E. Europe in April are reported 
to be receiving military training in Bulgaria. They 
were sponsored by KANU and not by the Defence 
Ministry. 
JJRERIA 
lsmello In 1963, Israeli officers were organizing 
an army school for civic action. 
USA. $60,000 o_f grant aid in 1961-63. 
USA. In 1959, a defence agreement was ~igned 1 
under which there was to be consultation i£ -
,,-
~r was attacked or threatened. ' J 
{.-.., , ' 
f-' - 1_ Y' ,,., ·1 I ~--. 
KENYA 
Cbiffll&o 18 Kenyans are reported to be receiving 
one year's guerrilla · warfare training at Wuhan 
military academy, sponsored by KANU •. 
lEti:lhmopim. Defence pa~t and military convena-
- .. " 
.. •; 
Liberia had received $2.lm of grant aid and 
$74,000 of excess stocks by March 1964. She 
had also bought $1,179,000 worth of equipment. 
on credit provided by the Military Assistance 
Programme. There is a further $1.Bm of grant. · 
aid and $9,000 of excess stocks in the pipeline. \ . 
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. Gv:s~ney~ 20 Libynn pilots and ground pemonnel 
. . . . :• ... . . . ~ . are ·~P5-.tnlm~ m .~~y.. . . ' . 
. -.~~·· Under aml aweerl!ent signed m l 953, Britain. 
~r~!ae~· -··~ h~ral . ~~ the_ right to station troop3 
. ira. JI.a~··~- reromfor an annual payment of.£3!m .. 
· . -ln ,1984 Brlwin had nvo battalions in the country 
. anQ· airfield:} at . Idris and elc.Adem. Negotiations 
. . . . . . 
. 
on the future of the basea are now 1n. progress. ' 
· In . 1958 Britain agreed to -provide and pay 
for the s~~ arms and light equipment for a 
Libyan ~}' of 5,000 mm Deliveries, worth a 
· quarter of. a million J}?-nundB, ivere completed in 
·.1961. Britain ·. h~ agreed to provide .2 ships 
. as~ the nucl~us of a. navy. Since 1962, the British 
military mwsio!-l has been joined by a naval 
mission. The joint mission is now 52 strong and is 
costing £84,,000 this year. Britain has also been 
paying l,7 ,000 p.a~ since 1962 towards the cost 
of trai.m.ng .26 Libyan naval cadets in the Unit~ 
Kingdo$. . 
VSiio The United States has a 3,000 acre 
train.h1g. and transport· base with 5,000 military 
personnel at _Wheelus. Field, guaranteed under a 
treaty.of September 1954 until 1970. The United 
States .. 'has paid about $10m a year in return, 
of which a cWllulative total of $5.3m has been· 
in , military assistance grant aid, with excess 
stocks worth $810,000. Though tp.e United 
States has given a certain amount of equipment 
(l DC.3, 2 T-33s, with another 4 T-33s, 6 C-47s 
and 2 helicopters to come) the major provision 
has been in training.. There is a MAAG of 26 
military and l civilian (10 more .than last year), 
training army and air personnel. 31 Libyan 
·pilots have been trained in the United States 
at a cost of not less than $3m, with 51 now in 
training, and a planned total . of 151 more by 
1969. ·There is in addition a small civic action 
training_ programme, costing $4,000 in FY 1965. 
Some military personnel are also being tra~ed 
in the Italian, Greek and Turkish forces. 
~AGAS~ 
Frumceo Bilatey;al defence treaty with· France. 
Madagascar is the centre of a zone d'outre-mer. 
· It is planned to reduce the number of troops on 
the island to 2,500, most at Diego Suarez with 
a few at Antsirahe.. France has provided experts 
., . 
and $6m worth of military assistance. 
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UThto The _1st iGng'n African Rifles foamed ~rt. 
of tlbe JFederration Defence Worces and v,~1:rs-eqwppoo 
vJiili irumrns of Britinh origin from JFooeratlon .··_·. 
funds. There are 41 British officm and NCOB · 
on· secondment. Some of these are officers in the 
army of the c Aw, · \-vho hmving uanzferrted to the · · , 0 0 , 
British Anny, are now ~erving · for nvo ye81!r5 in 
Malawi on secondment. 
. ,·, 
15 cadets are receiving training in Britain. · 
France. France evacuated her 4 Mali bases in 
196l. 
USAo The MAP total of$2m ($1,300,000 delivered 
by mid 1964), with a MAAG of 4, does not.repre-
sent the full US aid effort in Mali. The USAF 
First Air Commando ( equivalent to anny Special 
JF Of£~) completed in 1963 a mi..\tSion . involving 
the training and equipment of a paratroop 
company at a cost of more than $2}m dollars. 
There was also in 1964 a 17 man· engineering 
mobile training team . 
US§Il\ -OJID.d\ lE11 l"etml'f®~o Russian and East 
European equipment h~. :been est~mated · at 
perhaps $3m. Troops are armed with Czech sub-
machineguns~- In addition, some officers have ·,:'>1:'·f~ 
trained in the USSR. '>; ·' .. : 
MAURITANIA 
France. Bilateral defence treaty· with France. 
Under the forthcoming redeployment, a detach- . 
ment of· the Dakar garrison of 2,500 men will 
be stationed at Atar, one of France's major 
West African air bases. 
The Mauritanian army and a small air force 
were built up with French aid and cadres. · 
MOROCCO 
PftUICe. The 18,000 French troops (mainly 
air · force engaged in training aircrew) were 
withdrawn and the French bases evacuated at 
Moroccan request in 1961. 
The Moroccan army is largely a French 
creation. It was started in 1956 with the gift 
of 1,500 motor-vehicles and much other equipment, 
550 NCOs were assigned to the Moroccan army 
and many Moroccans were sent to train in 
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F:rance. When the ait bases ,vere evacuated, 
236 French instructors, NCOs and technicians 
were sent to train Moroccan aircrew. France is 
said to provide 'considerable logistic support' 
lor the Moroccan armed forces. In addition 
she delivered son1e Fouga Magister aircraft in 
1963, probably a~ a gift. 
~~ The Spanish garrison in Morocco which 
amounted to 65,000 me_n in 1956, was withdrawn· 
to the two 'presidios' or enclaves of Ceuta and 
Melilla in 1961. 
Moroccan cadets · up to 100 a year· at ()ne 
time- have trained .at Spanish military academies. 
UK. Britain gave 25 locally-assembled Land 
Rovers to the army in April 1964. 
lUSAo Until the end of 1963, the United States 
maintained 5 major bases witll 18,000 American 
servicemen in Morocco. 
The programn1e of American military aid 
is worth $20m but d~liveries are bqdly behind 
schedule. The MAAG, \vith a strength of52 in 1963-
64 (now 41) is the second strongest in Africa. 
The army mission, sent under an agreement made 
at the end of 1959, and responsible inter alia for . 
training an air-portable security battalion, has 
largely completed its work and is being phased 
out. The air mission of IO pilots which has been 
training Moroccans · in the use and servicing of 
the 6 c .. I 19s· aI?-d 6 C-47s given by the United 
States, and on occasion flying the aircraft on 
uncontroversial supply missions, is to remain for 
the time being. 
USS1Flo Apparently after some hesitation, Morocco 
decided to take a considerable quantity of arms 
from the Soviet Union in 1962, in addition to 
the 12 MiG 17s and 2 MiG 15s purchased in the 
previous year. As· many as 70 Russian tanks, 
· 7,000 tons of ammunition and other vehicles 
were delivered in Septemoor 1962. Arms other 
than the MiGs were· obtained on · 12 year credits. 
NIGER 
France. Regional defence agreement with France, 
Dahomey and Ivory Coast. The 1,000 French 
troops at present in Niger will · be evacuated 
except for a small detachment of the Abidjan 
garrison at Niamey. 
The armed forces are French-equipped, with 
· French advisers. 
USA" A cumulative total of $57,000 of United 
~ ' , . 'i. 
States grant aid was ,giY¢1j' in FY 1961 and 1962. 
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NiGIElRillA 
~.n@a 14 naval personnel and 8 a1my officers 
are training 1 in Canada. 
~ffl!irny. Germany has been training the 
Nigerian air force since 1963. There is a military 
·mission of 70, and 90 Nigerians are training in· 
· Holstein. 
Germany is providing 26 trainers, 30 com-
munications planes and IO Nor atlas. transports. 
lTimdw.o There are some cadets in India and 
Indian officers (on contract) at the Kaduna 
mjlitary academy. India vvas unable to grant the 
Nigerian request to train her air force. 
UOCo Britain provided basic army ·equipment. 
before independence, and gave . 2 ships as the 
nucleus of a navy.' 
'fhe Anglo-Nigerian d~.fence · agreement of 
November 1960 which provided unrestricted 
overflying and staging facilities, was cancelled 
· as a political embarrassment in January 1962. 
This did not however affect the military relations 
of the two countries,. since in mid .. 1962 it \VaS 
reported that half the offi,cer corps was British, 
either on secondment or contract. ·· There are 
~JI 15 British officers and NCOs on secondment 
and 361 Nigerians training i!l .Britain .. 
US.Ao An American military assistance programme 
has been in existence since 1962. Deliveries 
total $229,000 out · of a reported programme of 
$394,000. 
Cadets are ~o training. in Australia, Ethiopia 
and Pakistan. 
RWANDA 
Belgium. Although it was originally intended 
that Belgian troops would remain for a time 
after inde~endence, unacceptable conditions were 
demanded by the government of Rwanda and 
Belgian troops withdrew almost immediately. 
26 Belgians ( 39 in 1965) remain to train a 900 
man army. 
The cost in -1964 · °"'·as l Om Belgian frana 
(S0.2m) and the estimate for 1965, 14m Belgian 
francs, ($0.28m). 
' .. 
SENEGAL 
France. Bilateral def~nce treaty with France. 
Senegal is the centre of a . zone d'outre-mer. 
The 5,000 French troops stationed at Dakar 
will be.reduced to 2,500 (including a detachment 
in Mauritania). ~· 
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France gave the equipment for the army, and 
a small navy and air force. 
USAo The United Stat.es has had a considerable 
programme, v1orth about $2.Sm since 1961, 
intend~d to train an engineer battalion for civic 
action .. About $2m of this aid. has already be~n 
spent~· In .. addition, Senegal has r~ceived most 
·or a gift of $12,000 of excess stocks. The number of 
MAP personnel in the country has risen to 7. 
§~ .ILJE(Q)N]E 
. . 
Nlgcnioo . Nigeria is providing some preligtln~ry 
officer training. 
UK. Britain provided basic equipment before 
independence. There are 23 British officers and 
N COs on secondment. 21 cadets . are training · iij ..... 
Britain. 
SOMALIA. 
Italy.· Italy made a joint offer with Britain of 
£300,000 of military ·aid, accepted by Somalia 
in January 1962. The joint offer with west 
Germany .. and· the United States -of $10-15m 
of military aid to build up an army of 5-6,000 
\men in 1963 was rejected in.favour of the Russian 
offer. 
UAR. The UAR provided rifles,. two trainers and 
a military training group in 1961. Cadets were 
· ·sent to Egypt. 
UK. Somalia accepted a joint British-Italian 
offer of £300,000 military aid in 1962. The 
equipment, which included 5 medium tanks, was 
delivered during 1962. 2 cadets are still training 
in Britain. 
-90-
....... 
,~rid most other arms suppliers ( Canada, Switzer-
land and ,vest Germany) by the beginning of 
1964. 
lFrreum«:eo . France supplied 16 Mirage , I/IC jet 
fighters in 1963 and . Panhard aqrhotired cars 
are manufactured under licenc~ in South Africa. 
French policy is not to supply arms vvhich can 
be used in defence of apartheid. Training assistance 
was probably given on the aircraft. 
UKo Under the Simonstovm agreement of 1957, 
the Simonstown naval base was· handed over to 
South Africa, but Britain retained base facilities 
that could be used in a ,var in which South Africa 
remained neutral. 1'\here _were about I 00 British 
naval personnel . at Simonsto'\Nn in mid-1963. 
The agreement provided for 'joint . seaward 
defence' and for the order in Britain· of £ 18 
million of naval vessels, all. delivered by the 
end of 1963. Certain schedules of the agreement 
have not been published, but the 6 Wessex· heli-
copte.rs delivered in February 1964 certainly, 
and .the 16 Buccaneers on order probably, did not 
come under this agreement. . 
It ,vas the policy of the Conservative govern-
ment 'not to export arms to South Africa which 
would enable the policy ·or . apartheid to be 
enforced'. The Labour government supp·orts 
an embargo on am1S, but will allow delivery 
of the 16 · Buccaneers on order. 
The question of aid does not, properly speaking, 
arise in these transactions since the difficulties 
are political rather than financial. 260 South 
Africans are receiving naval training in Britain. 
USA. Though the American-Italian-west German 
· offer of aid was rejected, the. United States retains . . SUDAN · 
something of a foothold in their training of the Germany. It is reported that a frontier defence 
large (5,000 man) and well-equipped police force. force of 6 b':.':ttalions, separate fro1n the army, 
USSR. In 1963 Somalia accepted a Russian is fitting· out·,,with (;erman equipment including 
credit of· £I l.7m of military aid (repayable mortars, vrhicles, workshops and a munitions 
over perhaps 20 years) intended to !;)uiltl up an factory. The programme \\'ill cost DM · 120m 
army of about 20,000 men with a modern air · ($26m) over 5 years, of ,vhich Germany will 
force. By February 1964 there were at least provide Dl\,1 80m ($19m). 
90 Somali cadets training in Russia, the first No traininll. mission has been reported. There 
MiG-l5s had been delivered, with Russian are 120 pilots and ground-crew training in 
technicians to. maintain them and · Russian Germanv. 
engineers to build an operational base. There UK. Until recently Bri~ain possessed unrestricted. 
are r~ported to be 70 Russian military instructors ·overflying rights for her military aircraft over 
in Somali camps. the Sudan. Ho\vever, the new Sudanese govern-
SOUTH AFRICA 
A total embargo on the -sale of arms. to South 
Afri~a had been imposed by· the United States 
14 
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ment has specifically forbidden aircraft destined 
for South Arabia and \\'ithdrawn the blanket 
clearance on all other flights. 
The army's basic· equipment is British. Since 
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1961 gifls of equipment worth £750,000 have 
I been made, including 4 jet Provosts, 9 Saladin 
troop-carriers arid 3 Ferret scout•cars. Britain 
has also given military and air force· training 
worth £67,000 in 1964-65 (£75,000 in 1963-64). 
There is an armv and RAF mission of about l 5 J 
men in the Sudan and 6 Sudanese ar~ receiving 
naval training in Britain. 
. . 
USAD The United States has provided military 
training facilities on a small scale. 
USSJFt Russia gave 5 armoured· cars and sold 
_25 troop-carriers to the Sudan in 1960. 
Yugo@llawne. Yugoslavia has provided a mission 
for naval training. 4: patrol boats were constructed 
for the Sudan in Yugoslav yards between 1960-62. 
~ /~4 TANZANIA 
Since Tahzania is the home of the liberation 
movements, there is a good deal of doubt about 
whether arms landc-d are destined for the l~an-
zanian armed forces or the liberation movements. 
a. Twmgmmryfilka 
_ / ·. 
Alge~o A shipload of obsolescent arfilS (probably 
of Chinese origin) \<\·as delivered ·in return for 
coffee in January 1964. When the arrival of 
these ~rms ,-vas accidentally announced, it was 
officially stated that they were intended for the 
army and not, as some reports claimed, for the 
liberation committees. 
-eauadlao 12 cadets are training in Canada. 
Canada has agreed to provide staff for a military 
academy in Tanzania. 
China. China has sent 7 instructors and 4 inter-
preters, intended, according to a statement by 
Dr Nyerere, to train Tanganyikans in the use of 
Chinese arms delivered before the Zanzibar 
revolution~ Unless ther~ is a shipment unaccounted 
for, it seems reasonable to assume that these 
arms vvere those delivered by Algeria. There 
are in addition reports that about 120 tons of 
Chinese arms were la;nded in early September. 
Mr Kamhona has_rece1;1tly deni'ed that Tanganyika 
was receiving any Chinese or Algerian arms. 
Eddopii21i Tanzania has accepted the offer of 
' . 
3 · vacancies fox- cadet training in Ethiopia. A 
detachment of the Ethiopian Air Force is stationed 
in Tanganyika. 
Gemm£l@.fo Germany has agreed to provide 
training and equipment worth DM 40m ($9.Sm) 
for a Tanganyikan air force. The Luftwaffe 
will send instructors and technicians and give 
' ' ....:,.:.,.; ·,~_ ...... -,.._ .1':;t"'.•'-' -: .-.• 
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30 aircraft, Do-27 and 28 communication aircraft 
and 6 Norat/as transports. 
Germany _is . also providing 6 coastal patrol 
boats and naval training for 36 Tanganyikans in 
Germany. 
Ilorraell. Israelv was approached to train the air 
force, but. withdr~w at .. her own request. 15 
;irmy officers and 5 pilots were trained in Israel 
in 1963. 
Swfflemt. Sweden was also approached · to train 
the air force but refused to do so because of other 
commitments. 
UKo The army received British basic equipment 
before independence. It was British commanded 
· and largely British officered until the mutiny. 
Tanganyika rejected Britain's proposals for military 
aid in March 1964 and all British officers have 
now been withdrawn. 17 Tanganyikan cadets 
are still being trained in the United Kingdoin. 
USSR. It was recently reported that a shipload 
of Russian ar~ including field artillery and 
A.A. guns was · 1andcd in Dar-es-Salaam in the 
first \veek of November. 
b. Zanzibar 
Cbinao LTnder an agreement made before Union 
in April 1964, about a dozen Chinese are training 
300 men in a camp at Mtoni. There is a large 
number of automatic weapons of Chinese and 
Russian origin on the island. 
1 • 
USSR. There are about 70 Russian and east 
German instructors training 600 Zanzibaris with· 
some Tanganyikan~. in a camp at Chukwani. 
In March 1964, 40 Russian trucks and track-
mounted A.A. artillery were landed. These may 
have been diverted from Somalia. 
TOGO 
France. Though no bilateral defence agreement 
was signed in 1960, Togo received some military 
aid and some French experts between 1960-63. 
Discontent among the 7-800 French colonial 
troops, given .by France in 1962, was partly 
respoi:isible for the c~up which overthrew President 
Olympio in January 1963. 
Under a defence and aid agreement ·signed in r,, 
I 
. July 1963, Togo received increas~d aid and 46 · 
French anny and police officers. 
TUNISIA 
Fnace. All French · troops were withdrawn 
from Tunisia by September 1958, with the 
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exception of the Bizerta base which was evacuated 
in October . 1963. 12 French officers were left 
behind to provide instruction on the base facilities. 
France has provided 2 helicopters, 7 ships and 
a s~U amount of naval training. 
Sw~ca~ Tunisia bought 15 Saab::Safirs in 1960-61. 
A training mission was provided at Tunisian _ 
expense. . 
Ult 2 Tunisian army cadets are training in the · 
United IGngdom. "'t 
UAllt, A_ mili~ry aid agreement was signed with 
the u AR in l 961, as a result of the Bizerta crisis, 
under which th~ ... u AR \vas to send military sup-
plies, but little or nothing· seems to have come 
of it. · 
· US.Ao Details of American aid to Tunisia, except 
for the presence of a MAAG of four men, are classi-
fied.· However, it is evident from the hearings on 
the _Foreign Assistance Act, that Tunisia .. turned 
to the United States in 1959 as a result of strained 
relations with France over Algeria, that deliveries 
of equipment began in I 960 and· were due. to 
· · end in 1964 ~nd that assistance included training 
in the Unit~ States. ]'hough the cost of the 
programme is classified, some indication of its 
size is given by the complaint in the House of 
. Representatives report of 1964 that the FY 
1963 programme for Tunisia had been· justified 
before Congress in l\1arch 1962 at $102,000 
but had risen to $256,000 a year later. The 
/ programme had by then begun to tail off: this 
figure represents only a fraction. of the total. 
UGANDA 
India. 6 cadets are to train in India. 
Israel. 15 army officers and 5 pilots were trained 
in Israel in 1963. Israel has now undertaken 
Uganda air arm training. 
Pam.§~$ l cadet is to train at the Pakistani · 
staff college. 
UK. Uganda received British basic equipment 
before independence. All British officers have 
now been withdrawn. 31 Uganda army personnel 
are training in Britain. 
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UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC 
UK., 10 Egyptians are receiving naval training in 
Britain .. 
i!J §§ 1\ a.w..ml CE~h@ail@vnTI:dl~. Though the army 
and navy still retain some British equipment, 
since the Egyptian-Czech arms deal of 1955 
the Egyptian armed forces have been equipped 
o~ a lavish scale. by the Russians and Czechs (for inventory, see African Military Balance p. 11). 
• A recent estimate of the experue at about $750m 
is probably not far from the truth. The arms 
were supplied at 60 per cent of cost and paid 
for in cotton over 12 years at 2 per cent interest. 
It was recently reported that 50 per cent of 
the Eygptian cotton crop was committed to 
Russia and East Europe in payment for arms and 
agricultural machinery. 
Mr Khrushchev remarked during his visit 
/ 
to ·Aswan in 1964 that Russia would supply arms... 
'if you ask for them', though the details were 
unspecified. :,\' 
UPPER VOLTA 
France. Upper Volta refused to sign a bilateral 
defence treaty with France or to accept French 
bases on her soil. Howeve.r, under a regional 
defence treaty, Volta agreed to provide such 
facilities as might be necessary to carry out the 
quadripartite agreement, and to accept French 
assistance in building up an army. , 
USA. The United States has given grant aid 
' for civic action equipment worth $62,000. 
ZAI\l.mJIA 
Under the arrangements preceding the break-up 
of the Central African Federation, Zambia 
received a small nun1ber of non-combatant 
aircraft for her share of the CAF air force, and 2 
battalions for the army . 
Canadl.ao 2 arn1y cadets are in Canada. 
UK. The army has British basic equipment. 
3·7 officers and N COs are on secondment from ·· 
the British army (some of these transferred 
from the Federation's to the British a1my; in 
order to serve on secondment for two years). 
23 Zambian cadets are training in the United 
Kingdom. 
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Suze of Army 
50,000 
CONGO-lEOPOLD'lfllLE :J 29 000 
~· , 
,, 
. J 
. -
. Date oi 
Ta?mover 
June 19, 1965 
. November 25, 1965 
1 
. /!, _ ',) ,- ' • 
~··,·.1 r. \ 
II 
Deposed laaderis) 
President Ahmed Ben Bella · 
President Joseph Kasavubu 
Reason for llcUora 
To end Ben Bella's personal rule, "adventuris·m,n and 
"morbid love of power." Underlying factors: deepen-
ing economic crisis, Ben Bella's efforts to curtail 
Boumedienne's authority and that of other lieutenants, 
rumors of Boumedienne's imminent dismissal· under 
pressure from President's Marxist advisers, recent rec-
onciliation with avowed internal foes of Army. 
"To save the country from anarchy and chaos." Under-· 
lying factors: governmental paralysis resulting from 
parliamentary deadlod< between supporters of J{asa· 
vubu and Tshombe; Army's concern at rumored feelers 
by Kasavubu for rapprochement with Gbenye-f{anza 
rebels; precedent of previous military intervention in 
,,, 1960. 
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DAHOMEY · ;December 22, 1965 President Tahirou Conga-
cou (installed December 7 
as Army-sponsored provi-
sional chief of state pend-
ing elections) 
C) 
11To establish a new style of politics in which people 
would unite around a program and not around a few 
personalities." Underlying factors: debilitating parlia-
mentary deadlocrt between factions loyal to former 
Presidents Hubert Maga and· Migan Apithy, and Vice 
President. Justin Ahomadegbe; precedent of previous 
military intervention in 1963; ·regionalism, exacerbated 
by economic difficulties and· governmental corruption, 
threatened civil strife. 
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CENTRAL- AFRICAN 
REPUBUC 
450 . January 1, 1966 
-
President David Dacko To "abolish the bourgeoisie" and end economic class 
~istinctions. Actual reasons unclear; underlying factors 
may be discontent with military appropriations, rumors 
of plans for Boftassa's dismissal, governmental corrup-
tion, unrest over new austerity program effectively 
cutting government salaries. by 20 percent,· and fear of 
allegedly growing Chinese influence on "You·ng Turks" 
in administration. 
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UPPER VOLTA 1,200 
NIGERIA 8,000 
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January 3, 1966 
January 15-,16, 1966 
President Maurice 
Yameogo 
President Nnamdi Azikiwe, 
Prime Minister Sir .Abu0 
baf<ar Tafawa Balewa , 
1,,: 
'i' 
"To safeguard republican and democratic institutions Ii 
,j 
and avoid bloodshed" _following 4 days of union-led · ,. t; 
strikes and rioting against mandatory wage cuts insti· t 
Ji; 
tuted by Yameogo. Underlying factors: labor opposition [•!• 
to Vameogo's one0 man government, to l\f!ossi political i 
predominance, and to close ties with more conserva.. l 
tive French-speafdng states. f' ~ 
Small group of middle-grade officers launched revolt in 
federal and two regional capitals {Lagos, l(aduna, Iba· 
dan) on January 15. f oUowing seizure of Balewa and 
. assassination of two regional premiers, civilian Cabinet 
handed · over power. to General Aguiyi-lronsi, who ap-
pare.ntly was not privy to original coup attempt but 
reached compromise with its leaders. Stated purpose 
of revolt was "to end corruption, nepotism, gangster0 
ism, and violence." One immediate cause ,~Jas con-
tinuous unrest in lfJestern Region following rigged elec0 
tions of October 1965. 
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. Preseni Status and tVhereabouis of 
tnusied !Leadership 
Ben Bella in Army confinement at undisclosed 
location, but said to be in good health. ~Jiany 
former Ministers in new government. 
' 
' 
Kasavubu and other deposed poJiticians "free '.to 
do wh~t they want." Both J{asavubu and Tshombe 
retain their parliamentary seats. 
Former leaders are not detained. 
. ,,. . . 
. ..-~·· ,a~ ;·. ', . 
. . 
Dacko in detention. His Ministers briefly under 
. arrest, but subsequently released. 
• 
Yameogo~ who thrice urged Army to intervene to 
preclude · more serio4s crises, said he was "first 
to rejoice" at military takeover. No known deten .. 
tions e}(cept Yameogo and former Minister of 
Interior Denis Yameogo. House protection of 
other Ministers. . Middle-level officials continue 
normal duties. 
President Azikiwe, in London at time of the coup, 
has not retlirhed. Prime Minister Balewa, Western 
Region Premier Chief S. L. Altintola, Northern 
Region Premier Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Belio, and fed-
eral Minister of Finance Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh 
assassinated. Eastern Region Premier M. t Ok-
para and some 80 former federal Ministers at 
liberty. 
AIHUCA n!EPORT, FEBRUARY 1966 
Colonel Houari Boumedienne, 42, Minister of 
Defense and Army commander under Ben 
Bella; now': in addition- President and Prime , 
Minister. 10 
Lieutenant-General Joseph Mobutu, 35, com-
mander in chief of the Armes n"1iuomde con .. 
golaise under Kasavubu; no~J President and 
Minister of Defense. Brigadier General Leon-
ard Mulamba is Prime Minister and ANC 
commander. 
General Christophe Soglc}, 56, Army chief of 
staff; now President and Prime Minister. 
(Note: Soglo forced the resignations of Presi-
dent Apithy and Vice President Ahomadegbe 
on November 29, 1965 and sponsored th1 . abortive provisional presidency of Tahirou' ! 
Congacou. Hence his assumption of power 
might be dated from November 29.} 
Colonel Jean Bedel Bokassa, 44, professional 
soldier and Army chief of staff; now Presi-
dent and Prime Minister, and Minister of 
Defense and Justice. He is. Dacko's cousin, 
and a nephew of the late Barthelemy Bog-
anda, father of CAR nationalism. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Sangoule. Lamizana, 50, 
professional soldier and Army chief of staff; 
now also chief of state. 
Major-General Johnson T. 0. Aguiyi-lronsi, 
41, Army commander; now President of 
Federal Military Government. 
• •• -.-.n - ·-· . .___._ ec ' - l::! ........... ·.LJ .. DD,, • lJ . lJ LJ LJ. lJ lJ L...J. . lJ LJ lJ L\yj .. -- ' ' ', ' ... ·. ----=-- F-'s: - . ·: 
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Post-Coup Constitutional and 
Structur~! Changes 
1963 constitution, National Assembly, . and flN 
Political Bureau "suspended." Col,egial leadership 
invested in 26-man Consenl naUonai . de la rlvolM· 
tion which guides 20-man Council of Ministers. 
FLN being restructured to "animate and direct'' 
rather than substitute for government. 
Scheduled 1966 Presidential election cancelled; 
basic principles of 1964 . constitution cdrifilmed;_ 
22-man civilian "government of national union" 
embraces all regions and·· factions. Mobutu says he 
plans to rule for 5 years by decrees having force 
of law unless rejected. by Parliament. 
.. 1964 lonstitution suspended; · National Assembly, 
political parties, and municipal, district, and village 
councils dissolved; 9-man "government of techni-
. cians" includes 2 military; mixed 25-man· "National 
Renovation Committee," including ministers, to 
guide government action and communicate between 
Army and people. , 
Constitution . abrogated; National Assembly dis-
solved; new· JO-man cabinet {or "Revolutionary 
Council") includes 3 civilian holdovers, 3 military.· . 
, 
. ~ 
Constitution suspended, National ,Assembly dis-
solved "until circumstances allow republican insti-
tutions to resume functioning." In provisional gov-
ernment of 7 military and 5 civilians, Lamizana is 
President of the Republic and Prime Minister, and 
rules by decree for "interim period." 
Constitution abrogated; federal and regional legis-
latures suspended; offices of President and Minis-
ters abolished. Supreme Military Council and fed· 
eral Executive Council, both under Aguiyi-lronsi, 
ruf e through military governors in each region (re-
named zones). Civil Service operating under perma-
nent secretaries. 
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